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Abstract 
There exists a critical mass in research related to adaptive protection 
approaches that address some of the shortcomings of conventional protection 
functions. This is in response to concerns in the reliability of conventional 
protection which manifested itself in some severe disturbances in more recent 
years. Despite the fact that adaptive protection offers a compelling technical 
solution to some of these performance problems, the industry has not widely 
adopted adaptive protection approaches as a de facto policy for future 
protection scheme implementations. 
This is attributed to the difficulties associated with the testing of such schemes 
where no significant work has been reported yet. Furthermore, the benefits vs. 
the risks associated with such a protection strategy are not well understood. 
This is coupled with the conservatism towards radical changes in the way the 
power system is operated. As such the work reported in this thesis 
complements the existing body of research in order to address some of the 
major technical and institutional challenges associated with adopting adaptive 
protection schemes for future networks, especially those networks that exhibit 
flexibility in operation to deal with uncertainty in generation and to maximise 
asset utilisation. These are network characteristics that adaptive protection 
approaches are seen to be an effective enabler of. 
This thesis focuses on formal structural and behavioural modelling of adaptive 
protection schemes as means to effectively validate their functional operation 
and verify their performance. Novel contributions have been made in 
formalising a user requirements driven architecture for these schemes. 
Furthermore, significant contributions have been made to conducting formal 
algorithm verification that complements inherently limited standard protection 
scheme validation techniques. The thesis makes thorough use of a proposed 
adaptive distance protection scheme for circuits with quadrature booster 
transformers to communicate the challenges, lessons learned and contributions 
in designing, implementing and testing adaptive protection schemes. 
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1 Introduction 
 
 
 
1.1 Research context and justification 
pproaches to power system protection are under scrutiny for mal-
operation and shortcomings in performance which leave the power 
system exposed during dynamic and stressed system operating 
conditions. The dynamic system operation and the uncertainties brought with it 
were some the main focuses of the research consortium SUPERGEN FlexNet that 
funded the research reported in this thesis. These operational challenges have 
been echoed by the protection research community that identified a number of 
issues that affect the performance of protection schemes. Such issues include: 
 Topological changes in the power system and transmission and distribution 
levels result in changes in fault levels that affect the operating times or even 
the sensitivity of protection or changes fault paths that affect the 
coordination of protection [1, 2]. 
 The impact of power electronic generator and energy storage interfaces on 
the fault levels seen by protection which can affect their sensitivity especially 
in islanded power system operation [3, 4]. 
 Operating the power system with lower inertia due to the connection of large 
levels of wind generation, in addition to the increased utilisation of the 
transmission network can result in more forceful system disturbances. This 
can affect the performance of system protection especially those relying on 
system frequency to operate [5, 6]. 
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One of the approaches to improve the protection functionality, as proposed in 
the literature, relies on adaptive techniques. These involve dynamic changes in 
the protection functionality to reflect the state of the power system at any given 
time. These dynamic changes in protection configuration are governed by 
specially designed and often bespoke logic. This logic can rely on simple 
mappings between system states and new protection configurations or more 
complex arrangements that utilise intelligent systems or optimisation 
techniques [7, 8]. System operators are also expressing interest in adaptive 
protection. Smart grid projects funded by the low carbon network fund (LCNF) 
scheme consider adaptive protection in their demonstration [9]. But the more 
pressing issue is that the philosophy of adaptive protection was never fully 
embraced by the power system operators despite the clear performance 
enhancements that they provide and the clear need to achieve such 
improvement in performance. 
There are some fundamental problems related to adaptive protection that are 
not being addressed sufficiently or are being outright ignored. For instance, 
issues related to testing the adaptive schemes out with a set of very specific case 
studies are rarely discussed. No standard or widely accepted approaches to 
testing exist. Furthermore, the requirements development for adaptive 
protection schemes is fairly basic despite it being an important prerequisite for 
scheme validation and verification. Furthermore, it is important to consider the 
implications of gradually introducing more adaptive protection schemes 
alongside more conventional approaches to protection. As such, there must be 
strategies for non-intrusive integration of these protection schemes to 
substations as well appropriate revisions for related utility policies. 
To this end, the work reported in this thesis complements the body of research 
related to adaptive power system protection. This is achieved by identifying the 
barriers to the adoption of such techniques and approaches to facilitate their 
adoption where needed. In doing so, this thesis answers three pertinent 
research questions: 
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 How much flexibility can adaptive protection provide and where can it be 
applied without adding an unmanageable level of uncertainty to the power 
system operation? 
 How can adaptive protection functions be integrated in a substation without 
the need for an overhaul in protection scheme design or equipment? 
 How should the testing methodology for adaptive protection be approached 
in order to de-risk the behaviour of such schemes? 
1.2 Research main hypothesis and contributions 
The following statements describe the main research hypothesis: 
Power systems that are operated in a flexible manner necessarily require 
protection schemes that display flexible operating characteristics. Adaptive 
protection techniques strategically integrated within substations can deliver the 
required level of flexible operation without jeopardising required performance 
levels. 
From these statements, a number of sub-hypotheses are examined throughout 
the course of this thesis: 
 Existing protection scheme testing practices are not sufficiently effective in 
validating the overall adaptive scheme functionality and existing practices 
must be complemented but not completely revamped. 
 In order to de-risk the adaptive protection functionality, a description of its 
behaviour is required such that it takes into account the state of the power 
system, the configuration of the protection scheme and dynamic interactions 
between both systems. 
 Achieving the flexibility required from adaptive protection can be achieved 
effectively through functional integration with existing relaying platforms 
and conventional protection elements.  
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The development of a lab based adaptive protection using commercial distance 
protection functions and substation automation equipment served as a vehicle 
to test the hypotheses made earlier. To this end, four main novel contributions 
have been made. These are: 
 An experimentally validated adaptive distance protection scheme has been 
developed. It is based on dynamic settings group selection to improve the 
performance of distance protection in the presence of quadrature booster 
transformers (QB). This provides an improvement in reach of up to 20% for 
distance zones that are affected by the under-reach effect of the QB. 
 The adaptive protection architecture proposed in previous work, which is 
adopted by the developed adaptive distance protection scheme, was 
formalised and validated using a system’s engineering approach. This 
considered the functional requirements of an adaptive protection scheme 
over its lifecycle and utilised model based design using Simulink to create 
platform independent adaptive protection functions. 
 Limitations in the standard method of hybrid modelling abstraction (which is 
used in this thesis to model the behaviour of the adaptive protection) were 
overcome. This was achieved by extending the behavioural model to 
accommodate concurrent control loops which encompasses the adaptive 
protection functionality. 
 A powerful approach to formally verify the logic of adaptive protection 
schemes has been demonstrated. This method is based on a novel application 
of reachability analysis (safety property verification) to adaptive protection 
that utilises the developed hybrid behavioural model. 
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1.4 Thesis outline 
The remainder of the thesis chapters are laid out as follows: 
Chapter 2 – a review of power system protection fundamentals is presented in 
this chapter. This chapter focuses on distance protection and loss of mains 
protection as these protection concepts are revisited over the course of the 
thesis. The chapter also presents recent advances and emerging approaches to 
protection including wide area protection systems based on synchrophasor 
measurement technology and the application of the IEC 61850 international 
standard to substation automation. The chapter also discusses different 
methods for the testing of protection schemes and highlights some of the 
challenges associated with the testing of new approaches to protection. 
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Chapter 3 – claims of conventional protection performance shortfalls have been 
substantiated in this chapter through a combination of literature review, 
simulations and laboratory testing. The chapter focuses on protection 
performance issues that stem from the varied and flexible operation of future 
power systems. Simulations conducted have quantified the effect quadrature 
booster transformers have on the reach of distance protection. Furthermore, the 
performance of loss of mains protection (mainly ROCOF) was evaluated using 
secondary injection testing. The chapter finally asserts that to overcome 
protection performance challenges caused by flexible power system operation a 
flexible approach to protection is required. 
Chapter 4 – this chapter reviews adaptive protection methods as an approach to 
provide the required flexibility for protection scheme functionality and thus 
enhance its performance. This review focuses on adaptive protection techniques 
that improve the selectivity or coordination of protection schemes. By 
recognising the technical and institutional challenges facing the adoption of an 
adaptive protection strategy, the chapter identifies the scope adaptive 
protection functionality where it is considered most applicable. The chapter 
finally provides a preliminary design for an adaptive distance protection 
scheme based on multiple settings groups to address problems identified in the 
previous chapter. 
Chapter 5 – a systems engineering based approach to adaptive protection is 
presented here. It focuses on developing life-cycle functional requirements for 
adaptive protection schemes which are reflected in a formalised adaptive 
protection architecture. An architecture compliant design and implementation 
of the adaptive distance protection scheme is presented. Hardware in the loop 
testing is used to validate the scheme in full view of the developed requirements 
and architecture. 
Chapter 6 – this chapter develops a behavioural representation of adaptive 
protection functionality using hybrid systems modelling which combines 
discrete and continuous system dynamics in a finite automaton. It focuses on 
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using this behavioural representation to extract a measure of adaptive 
protection performance (adaptive protection safety) and verify it using 
reachability analysis. The adaptive setting logic used by the distance protection 
scheme developed in the thesis was verified using reachability analysis. 
Chapter 7 – the main thesis conclusions are presented in this chapter with a 
focus on contributions made to the power system protection community and 
the systems verification body of research. Future directions of research have 
also been identified with focus on applying the modelling and testing 
methodologies developed in this thesis to wide area protection schemes. 
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2 A Modern Perspective on Power System Protection 
 
 
 
2.1 Chapter methodology and contributions 
odern substation technologies provide the building blocks for the 
realisation of new and improved protection techniques and 
systems. This chapter examines the fundamental concepts and 
recent developments in power system protection practices. A brief explanation 
of distance protection principles is included as it will be revisited in later 
chapters of the thesis. Other functions will not be discussed in detail as they 
have been treated exhaustively in previous theses and related textbooks. Focus 
will also be placed on the emerging concepts of the digital substation and wide 
area protection systems. Finally, the testing of protection schemes will be 
discussed while identifying potential shortfalls of existing testing practices. This 
will be used as a springboard for the development of improved functional 
testing methodologies in later chapters. All protection functions discussed in 
this chapter are based on numerical methods. 
The main contributions of this chapter are: 
 Review of emerging approaches to power system protection including 
those utilising synchrophasor technologies and digital substation 
functions. 
 Discussion of limitations in protection system testing practices in coping 
with scheme developments and new functional requirements. 
 
M 
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2.2 Power system protection principles 
Although protection systems represent a 5% capital investment of the overall 
power system [1], they are considered a fundamental operational component. 
Without protection schemes, power systems cannot be operated in a stable, 
secure or reliable manner. Different protection functions are deployed in 
transmission and distribution networks. This is mainly due to the more 
stringent stability requirements placed on transmission networks [2]. 
Consequently more complex scheme configurations are found on transmission 
networks in addition to redundant schemes. Distribution networks on the other 
hand require more cost effective protection solutions due to the sheer volume of 
feeders and network assets that need to be protected [3]. 
Recent developments in distribution network automation in addition to the 
increased penetration of DG are stimulating more interest in distribution 
network protection [4]. This particular field has seen growth in research activity 
which led to the development of many improved protection functions including 
those dealing with protection performance issues arising from islanded 
network operation [5], changes in network topology [6], increased use of power 
electronics in generator interfaces [7], etc. 
2.2.1 Unit-based protection 
Zones of protection are used to define the areas of the primary system which 
are protected by a specific protection function. In a unit-based protection 
scheme (current differential for example), the zone of protection boundary is 
defined by the instrument transformers used to measure the current flow 
through the protected feeder as shown in Figure 2-1. Such schemes are mostly 
applied to transmission networks where the cost of required communications is 
justified. These schemes are also highly selective in their operation. However, 
they may suffer from instabilities if current transformers are saturated due to 
high through fault currents [8]. This can be mitigated by the use of new sensing 
technologies such as Rogowski coils, hall effect sensors or optical current 
sensors. These are referred to as non-conventional instrument transformers 
(NCITs) [8]. More recent developments make use of optical fibre Bragg gratings 
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to directly measure the line quantities without intermediate electrical/optical 
transformations. This allows for faster acquisition of line current from different 
points on the line using the same optical fibre [9]. 
 
Figure 2-1 A typical current differential protection scheme showing zone of protection 
Digital current differential protection relies on communications to exchange 
measurements made across the protection zone boundary. Dedicated point to 
point communications links are commonly used for this purpose. Such links’ 
latencies can be characterised so that corresponding measurements made at 
different physical points can be compared at the same time regardless of 
communications channel delay. Alternatively, the delay compensation 
algorithms (e.g. ping pong method) can be used to dynamically calculate this 
delay and compensate for it [10]. With the advent of non-deterministic packet 
switched communications networks, compensating for channel delays becomes 
more problematic. To tackle this problem, GPS synchronisation can be used 
were each measurement can be tagged with a GPS time stamp [11]. Therefore, 
only corresponding measurements are compared. When backhaul 
communications infrastructure is used for exchanging measurements, routing 
technologies such as IP/MPLS (Internet Protocol/Multi-Protocol Label 
Switching) can guarantee the communications quality of service by prioritising 
protection traffic [12]. 
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2.2.2 Non-unit based protection 
Non-unit protection schemes can be found in both transmission and distribution 
networks. These rely on local measurements made by instrument transformers 
to inform the protection functions. Such functions include overcurrent and 
distance protection. The latter will be discussed in detail in the following section 
due to its relevance to the remainder of the thesis. 
Overcurrent protection is mostly applied in distribution networks due to its 
simplicity. It is however also used in transmission networks as a backup 
protection function. Phase or earth faults are detected by simply measuring the 
current at the relaying point and comparing that with a predetermined pick-up 
setting. To achieve selectivity in operation, time delays or fault levels or a 
combination of both are used. The latter method is most commonly used and is 
achieved using an inverse definite minimum time (IDMT) characteristic as 
shown in Figure 2-2. The IDMT characteristic ensures that faster operation is 
achieved with higher fault currents. A time setting multiplier is used to 
coordinate the operation of relays in series (R1-R3) which creates a grading 
margin. The grading margin is selected based on breaker operating times, errors 
in the protection system and the overall acceptable operating time for the 
specific network. 
 
Figure 2-2 Radial distribution network showing grading between IDMT characteristics to achieve 
selectivity between overcurrent protection relays 
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One of the main issues facing the application of overcurrent protection is the 
increased penetration of distributed energy resources (DER) as well as changes 
in operation practices such as islanded network operation or the dynamic 
changes in network topology. These network operating conditions and their 
impact on protection performance will be examined further in chapter 3. 
Overcurrent protection reach depends on fault type and source impedance [8, 
13]. Thus its application as a main protection function to transmission lines is 
undesirable since non-selective operation can have a detrimental impact on 
system stability. Therefore, a protection method that is mostly independent of 
variable fault currents is necessary. Distance protection is an example of such a 
protection method. 
2.3 Distance protection 
Distance protection is mainly used in transmission systems. It is applied, to a 
lesser extent, in meshed distribution systems to improve selectivity with a 
faster operating time [14]. Distance protection relies on the simple principle 
that the protected line impedance is proportional to its length. Therefore, by 
measuring (or more practically calculating) the protected line impedance, a 
fault can be identified by monitoring changes in the impedance. These changes 
can then be compared with impedance characteristics to determine the need to 
operate or restrain [14]. Multiple distance relays can be made part of a 
communications based scheme. Such schemes are used to overcome reach 
issues or accelerate tripping of time delayed distance relays. 
2.3.1 Elements, characteristics and polarisation 
Distance protection relies on both current and voltage measurements in order 
to obtain the apparent impedance of the circuit at the relaying point. This is 
then compared with the relay settings which represent the distance protection 
reach (or protection zone boundary). A distance protection algorithm consists 
of  six of these impedance calculation elements which correspond to each fault 
type in a three phase system – that is AG, BG, CG, AB, BC and CA short circuit 
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faults for an ABC three phase system where G represents ground. The apparent 
impedance is calculated as in (1, 2) [15]: 
Earth fault: 
          (       )       (1) 
Phase fault: 
         (         ) (       )     (2) 
Where       is the apparent impedance calculated by the relay for a phase to 
ground fault,          is the apparent impedance in a phase to phase fault 
situation,     is the phase voltage,    is the line current,    is the zero sequence 
current and    is the a compensation factor used to compensate for the zero 
sequence current present during an earth fault [16]. More details on this factor 
will be given in the following section. Close up faults resulting in a large 
depression in measured voltage, below the minimum voltage level required for 
a reliable measurement, can result in incorrect identification of the faulty 
phases. This is problematic in single pole tripping schemes. To overcome this, 
phase selection logic is used. One method of realising phase selection is based 
on comparing pre and post fault quantities to determine the amount of step 
change to accurately identify the faulted phases [8]. 
Several operating characteristics exist for distance protection. Modern 
numerical relays provide the ability to create a custom characteristic. However, 
the most common ones used are the Mho and quadrilateral characteristics. The 
MHO characteristic, as shown in Figure 2-3, is self-polarised. The voltage 
measurement is used to restrict fault detection to those faults that occur 
downstream of the relay. 
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Figure 2-3 Mho distance protection characteristic 
The area inside the characteristic is the operate region. The protected 
transmission line is inclined at its angle (e.g. 85° for a 400kV system with a 12 
X/R ratio). Polarisation using healthy phase voltages is not possible during a 
three phase fault. Therefore, memory polarisation is used to overcome this. In 
this case, recent measurements of the faulty phase that are stored in the relay 
memory prior to fault inception are used. For non-symmetrical faults, healthy 
phases not affected by the fault can be used for polarisation which is known as 
cross polarisation [8]. 
Quadrilateral characteristics are mainly used to address the under-reach 
problem caused by resistive earth faults or arcing faults [17]. The resistive 
reach of the characteristic can be adjusted independently of the reactive reach 
as shown in Figure 2-4. 
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Figure 2-4 Quadrilateral characteristic showing independently adjustable resistive and reactive 
reaches 
Plain (non-communications based) distance protection schemes are usually 
arranged in a stepped zone configuration (see Figure 2-5) to achieve remote 
backup functionality and, at the same time, coordinate with other distance 
schemes upstream of the relay. Each relaying point will usually have three 
active distance protection zones – zone 1, zone 2 and zone 3 (Z1–Z3). Each zone 
protects a predetermined circuit length and an appropriate time delay (e.g. t1 
and t2) to coordinate between the different zones. Typical zone settings are 
summarised in Table 2-1 [8]. Zone 3 can be offset by 20% of the protected line 
length in order to provide backup protection for the local busbar. 
 
Figure 2-5 Distance protection zones 
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Table 2-1 Typical distance protection zone settings [8] 
Distance Zone Settings 
Zone 1 80% of line impedance, instantaneous 
Zone 2 100% of line impedance + 50% of shortest adjacent line, 0.5s delay 
Zone 3 
120% of line impedance and longest adjacent line, 1s time delay 
20% of line impedance reverse reach 
 
Zone 2 is set such that it coordinates with the shortest adjacent line. If this is not 
taken into account then selective operation can be lost as shown in Figure 2-6. If 
Z2 of R1 is set such that it covers 50% of the longest adjacent line (dotted line in 
Figure 2-6), then it would overlap with Z2 of R2 resulting in loss of 
coordination. As such, Z2 for R1 may trip before Z2 of R2 for a fault between R4 
and the end of Z1 of R2 (fault position shown in Figure 2-6). Therefore, the 
dashed line represents the correct coordinated zone setup. 
 
Figure 2-6 Zone 2 coordination with shortest adjacent line 
2.3.2 Ground fault detection 
Distance protection settings are expressed using positive sequence quantities. 
Apparent impedance is also calculated in the same manner. Therefore, to 
accommodate ground faults, a compensation factor    is used in the calculation. 
This takes into account the ground loop impedance during a ground fault 
situation. Different relay manufacturers implement this compensation factor in 
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different ways. Therefore, it is important to refer to the relay documentation to 
ensure the correct settings of the factor.    for instance is normally calculated 
using the positive and zero sequence line impedances    and    respectively as 
in (3) [16]: 
   (    ⁄ )           (3) 
Alternatively, a residual compensation factor    can be used where       ⁄ . 
In this case, the measured ground fault impedance will depend on the residual 
current measurement    instead of the zero sequence current    used in (1) [16]. 
2.3.3 Communications based distance schemes 
The performance of distance protection schemes can be enhanced using 
communications channels. This is particularly useful in interconnected 
transmission circuits where faults at certain positions are not immediately 
cleared by zone 1 elements on both ends. Faster fault clearance times can be 
achieved through remote signalling. Two commonly used distance schemes are 
summarised in Table 2-2. 
Table 2-2 Common communications based distance schemes and their application [8] 
Scheme category Scheme types Principle of operation 
Transfer tripping 
Direct under-reach 
transfer trip, permissive 
under-reach transfer trip, 
permissive over reach 
transfer trip. 
An intertripping signal from the fault 
detecting end of the line is used to 
directly trip the remote end of the line 
to accelerate fault clearance. Additional 
checks can be applied including remote 
zone 2 pickup and directional checks. 
Overreach blocking 
Over reach blocking using 
zone 1, over reach blocking 
using zone 2. 
Lengthy fault clearance delays can be 
caused if the communication channel is 
faulty, so a combination of inverse logic 
and the pickup of overreaching zones 
are used.  
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2.3.4 Distance protection application issues and considerations 
Although distance protection is considered a mature protection method, a 
number of application challenges persist. These are briefly discussed here along 
with some advances aiming to tackle them. 
a) Load encroachment 
Load encroachment occurs when the apparent impedance caused by a circuit 
overload encroaches into the distance protection zones. This usually occurs 
with long transmission lines whose impedance is comparable to that of the load 
and is usually accompanied with a voltage depression. Load encroachment into 
zone 3 was one of the main events leading to the North American blackout in 
2003 [18]. Load blinders are usually used to deal with load encroachment. 
These eliminate the area of the distance characteristic prone to load 
encroachment as shown in Figure 2-7. 
 
Figure 2-7 Load blinders used to minimise load encroachment 
In a piece of work commissioned by NERC [19], it was concluded that if load 
blinders are used, transmission line loadability can be increased to 150% of the 
thermal rating while still providing adequate resistive fault coverage. 
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b) Multi terminal line arrangements 
Distance schemes applied to multi-terminal circuit configurations (as shown in 
Figure 2-8) are particularly challenging [20]. Different source infeeds from the 
circuit terminals affect the apparent impedance seen by the relay which may 
cause reach inaccuracies. For example, the fault contribution from the teed 
circuit for the fault illustrated in Figure 2-8 results in an increase in the 
apparent impedance measured at R1. Zone 2 set to protect the remote busbar B 
and beyond would then under-reach [8]. The reach of Zone 2 for R1 can be set 
to take into account the worst case infeed from the teed feeder. This may result 
in a large overreach when the infeed is switched off. An under-reach direct 
transfer trip scheme may also be used [8]. 
 
Figure 2-8 Distance protection of multi-terminal circuits 
c) Mutual coupling between parallel circuits 
Zero sequence mutual coupling between parallel lines during earth faults can 
result in under-reach [3, 21]. This is particularly problematic with un-
transposed lines. This can usually be addressed using additional current inputs 
from parallel circuits into the distance scheme to compensate for the coupling 
effect. Additional factors can affect the reach accuracy including earthing 
arrangements and the earthing or otherwise of de-energised parallel lines. 
Another compensation technique proposed in literature determines the state of 
the circuits involved and produces a correction factor accordingly [22]. 
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d) Circuits with Flexible AC Transmission Systems (FACTS) 
The connection of FACTS devices (e.g. series and shunt compensation) present a 
number of challenges, mostly reach related, when setting distance protection 
relays [23-25]. Transmission system operators usually deal with such problems 
on a case by case basis with through detailed system studies and manufacturer 
recommended settings [20]. Some of these issues will be picked up in chapter 3  
2.4 DER interface protection 
Engineering recommendations such as G59/2 [26] in the UK or IEEE 1547 
guidelines [27] stipulate the functions necessary to protect the DER. These 
differ according to the type of DER, the voltage level it is connected to and the 
country. [28] provides useful information on international practices related to 
the protection of DER. This section focuses on loss of mains (LOM) protection 
functions as it will be revisited in chapter 3. 
2.4.1 Loss of mains protection 
Loss of mains is the condition where a section of the distribution network is 
disconnected from the main grid and remains energised by installed DER. This 
islanded mode of operation is not currently permitted due to the following 
reasons [29]: 
 The islanded distribution network frequency may drift in relation to the 
main grid. Therefore, out of synch re-closures at the point of common 
coupling are a possibility unless check synchronism functionality is 
fitted. 
 Power quality usually cannot be maintained by DER. 
 Operational procedures normally assume that an islanded network is not 
energised which if it were not true would pose a safety risk to personnel 
working on this network. 
A surplus or deficit in generation capacity provided by the DER compared to the 
local load in the islanded network determines the ease of detecting a LOM 
condition. When these are not matched then voltage and frequency protection 
can be effectively used to detect LOM [8]. However, when generation and local 
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loading are closely matched then it is more difficult to detect the islanding 
event. Therefore, more specialised protection functions are included. The most 
commonly used functions are rate of change of frequency (ROCOF) and voltage 
vector shift (VS) [8]. 
ROCOF as the name suggests monitors variation in system frequency as an 
indicator for LOM. The rate of change of frequency     ⁄  can be calculated 
according to (4) over a three cycle window using measured frequency    [30]: 
    ⁄  
            
      
        (4) 
ROCOF can suffer from spurious tripping in response to remote disturbances. 
Such behaviour can lead to undesirable tripping of DER which can exacerbate 
system frequency disturbances [31]. A number of alternative solutions have 
been proposed to improve the stability of ROCOF such as CO-ROCOF which 
relies on communications to enhance the scheme performance [32]. Other 
communications-based protection algorithms in the research stage rely on 
internet [33] or satellite [34] communications to provide a reference frequency 
signal representing the frequency of the grid. 
Recent developments, that are undergoing field trials, include the phase angle 
drift (PAD) algorithm. This LOM protection algorithm relies on historical 
frequency data and an accumulator which, when it exceeds a pre-set threshold, 
results in a trip command [35]. 
2.5 System integrity protection schemes 
In addition to the protection against short circuits, there are schemes that are 
used to protect the overall integrity of the power system against certain events 
that usually lead to unstable transients, overloads or, in extreme cases, 
blackouts. These are called system integrity protection schemes (SIPS) [36]. The 
actions performed by system integrity schemes are designed based on extensive 
system studies. For example, frequency excursions lasting longer than a 
predefined amount of time usually trigger generation or load disconnection as 
appropriate. Failing to do so can result in loss of system synchronism. Similarly, 
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excursions in voltage limits (usually voltage depression) should be treated to 
avoid a system voltage collapse. This can be remedied by managing power flows 
or switching of FACTS [37]. The advent of wide area measurements promises 
more flexibility in available protection actions through the implementation of 
more advanced SIPS functions. 
2.6 Wide area measurement, protection, automation and control 
2.6.1 Synchrophasor measurement technology 
Collecting synchronised voltage measurements from remote busses was first 
discussed in [11]. The technology has since then developed significantly and 
currently relies on GPS (global positioning system) as a universal source of 
synchronising signals. These signals are used by phasor measurement units 
(PMU) to time stamp each measurement made for comparison at a later stage. 
The operation of PMUs is described in standard IEEE C37.118 [38, 39]. 
Synchrophasor measurement technology (SMT) consists of a number of building 
blocks which provide data measurement, collection, archiving and visualisation 
systems. SMT can be used in a range of applications, mainly in system 
monitoring where it is usually referred to as a wide area measurement system 
(WAMS) [40]. 
A number of real-time protection and control applications based on PMU 
measurements have been proposed. These, however, require further 
development and the appropriate infrastructure put in place including suitable 
communications networks and algorithms. These are usually referred to as wide 
area measurement protection and control systems (WAMPAC) [40]. Figure 2-9 
depicts a typical WAMPAC architecture. An extended version of this architecture 
can be found in [41], where WAMS can be utilised to perform adaptive 
protection functions to cope with variable power system operational states. 
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Figure 2-9 Typical WAMPAC architecture 
2.6.2 Protection applications of SMT 
SMT is seen as an enabler for more advanced system integrity protection 
functions. The ability to compare measurement from the wider network can 
enable greater flexibility and potentially more selective protection operation. 
Below is a list of some SMT based protection functions proposed in the 
literature [42]: 
 Predictive angular and voltage stability protection. 
 Fault localisation and classification. 
 Precise islanding detection. 
 Adaptive load shedding. 
 Real-time state measurement or estimation to enable further protection 
and control functions. 
It is envisaged that SMT technology can enhance dependable and secure 
performance of SIPS. By shifting the balance between these performance 
criteria when the system is normally loaded or under stress respectively, 
undesirable operation can be avoided [43]. 
GPS
PMU PMU PMU
LAN/WAN
PDC
Stability Analysis State Estimation
Energy 
Management 
System
PMU-assisted Short 
Circuit Protection
Substation
Primary Plant
(e.g. breakers, FACTS)
Synchrophasors & 
status indications
P
ro
te
c
ti
o
n
 &
 C
o
n
tr
o
l 
S
ig
n
a
lli
n
g
Trip commands
Measurements
PMU-assisted 
System Integrity 
Protection
49 
2.7 The digital substation 
The introduction of microprocessor based protection and control devices has 
enabled the delivery of more powerful and flexible functions. The term digital 
substation refers to the integration of these devices over communications 
channels. Intelligent electronic devices (IEDs) are considered the building block 
of digital substations. 
2.7.1 Intelligent electronic devices 
Relaying platforms have evolved from electromechanical based protection 
relays to multifunctional numerical functions implemented on IEDs. The latter 
offers a wide range of protection functionality within a single physical device 
along with more integration of monitoring and control functions. 
2.7.1.1 IED advantages over legacy relaying platforms 
Greater flexibility in protection scheme deployment is achieved due to a 
potentially large number of protection and automation functions that can be 
activated on any given IED. IEDs are based on embedded platforms that 
constitute modular hardware components. This means that upgrading a 
scheme’s I/O or hardware capabilities is a relatively straightforward task since 
complete hardware replacement is not necessary. Upgrades to the functionality 
can also be achieved through firmware upgrades. Figure 2-10 shows a typical 
hardware architecture of a modern IED [8, 10]. 
 
Figure 2-10 IED hardware architecture 
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The use of a numerical platform allows the use of advanced measurement 
techniques including adaptive digital filtering and adaptive frequency tracking. 
Consequently, protection algorithms can be more immune to adverse conditions 
such as harmonics. Furthermore, reliable operation can be maintained even at 
off nominal system frequencies [44]. Digital fault and event recording are 
standard features in protection IEDs. These enable the performance of post fault 
diagnostics to verify relay operation. IED now also integrate PMU measurement 
capabilities, a testament of a highly integrated and powerful substation 
automation platform. 
The ability to communicate remotely with IEDs is perhaps one of the most 
compelling benefits of the platform. Not only does this allow the remote 
interrogation of the relay status including the extraction of fault records, but it 
also allows remote configuration of the relay including the adjustment of its 
settings. 
Programmable scheme logic (PSL) is another useful feature of numerical relays. 
Device I/O in addition to internal function I/O can be mapped to a user specified 
logic diagram. This allows greater control over the behaviour of protection in 
more complex schemes. Flexibility in operation can also be achieved by 
specifying additional logic inputs to a protection element which contribute in 
determining the final state of the relay output (e.g. trip command). Figure 2-11 
shows a snapshot of a PSL taken from a commercial relay configuration 
software (ALSTOM’s MiCOM S1 Agile [45]). 
51 
 
Figure 2-11 Typical PSL diagram [45] 
2.7.1.2 IED reliability 
IEDs have built in features that enhance their reliability. For instance, the 
overall health of the hardware and software execution is monitored using 
watchdog functions and checksums [8]. These self-supervision features allow 
early detection of IED or auxiliary system faults by raising appropriate alarms. 
As a result, the mean time to repair (MTTR) is significantly reduced compared 
to standard maintenance cycles (1-5 years). Consequently, higher relay 
availability is achieved [46]. I/O supervision including current transformer (CT), 
voltage transformer (VT) and trip circuit supervision are also standard features 
of IEDs. Faults in any of these components can be identified and reported. 
IEDs also employ security measures such as multi-level password protection to 
prevent unauthorised access to the devices and unapproved changes in their 
configuration. These are important cyber security features as modern 
substations become increasingly accessible remotely and reliant on mainstream 
ICT technologies. 
Trip Signals
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2.7.2 IEC 61850 communications standard 
Proprietary communications protocols are very common among protection 
devices. This impeded further integration between devices from different 
manufacturers. Greater interoperability was desired by utilities such that 
scheme replacement costs are minimised and its process simplified. The IEC 
61850 is a standard for communications networks and systems in substations 
[47]. It aims to enable interoperability between devices from different 
manufacturers by specifying a data model and a mapping between the model 
and the underlying mainstream communications stack to perform required data 
exchange services. 
IEC 61850 emphasises functional abstraction by utilising the so called logical 
nodes (LN). Substation automation functions are decomposed into LNs which 
reside in physical devices (PD). LNs are effectively containers of data objects 
(DO) which can be exchanged between devices from different vendors. This 
hierarchy is illustrated in Figure 2-12. 
 
Figure 2-12 IEC 61850 functional hierarchy 
A typical substation architecture employing IEC 61850 is depicted in Figure 
2-13. The process bus is where measurement and control commands are 
exchanged in a digital format. Analogue measurements are digitised using 
merging units (MU) or NCITs and are transferred across the process bus at a 
high rate using sampled values (SV), the format of which is specified in the 
standard. This allows the sharing of measurements between different devices 
without the need for dedicated hardwiring between transducers and relays. 
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This provides significant cost savings in wiring. Measurement circuit 
redundancy can still be achieved by configuring the process bus in a ring 
arrangement. Tripping signals are exchanged using high speed GOOSE (generic 
object oriented substation event) messages. The station bus interconnects the 
protection and control bays with substation gateways and human machine 
interfaces (HMI). The nature of the communications at the station bus means 
they are not as time critical as those at the process bus and follows a client-
server approach. Data related to fault records and alarms are transferred across 
the station bus. 
 
Figure 2-13 Typical substation architecture utilising IEC 61850 
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information about the capabilities of the IEDs in the substation, their 
connectivity and the configuration of the primary system such as voltage levels. 
2.8 Functional testing of power system protection 
The testing of protection devices is important to ensure that they are capable of 
delivering the performance levels necessary for a safety critical application. 
There is a wide range of tests that are conducted by relay manufacturers and 
utilities and these are covered by international standards and testing 
procedures. The tests cover environmental, mechanical, electrical and 
functional aspects of the devices under test (DUT). This section will focus on 
functional testing since it will be revisited at a later stage in this thesis. 
Information on other types of tests can be found in [8]. 
2.8.1 Functional type testing 
Functional type testing involves applying appropriate inputs to the DUT and 
measuring the performance of the relay in response to these inputs. This is then 
verified against specifications described in international standards such as IEC 
60255 [48]. For instance, a standard inverse IDMT overcurrent protection 
element can be subjected to simulated short circuit currents, through secondary 
injection, to verify that the characteristic does indeed comply with the IEC 
60255 IDMT specifications in terms of operating times, pick up and drop off 
thresholds, accuracy limits, etc. 
2.8.1.1 Static type testing 
Secondary injection test amplifiers are used to apply inputs to the DUT and 
record their response. These are usually connected to a host PC with 
appropriate control software that automatically applies these tests. 
2.8.1.2 Dynamic type testing 
Dynamic type tests involve the use of a power system simulator to generate the 
input testing signals as well as receive the trip commands from the DUT. 
Nowadays, digital power system simulators are used to model the protected 
primary systems to a high fidelity. Analogue outputs can be reproduced 
faithfully and even contain high frequency information if necessary. These 
55 
simulators are equipped with analogue and digital I/O to interface with the 
DUT. Dynamic type tests are automated where the response of the DUT is 
recorded for later analysis and verification. Modern simulators also offer 
communications based interfaces such as IEC 61850 SV and GOOSE inputs and 
outputs. This enables the testing of relays compliant with the standard. Figure 
2-14 shows a schematic of a dynamic type testing arrangement. 
 
Figure 2-14 Dynamic type testing of protection relays 
2.8.2 Software type testing 
Software used to implement the protection functions must be tested thoroughly. 
This aims to ensure that software elements are error free and do not contain 
flaws in data structures or logic. Unit testing of software functions is performed 
to verify these functions against the software specification detailed by the 
manufacturer. The integration of different software elements is also tested to 
ensure that the software interfaces comply with the specification. Dedicated 
automated software testing tools are used for this purpose to ensure 
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is also tested. In this case, the operation of low level drivers is verified along 
with execution timings, I/O, etc [8]. 
2.8.3 Commissioning testing 
When a protection scheme is deployed in the field, a whole host of tests are 
conducted to ensure correct scheme connectivity, configuration and 
functionality. On site secondary and primary injection are conducted. The 
correct operation of the scheme is determined while at the same time ensuring 
that instrument transformer connections are also correct [8]. 
2.8.4 Shortfalls of existing testing practices 
The testing practices described above are suitable for existing applications and 
protection functions. However, as new developments in power system 
protection are introduced, new and improved testing procedures may be 
necessary [49]. Such changes include: 
 Introduction of adaptive protection functions. 
 Further integration between protection and control functions. 
 Protection functions become more reliant on communications. 
Lack of testing standards to deal with some of these changes is one of the main 
issues. Existing standards may not need to be replaced, but they can certainly be 
complemented to accommodate new functions and substation configurations. 
The aforementioned changes introduce an additional layer of variable 
performance that must be verified prior to deployment.  
To this end, a comprehensive suite of tests may need to be devised in order to 
deal with emerging changes in protection practices. If more complex functions 
are to be deployed, then the utilities will have less visibility of the intricacies of 
the scheme. Therefore, it is necessary to develop accessible tools for the 
protection engineers. It may then be necessary to provide more contextual 
information about test configurations and test reports. For instance, instead of 
having to deal with low level protection scheme configuration, a user may select 
test scenarios customised for a certain power system operating condition. The 
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test system would then select the appropriate scheme configuration and test 
scenarios to verify the required functionality. 
Conventional testing practices of wide area protection schemes may prove 
difficult. For instance, planning outages for several substations involved in a 
WAMPAC scheme for commissioning is impractical. Therefore, alternative 
means of testing may be necessary. Perhaps more emphasis should be placed on 
offsite verification procedures. 
2.9 Chapter summary 
The art and science of protective relaying continues to evolve. New functional 
and performance requirements emerge to achieve greater integration and to 
address some performance issues. One of the most important features of power 
system protection in the past decade is the push for device interoperability and 
more reliance on communications networks. 
This chapter reviewed some of the fundamentals of power system protection 
while emphasising distance and LOM protection as they will be revisited in later 
chapters. Recent system blackouts have stimulated a lot of activity in wide area 
protection schemes in an attempt to devise protection functions which minimise 
erroneous behaviour under stressed system conditions and even avoid unstable 
transients. 
The testing of new protection devices has also seen major steps forward 
especially with modern IEDs. However, as new functions emerge especially 
those dealing with wide area phenomena, testing requirements must be revised. 
Furthermore, new tools may be necessary to deal with some of the complex 
configurations of new protection schemes. 
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3 Evaluating the Performance of Existing Protection Schemes 
under Flexible Primary System Operation 
 
 
 
3.1 Chapter methodology and contributions 
rotection scheme performance is increasingly suffering due to the 
influence of primary and secondary system conditions and defects 
respectively, with varying impact, and it is important to provide 
flexibility in protection behaviour in order to cope with such deterioration in 
performance. This is the underlying hypothesis of the chapter which requires 
understanding the nature of the conditions affecting the performance of 
protection schemes and demonstrating their impact. This consequently enables 
assessing the appropriateness of flexible protection scheme behaviour as a 
means of enhancing their performance. 
The previous chapter reviewed power system protection and its importance to 
system integrity. It also included recent developments in protection schemes 
and digital substations which increasingly make use of communications 
channels. Furthermore, the chapter also highlighted some of the most recent 
changes and improvements made in certain protection schemes to cope with 
changes in the primary system either due to common use of FACTS (or similar 
devices), more frequent changes in network topology, wide-area disturbances 
and increased utilisation of DER. 
This chapter therefore reviews the impact these changes have on existing 
protection schemes as well as the potential impact future trends in power 
system operation have on the performance of these schemes. This review 
specifically qualifies the impact these have on protection from the point of view 
of flexible power system operation which is becoming an increasingly common 
P 
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approach to operating a stressed primary system while minimising major 
reinforcements. By understanding the nature of the impact these system 
changes have, opportunities for improving the performance of protection 
schemes can be duly identified. The provision of sought after improved 
performance is argued to be through striking a balance between robust and 
flexible protection scheme behaviour. 
Detailed simulations have been conducted in this chapter to illustrate the 
shortfalls in protection performance in two example cases – distance protection 
and loss of mains protection. Protection sensitivity and stability evaluation have 
been conducted on the former to ascertain the impact of different DER 
operating conditions, coupled with islanding and remote disturbances, on the 
performance of loss of mains protection. The latter evaluates reach selectivity of 
distance protection while quadrature booster transformers exist and are 
actively managed on the protected or adjacent circuits. Both studies conducted 
were unique at the time of writing the thesis in terms of primary system 
operating conditions and thoroughness of simulations and protection 
performance testing. 
The main contributions of this chapter are: 
 Reviews the impact topology changes, DER utilisation, FACTS and wide-
area disturbances have on protection performance. These factors have 
also given impetus to the flexible operation of the primary system, and 
consequently the impact that has on protection performance was also 
examined. The latter examination was unique at the time of writing the 
thesis. 
 Quantification through simulation of QB impact on the reach of distance 
protection zones 2 and 3 under all possible QB operating modes and 
different fault conditions. This exercise also qualifies the additional 
potential reach issues that coordinated QB control can pose. Particularly 
under coordinated QB control, the National Grid UK recommended 
distance protection settings are shown to be potentially exposed. 
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 Quantification through secondary injection of loss of mains protection 
sensitivity and stability under a comprehensive set of testing scenarios 
and using commercial relaying products. This also revealed the disparity 
of performance between different LOM protection offerings under the 
same operating conditions due to different LOM algorithm 
implementations. Moreover, compromise settings are proposed along 
with LOM protection performance evaluations procedures and were 
recommended for industry use. 
 Argues the necessity of protection to exhibit both robust and flexible 
behaviour to achieve improved performance levels especially under 
flexible power system operation. The balance between these two is 
defined based on network conditions and protection scheme elements. 
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3.2 Causes of deterioration in protection performance under 
flexible power system operation 
This section focuses on the impact that flexible operation of power systems can 
have on the performance of protection schemes. This is in contrast to the 
available research work which mainly focuses on the impact of discrete primary 
system components such as DER and FACTS on the performance of existing 
protection. It is firmly believed that operating a number of these discrete 
elements to support a flexible power system can reveal new protection 
performance challenges. Therefore, it is important to outline the additional 
complexity of operating a primary system in a flexible fashion relative to the 
traditional operational practices. Consequently, the nature of the impact this can 
have on protection performance can be understood. 
3.2.1 Flexible operation of the primary power system 
Increasing pressure to meet renewable generation targets and at the same time 
maintaining or improving supply security levels present great technical 
challenges from the operational point of view. This is especially the case when 
minimising investment cost is a priority constraint. Better utilisation of the 
existing assets, therefore, becomes more preferable. And achieving this 
improved utilisation can be partly delivered through flexible operation (in 
addition to other strategies such as asset life extension which is out with the 
scope of this thesis). The flexible operation of the primary system entails 
secondary system strategies (control and protection) which contextually 
manage constraints to ensure minimum performance levels are not 
compromised. This research has identified four main areas that can pose a 
performance penalty on protection systems when the primary system is 
operated under certain conditions, these are: 
 Power system topology changes. 
 Utilisation of DER. 
 FACTS and similar devices providing operational support. 
 Wide-area disturbances. 
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Some of these areas are well understood and their impact on protection 
performance has been covered extensively in literature. However, operating the 
primary system in a flexible fashion may intentionally invoke the increased 
utilisation of some of these as assets to enable such operation to increase 
stability margins or improve supply reliability (e.g. FACTS and intentional 
topology changes). On the flip side, more utilisation of DER and increasingly 
complex control and protection structures may lead to reduced resilience to 
severe disturbances due to reduced system inertia or secondary system failure 
respectively. These are issues that are presenting themselves time and time 
again when blackouts/brownouts are becoming more commonplace [1, 2]. 
To this end the aforementioned four distinct areas will be examined to qualify 
the impact these have on the primary system when it is operated in a flexible 
manner. And consequently, any adverse effects this can have on the 
performance of prevailing power system protection practices. 
3.2.2 Power system topology changes 
Operating the primary system flexibly is usually synonymous to modifying its 
topology as and when required to fulfil operational objectives a rigid topology 
cannot achieve. Topology changes considered here include any switchgear 
controlled modifications to the primary system impedance or power flow paths 
and these include: 
 Shifting of normally open points in a radial distribution network [3]. 
 Creation of an islanded section of the power system or the splitting of 
transmission system zones [4]. 
 Removal of system earthing such as the disconnection of earthing 
transformers [5]. 
Some of these topology changes are becoming widespread and more frequent 
(at least at distribution level) as more automation and active network 
management schemes are introduced to the system [6]. [7] shows how 
employing automatic load restoration schemes can affect the performance of 
overcurrent relays which leads to non-selective operation and the potential for 
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unnecessary loss of customer supplies. This means that existing distribution 
protection schemes’ performance can be highly susceptible to system 
topological changes. 
System islanding whether used to protect against system collapse, or to 
facilitate security of supply through micro-grids, is becoming a favourable 
system operation strategy and policies are emerging to support such 
operational objective. Intentional islanding, however, brings along with it a 
whole host of protection performance issues including reliable LOM detection 
[8, 9] and the lack of sufficient fault contributions for proper protection 
operation [10, 11]. 
Changes in the source impedance or ground sources can affect the fault 
characteristics which can lead to distance protection operation issues [12]. 
Reach issues are also associated when multiple fault in-feeds are present 
especially in a teed feeder [13]. However, as more frequent topological changes 
occur, compromise distance settings may no longer provide the required level of 
selectivity. 
From the above, it can be seen that changing the system topology to meet 
operational objectives in a flexible manner results in deterioration in protection 
performance due to: 
 Alteration of normal grading paths which affects protection coordination. 
 Alteration of fault levels including earth fault contribution which 
desensitises protection leading to operation failures or reduced 
coordination. 
This highlights the difficulties in meeting stringent protection performance 
requirements when static settings or protection configuration are employed. 
Therefore performance levels offered by compromise protection settings 
usually drop when primary system flexibility through topology changes is 
adopted. 
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3.2.3 Utilisation of DER 
The increased installed DER capacity and utilisation of DER are seen as one of 
the main participants in flexible power system operation. Increased penetration 
of DER in the distribution and transmission networks is changing the passive 
nature of the primary system. These are less predictable in terms of the power 
flows and fault level contributions in steady state and transient conditions 
respectively compared to conventional large scale generation. As discussed 
previously, intentional islanding can cause operational issues. This is 
particularly an issue with inverter-interfaced DER. Improved control schemes 
are proposed to flexibly manage the DERs impact on power system stability and 
overall quality of supply. These result in an increasingly dynamic DER portfolio 
where DER connections, composition and configuration change to serve 
operational objectives and hence result in varying the fault contributions which 
affect the protection performance [14-16]. To this end, the potential for 
protection performance deterioration caused by DER is a result of: 
 Desensitising of protection due to overall low fault contributions under 
islanded conditions. 
 Mis-coordination of protection due to uncertainty in fault contributions. 
Once again, these issues highlight the adverse impact that flexible operation of 
the primary system has on adopted static protection setting philosophies. 
3.2.4 FACTS and similar devices providing system operational support 
FACTS such as series compensation and phase shifting transformers as well as 
similar devices such as fault current limiters aid in increasing the utilisation of 
the primary system and deferring costly reinforcement as it moves closer to 
capacity and stability limits. To serve the philosophy of flexible primary system 
operation, these can be controlled dynamically to meet operational objectives as 
system constraints change with changing generation profiles, post-fault system 
configuration and mitigating the effects of severe disturbances. FACTS have 
been shown to have undesired effects on transmission system protection 
performance especially in terms of distance reach [17, 18], directional 
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sensitivity [19] and zone coordination [20]. To a lesser extent, differential 
protection’s harmonic restraint functionality is also affected [21]. Operating 
these devices dynamically causes further uncertainty in protection performance 
[17]. 
Although advanced numerical protection algorithms with dynamic 
characteristics that aim to compensate for the effects of FACTS are in use [22], a 
main barrier against reliable performance is the static settings adopted by 
existing protection schemes. 
Fault current limiters (FCL) are another example of how such devices affect the 
performance of protection schemes. The lower fault levels as well as the 
additional resistance introduced to the network results in slower overcurrent 
protection operation and distance protection under-reach respectively [23, 24]. 
Switching FCLs in and out of a circuit as and when required can prove even 
more detrimental to a protection scheme applying a fixed setting strategy. 
3.2.5 Wide-area disturbances 
Reduced system inertia and suboptimal control and protection schemes coupled 
with a primary system operating at its limits, meant that severe disturbances 
can have devastating effects often manifesting themselves in wide scale 
blackouts [25]. The recently frequent occurrence of such disturbances provided 
impetus for introducing measures to increase system resilience against these 
disturbances [26] – one of which is flexible primary system operation which 
introduces its own issues as discussed above. 
3.2.6 Hidden failures 
Although strictly related to the protection scheme, networks operating at their 
limits unearth more protection hidden failures. These are system or 
configuration defects in the protection scheme which only manifest themselves 
during an event with undesirable consequences [27]. Faulty instrument 
transformers, incorrectly configured primary/secondary ratios or incorrectly 
set timers are example hidden failures that can lead to protection mal-operation 
[28]. Most of these can be attributed to lapses in commissioning protection 
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system commissioning procedure. Failing to detect these failures is also partly 
due to the unavailability of continuous platform health checks that can 
contextually verify the applied protection configuration in addition to standard 
procedural hardware/software execution checks carried out by relay watchdogs 
[29]. When the primary system’s flexible operation presents protection schemes 
with variable conditions, dormant hidden failures will almost always present 
themselves and sometimes with catastrophic consequences. 
3.2.7 Closing discussion on performance issues 
Inherent to the shortfall in protection performance, are the elements that the 
protection system constitutes. That is the protection characteristic, scheme logic 
and to a lesser extent the input stage of the protection. The first two have the 
protection settings in common. While the protection characteristic is directly 
affected by the settings, scheme logic is only partially affected by the settings. 
And as revealed by the review so far, the potentially poor performance is 
attributed to (from the protection point of view) to unsuitable pick-up 
thresholds, non-optimal time delays or ineffective signalling. 
In order to achieve improved performance, it only makes sense to target these 
affected elements and seek to modify their behaviour as dictated by the power 
system conditions. 
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3.3 Overview of quadrature booster transformers 
Quadrature booster transformers (QB) are a special kind of phase shifting 
transformers (PST) which provide an active means of controlling the power 
flow in a transmission system where otherwise circuit impedance would 
passively determine the flow. This is achieved through artificially introducing a 
phase shift in the voltage angle across the transmission circuit. This is 
particularly useful to alleviate thermal or stability constraints of heavily loaded 
transmission networks [30]. QBs are more cost effective compared to PSTs due 
to the relatively limited range of phase shifting they can provide which is 
deemed appropriate in certain transmission networks (e.g. UK National Grid) 
[31]. 
3.3.1 QB construction, connection arrangements and functions 
A QB consists of two sets of windings – shunt and series as shown in Figure 3-1. 
The shunt element taps the transmission line’s phase voltage. This is then 
shifted by 90˚ and is then injected to the other back to the transmission line 
through the series element. Figure 3-2 illustrates the voltage phasors associated 
with the QB and transmission line. 
 
Figure 3-1 Schematic showing QB shunt and series elements 
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Figure 3-2 QB phasor diagram showing primary system quantities incorporating QB action 
The shunt element of the QB is tapped using an on-load tap changer (OLTC) in 
order to control the voltage magnitude injected into the transmission line by the 
series elements. This directly controls the phase angle shift introduced by the 
QB and hence the amount of power flow control in the circuit. There are 
typically twenty tap positions to provide a maximum phase shift of around 11˚ 
across the transmission line or around 20% of the MVA rating of the QB [31]. 
QBs can be found in up to 2750MVA rating which is limited by OLTC rating [32].  
Furthermore, the QB operates in two modes – boosting and bucking. When the 
QB is connected with the shunt element is on the substation busbar side and 
series element on the transmission line side, boosting mode pushes more power 
away from the substation and bucking mode impedes the power flow into the 
transmission line. The tapping convention adopted by UK National Grid denotes 
tap 1 for maximum boost, tap 39 for maximum buck while centre tap resides at 
tap 20. Figure 3-3 depicts how a QB is typically connected in a substation. The 
QB can be bypassed through dedicated switching arrangements for operational 
or maintenance reasons. The instrument transformers used for protecting the 
circuit directly connected to the QB are positioned on the transmission line end 
of the QB. This avoids undesired effects the QB has on the line protection, 
especially distance protection, which will be apparent from the analysis to 
follow in section 3.4. 
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Figure 3-3 QB substation connection arrangement [33] 
3.3.2 QB control and protection arrangements 
The main function of the QB control system (QBCS) is to set the tap position of 
the QB based on two factors [31]: 
 Tap position selected remotely by the EMS operator. 
 QB operating envelope to avoid over-fluxing. 
The transmission system operator will seek to choose an optimum setting to 
control the power flow through constrained circuits. This is particularly 
important for post-fault management of the system. However, the QB will have a 
maximum capability due to transformer thermal limits and the potential to 
over-flux the core especially in bucking mode. Figure 3-4 shows a typical 
operating envelope at different tap positions that is specified by the QB 
manufacturer. Thus the QBCS employs this to restrict the tap position should 
the operating limits be violated. Figure 3-5 shows a high level functional block 
diagram of a QBCS which uses measured primary quantities in association with 
the QB operation envelope to enable or restrict tap changes selected by the 
system operator. The QBCS also performs temperature monitoring and QB data 
logging. 
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Figure 3-4 Typical QB operating envelope [33] 
 
 
Figure 3-5 Typical QB local control system [33] 
The protection arrangements for a QB are similar to those used for a power 
transformer. Four main functions are usually specified [32]: 
 Overall current differential protection. 
 LV earth fault protection. 
 Temperature winding alarm and protection. 
 Buccholz protection. 
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3.3.3 Setting of distance protection for transmission lines with QBs 
There is no specific National Grid policy with regards to this matter. However, 
the policy statement indicates that zone 2 should provide remote busbar 
coverage taking into account maximum QB impedance at maximum boost or 
buck operation. Zone 3 should be set to provide coverage of the longest line 
connected to the remote busbar. However, these may result in excessive 
overreach should the QB be bypassed. Therefore the policy recommends 150% 
reach for zone 2 and relies on zone 3 to provide backup should 150% reach 
setting fall short of covering the remote busbar. 
Although this recommendation may be suitable for the existing control regime, 
it remains static and does not take into account plans to implement coordinated 
QB control. This not only introduces more variability in the expected QB modes 
but also makes coordination of distance zone between adjacent circuits more 
challenging while risking lower levels of performance as indicated by the 
recommended settings. The coordinated control strategy is discussed in the 
following section. 
3.3.4 Coordinated control of QBs 
Operating a QB or a collection of QBs dynamically provides operational 
advantages especially in maximising post-fault circuit capacity [34]. However, 
the impact of a QB is not merely localised. Steady state studies on the PSTs in 
European transmission networks have shown the effect a single QB has on the 
adjacent circuits [35]. This then becomes an optimisation problem which should 
take into account the wider effects on the system. Nevertheless, providing a 
coordinated (or centralised) means of operating QBs is advantageous given that 
the coordination issues are resolved. Furthermore, as part of delivering this 
coordinated control approach, some QBs are installed in substations with the 
ability to switch between two circuits as dictated by the operational 
requirements [17]. Moving towards a coordinated QB control strategy means 
that the operating mode and tap position of a specific QB is not known 
beforehand and highly variable. The impact this may have on distance 
protection will be examined in the following section. 
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3.4 The evaluation of the impact of QBs on distance protection 
performance 
This section presents the results of the evaluation of the distance protection 
performance for circuits containing QBs. At the time of writing this thesis, these 
were the only related comprehensive studies available where preliminary 
results were published in [17]. Work published by Dash et al [36] partially 
examined a similar problem. It was limited to power electronic based phase 
shifting transformers. Moreover, the results presented were only for resistive 
single phase faults at a single fault position. 
3.4.1 Evaluation methodology 
Simulations were conducted on the RTDS platform. This will facilitate the 
testing of the developed adaptive protection solution using a hardware in the 
loop approach as shown in the remainder of the thesis. The primary system data 
were obtained from the National Grid seven year statement for winter 2010/11 
[37].  
 Figure 3-6 shows a single line diagram of the modelled network. The network 
section contains two QBs (QB1 at HIGM substation and QB2 at STAY substation). 
This enabled testing the impact of simultaneous QB operation on distance 
protection. Furthermore, the size of the network was chosen to allow the 
application and evaluation of zone 3 distance protection. The model data is 
summarised in Appendix A. 
The relaying point is denoted by 21 in Figure 3-6. The distance protection model 
used was that offered by the RTDS standard components library, which is a 
multifunctional distance relay block [38]. This offers the use of Mho or 
quadrilateral characteristic. The former was used as it is the prevailing 
characteristic in the UK transmission network. Furthermore, the settings used 
are those specified in the National Grid policy and are summarised in Appendix 
A. No communications-based schemes were considered in this study. 
Furthermore, DAR functionality was disabled as the study is interested in 
quantifying the impact of the QB on the distance protection reach in isolation of 
circuit restoration post transient faults, so all faults applied were of a 
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permanent nature. Different fault types were placed on the line between HIGM 
and RATS substations (i.e. downstream of QB1). The faults were positioned at 
0%, 30% 50%, 70% and 100% of the concerned line length. The impedance 
measured by the distance relay was observed for a range of QB modes and tap 
positions. 
 
 Figure 3-6 Modelled primary system single line diagram showing QB positions 
 
3.4.2 QB model 
The QB was modelled by connecting a phase shifting transformer (PST) 
windings in an extended delta configuration as shown in Figure 3-7 [32] to 
provide the quadrature voltage injection for QB operation. The PST model in the 
RTDS only provided eight tapping positions. This does not affect the possible 
maximum and minimum impact of tap positions, only the resolution of the 
results would be limited. The rating of the QB used was 2750MVA with an 
impedance of 15% (rating base) [37]. 
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Figure 3-7 QB in extended delta winding connection 
Figure 3-8 shows the QB introduced phase shift vs. the QB tap position in both 
boost and buck modes. The phase shift angle is calculated as the additional 
voltage angle difference introduced by the QB between busbars HIGM and RATS. 
The relationship between the line power and QB tap position is shown in Figure 
3-9. This is only indicative as the power flow depends on the circuit 
configuration. The power flow as a result of the simultaneous operation of both 
QBs as well as other related operational issues is out with the scope of this 
chapter. 
 
Figure 3-8 QB introduced phase shift vs. tap position 
 
Figure 3-9 Circuit power flow vs. QB tap position 
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3.4.3 Results of the distance protection reach evaluation 
The results of the simulations are summarised in the following tables. Since only 
asymmetrical faults result in errors in the impedance reach [17], single phase (A 
phase to ground, AG) and phase to phase (A phase to B phase, AB) faults are 
presented. Table 3-1 to Table 3-5 present the impedance measured by the relay 
for the single phase (ZAG) and phase to phase faults (ZAB) located at 0% to 100% 
of the HIGM-RATS circuit. The range of tap position presented is taps 1, 3 and 5 
with tap 1 being the most extreme in boosting or bucking effect. All measured 
impedances fall within the appropriate protection zone for taps higher than 5. A 
measured impedance error is also presented and is calculated relative to the 
fault impedance when the QB is bypassed. 
Results for resistive faults are also presented in Table 3-6 for AB faults at 50% 
line length.  It should be emphasised that the detection of resistive faults and 
solutions related to this problem are out with the scope of this thesis. 
Finally, Table 3-7 presents the measured impedance for simultaneous QB 
operation. A middle tap position was chosen for QB1 while tap 1 was selected 
for QB2 to maximise the potential impact on the measured impedance. The 
results in Table 3-7 are similar to those in Table 3-3 for individual QB operation. 
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Table 3-1 Measured impedance and impedance error for faults at 0% line length 
 
 
R (Ω) X (Ω) |Z|(Ω) <Z (°) R (Ω) X (Ω) |Z|(Ω) <Z (°)
Bypass - 0.14 1.23 1.24 83.69 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
1 1.13 0.92 1.45 39.00 0.99 -0.32 1.04 -17.58
3 0.91 1.01 1.36 47.95 0.78 -0.22 0.81 -15.85
5 0.65 1.10 1.28 59.61 0.51 -0.13 0.53 -14.33
1 -1.23 1.47 1.92 129.92 -1.37 0.24 1.39 170.04
3 -0.81 1.47 1.68 118.74 -0.94 0.24 0.97 165.71
5 -0.39 1.39 1.44 105.79 -0.53 0.16 0.55 163.17
Bypass - 0.16 1.22 1.23 82.39 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
1 1.60 1.08 1.93 34.02 1.44 -0.14 1.44 -5.56
3 1.24 1.12 1.67 42.09 1.08 -0.10 1.08 -5.30
5 0.85 1.17 1.45 54.00 0.69 -0.05 0.69 -4.16
1 -1.57 1.58 2.23 134.82 -1.73 0.36 1.77 168.26
3 -0.99 1.50 1.80 123.40 -1.15 0.28 1.19 166.34
5 -0.47 1.40 1.48 108.63 -0.64 0.18 0.66 164.17
Boost
Buck
Boost
Buck
ZAG, AB ZAG, AB error
Tap position
0%
AG
AB
Fault position Fault type QB mode
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Table 3-2 Measured impedance and impedance error for faults at 30% line length 
 
 
R (Ω) X (Ω) |Z|(Ω) <Z (°) R (Ω) X (Ω) |Z|(Ω) <Z (°)
Bypass - 0.28 2.84 2.85 84.47 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
1 1.66 1.87 2.50 48.40 1.39 -0.97 1.69 -35.01
3 1.41 2.13 2.55 56.50 1.14 -0.71 1.34 -32.03
5 1.06 2.42 2.64 66.35 0.79 -0.42 0.89 -28.15
1 -2.07 3.17 3.79 123.14 -2.35 0.33 2.37 171.99
3 -1.40 3.23 3.52 113.43 -1.68 0.39 1.72 166.89
5 -0.69 3.17 3.24 102.33 -0.97 0.33 1.02 161.18
Bypass - 0.32 2.80 2.82 83.52 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
1 2.06 1.94 2.83 43.28 1.74 -0.86 1.94 -26.27
3 1.69 2.16 2.74 51.96 1.37 -0.64 1.51 -25.01
5 1.24 2.41 2.71 62.77 0.92 -0.39 1.00 -22.93
1 -2.63 3.57 4.43 126.38 -2.95 0.77 3.05 165.36
3 -1.67 3.48 3.86 115.64 -1.99 0.68 2.10 161.12
5 -0.78 3.28 3.37 103.36 -1.10 0.48 1.20 156.37
Buck
Boost
Buck
Boost
ZAG, AB errorQB mode Tap position
ZAG, ABFault position Fault type
30%
AG
AB
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Table 3-3 Measured impedance and impedance error for faults at 50% line length 
 
 
R (Ω) X (Ω) |Z|(Ω) <Z (°) R (Ω) X (Ω) |Z|(Ω) <Z (°)
Bypass - 0.37 3.91 3.93 84.57 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
1 1.97 2.46 3.15 51.31 1.60 -1.45 2.16 -42.22
3 1.73 2.84 3.33 58.65 1.36 -1.07 1.73 -38.24
5 1.33 3.28 3.54 67.93 0.96 -0.63 1.15 -33.33
1 -2.57 4.24 4.96 121.22 -2.94 0.33 2.96 173.60
3 -1.78 4.38 4.73 112.12 -2.15 0.47 2.20 167.68
5 -0.89 4.34 4.43 101.56 -1.26 0.43 1.33 161.16
Bypass - 0.42 3.86 3.88 83.79 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
1 2.33 2.48 3.40 46.79 1.91 -1.38 2.36 -35.85
3 1.98 2.82 3.45 54.93 1.56 -1.04 1.87 -33.69
5 1.51 3.22 3.56 64.88 1.09 -0.64 1.26 -30.42
1 -3.29 4.79 5.81 124.48 -3.71 0.93 3.82 165.93
3 -2.11 4.76 5.21 113.91 -2.53 0.90 2.69 160.42
5 -0.96 4.52 4.62 102.03 -1.38 0.66 1.53 154.49
Boost
Buck
QB mode Tap position
ZAG, AB ZAG, AB error
Boost
Buck
50%
AG
AB
Fault position Fault type
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Table 3-4 Measured impedance and impedance error for faults at 70% line length 
 
 
 
R (Ω) X (Ω) |Z|(Ω) <Z (°) R (Ω) X (Ω) |Z|(Ω) <Z (°)
Bypass - 0.47 4.97 4.99 84.55 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
1 2.26 3.02 3.77 53.19 1.79 -1.95 2.64 -47.51
3 2.03 3.52 4.06 60.03 1.56 -1.45 2.13 -42.98
5 1.62 4.11 4.42 68.49 1.15 -0.86 1.43 -36.89
1 -3.04 5.27 6.08 119.98 -3.51 0.30 3.53 175.12
3 -2.14 5.50 5.90 111.26 -2.61 0.53 2.67 168.54
5 -1.06 5.50 5.60 100.91 -1.53 0.53 1.62 160.94
Bypass - 0.55 4.91 4.94 83.62 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
1 2.58 3.00 3.96 49.30 2.03 -1.91 2.79 -43.24
3 2.26 3.45 4.12 56.77 1.71 -1.46 2.25 -40.47
5 1.77 4.01 4.38 66.18 1.22 -0.90 1.52 -36.39
1 -3.91 5.95 7.12 123.31 -4.46 1.04 4.58 166.87
3 -2.54 6.00 6.52 112.94 -3.09 1.09 3.28 160.56
5 -1.15 5.76 5.87 101.29 -1.70 0.85 1.90 153.42
70%
AG
AB
Boost
Buck
Boost
Buck
Fault position Fault type QB mode Tap position
ZAG, AB ZAG, AB error
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Table 3-5 Measured impedance and impedance error for faults at 100% line length 
 
 
R (Ω) X (Ω) |Z|(Ω) <Z (°) R (Ω) X (Ω) |Z|(Ω) <Z (°)
Bypass - 0.68 6.57 6.61 84.09 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
1 2.68 3.79 4.64 54.73 2.00 -2.78 3.42 -54.27
3 2.49 4.48 5.13 60.93 1.81 -2.09 2.76 -49.11
5 2.06 5.31 5.70 68.80 1.38 -1.26 1.87 -42.40
1 -3.77 6.75 7.73 119.18 -4.45 0.18 4.45 177.68
3 -2.69 7.17 7.66 110.56 -3.37 0.60 3.42 169.90
5 -1.33 7.28 7.40 100.35 -2.01 0.71 2.13 160.55
Bypass - 0.76 6.49 6.53 83.29 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
1 2.92 3.70 4.71 51.72 2.16 -2.79 3.53 -52.29
3 2.66 4.35 5.10 58.55 1.90 -2.14 2.86 -48.44
5 2.18 5.16 5.60 67.10 1.42 -1.33 1.94 -43.19
1 -4.82 7.51 8.92 122.69 -5.58 1.02 5.68 169.65
3 -3.19 7.79 8.42 112.27 -3.95 1.30 4.16 161.80
5 -1.42 7.60 7.73 100.58 -2.18 1.11 2.45 153.05
Tap position
ZAG, AB ZAG, AB error
100%
AG
AB
Fault position Fault type QB mode
Boost
Buck
Boost
Buck
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Table 3-6 Measured impedance for resistive faults at 50% line length 
 
 
Table 3-7 Measured impedance for phase to phase fault at 50% line length for simultaneous QB 
operation 
 
 
 
R (Ω) X (Ω) |Z|(Ω) <Z (°)
Bypass - 2.33 3.91 4.55 59.21
1 2.89 1.92 3.47 33.60
3 2.88 2.29 3.68 38.49
5 2.8 2.82 3.97 45.20
1 -0.98 6.1 6.18 99.13
3 0.22 5.83 5.83 87.84
5 1.31 5.19 5.35 75.83
Bypass - 1.95 3.82 4.29 62.96
1 3 2.02 3.62 33.95
3 2.84 2.35 3.69 39.61
5 2.61 2.82 3.84 47.21
1 -1.97 6.49 6.78 106.89
3 -0.43 5.98 6.00 94.11
5 0.82 5.17 5.23 80.99
Bypass - 4.21 3.85 5.70 42.44
1 3.72 1.55 4.03 22.62
3 3.92 1.9 4.36 25.86
5 4.1 2.45 4.78 30.86
1 0.72 8.45 8.48 85.13
3 2.48 7.48 7.88 71.66
5 3.67 6 7.03 58.55
Bypass - 3.41 3.72 5.05 47.49
1 3.63 1.67 4.00 24.71
3 3.63 1.98 4.13 28.61
5 3.63 2.47 4.39 34.23
1 -0.58 8.52 8.54 93.89
3 1.43 7.32 7.46 78.95
5 2.71 5.77 6.37 64.84
5Ω
10Ω
50%
ZAG, AB
Boost
Buck
AB
AG
AB
AG
Boost
Buck
Boost
Buck
Boost
Buck
Fault position Fault resistance Fault type QB mode Tap position
QB1 mode QB1 tap QB2 mode QB2 tap R (Ω) X (Ω) |ZAB|(Ω) <ZAB (°)
Bypass - Boost 1 0.43 3.89 3.91 83.69
Bypass - Buck 1 0.43 3.90 3.92 83.71
Boost 3 Boost 1 2.15 2.95 3.65 53.91
Boost 3 Buck 1 1.82 2.83 3.36 57.25
Buck 3 Boost 1 -1.99 4.57 4.98 113.53
Buck 3 Buck 1 -2.16 5.10 5.54 112.95
QB status ZAB
Faul typeFault position
50% AB
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The measurement impedance results have been illustrated in MHO diagrams to 
clearly present the reach issues influenced by QB operation. Only the worst case 
scenario faults in terms of reach error are shown (AB faults). In Figure 3-10 
shows the fault impedance at the aforementioned locations when the QB is 
bypassed. 
 
Figure 3-10 Fault impedance when QB is in Bypass mode 
 
Figure 3-11 shows the measured fault impedance when the QB is in boosting 
mode. Each set of impedance points relating to a tap position are grouped for 
clarity. In this case the maximum error in measured impedance occurs for faults 
at 100% of the line length when the QB is at maximum tap (tap 1). All faults 
occur within the reach of zone 3. 
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Figure 3-11 Fault impedance when QB is in Boost mode 
Finally, the measured fault impedance during QB buck mode is illustrated in 
Figure 3-12. This shows that a greater error in the impedance measurement is 
introduced. The maximum reach error also occurs for faults at 100% line length 
and tap position 1. It can also be seen that some of the measured impedances 
are located out with zone 3. 
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Figure 3-12 Fault impedance when QB is in buck mode 
3.4.4 Discussion of reach impact due to QB operation 
The results show that operating a QB in bucking mode always results in greater 
reach error compared to boosting mode for corresponding fault types and 
positions. For the range of faults applied in this study, the maximum reach error 
magnitude is 5.68Ω for maximum tap position. The corresponding error 
magnitude for boosting mode is 3.53Ω. The relationship between reach error 
and QB status (mode and tap position) is not strictly linear due to the offsets 
introduced by the inherent QB impedance. This is estimated in the following 
section. 
The results also show that operating QBs simultaneously do not have an 
additional effect on the reach of an individual distance protection relay. 
However, for a coordinated QB control strategy it is important to consider the 
following operating conditions that were not envisaged by the system operator: 
 Continuous change of QB status under coordinated control strategy 
means that settings calculated for the worst case scenario are not 
optimal. Also, setting for worst case scenarios may result in undesirable 
over reach when the QB is bypassed. 
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 QB switching between multiple circuits is also possible. This will have 
impact protection relays that were not previously affected by the 
presence of a QB in the protected circuit. 
The impact of QB on distance protection reach is limited to back up zones 2 and 
3. Zone 1 mal operation is mitigated by the relative placement of the protection 
relay under study to the QB. The degradation of performance of back up 
protection is an important problem that must be taken into consideration when 
assessing the reliability of the protection schemes in place. Not only because the 
performance specification of these back up zones are violated, but also to the 
greater important of ensuring protection reliability during flexible power 
system operating conditions. 
 
3.4.5 A relation for measured impedance error vs. QB mode 
In this section a measure for estimating the measured impedance error based 
on the QB mode will be established. In the following chapters, the impedance 
error magnitude will be incorporated in the development of an adaptive 
distance protection solution that takes into account this introduced error. 
The impact of QB operation on the introduced error is not entirely linear as 
observed from the results so far. The relation can be derived either empirically 
or by calculating the impedance from the power system quantities. Either way, 
both approaches will require a means of modifying the relation based on the 
primary system considered. This is mainly to take into account the effect of 
different QB impedances. If a direct derivation is pursued, then the primary 
system model must be resolved in to its equivalent sequence network circuits. 
This must also be achieved for the QB transformer. Information on modelling 
the QB sequence circuits can be found in [39]. One of the difficulties in using 
these QB equivalent circuits is that they do not directly apply to the extended 
delta QB model used in the simulations reported in this chapter. This is because 
the extended delta model does not consist of shunt and series elements, but 
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rather field and regulating windings to which the sequence network equivalents 
found in [39] do not apply. 
The alternative approach based on an empirical evaluation of the relation 
describing the impact on impedance will provide an estimate based on the 
specific simulation results reported in this chapter. An estimation in this case is 
valid since the reach of a distance protection zone is usually specified with a 
tolerance of +/-5% based on IEC 60255 [40]. To achieve this, it is proposed that 
the derived relation reflects the different factors that impact the reach error, 
these are: 
 The position of the fault along the protected transmission line. 
 Inherent impedance offset introduced by the QB. 
 The QB tap position and mode of operation. 
The reach error can manifest itself on either side of the protected line in the R-X 
impedance plane of the Mho distance protection characteristic according to the 
QB mode (i.e. boost or buck). Thus, the reach error is a complex quantity. 
However, it is deemed sufficient to only calculate the magnitude of the reach 
error as the position of the impedance point relative to the protected circuit can 
be determined based on knowledge of the QB mode. 
The impedance reach error magnitude      is defined as the distance between 
the impedance locus without the effect of QB to that when the QB is connected 
to the circuit. This is illustrated in Figure 3-13. 
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Figure 3-13 Mho characteristic showing how the reach error magnitude is measured 
When taking these different factors into account and the definition of the reach 
error magnitude, then      can be estimated by (1): 
     (                  )        (1) 
Where,        is the magnitude of the minimum error impedance introduced by 
the QB (at fault position 0% and tap position 5),           is the additional 
impedance offset introduced for each percentage point of line length   and   is a 
multiplier that depends on the tap position and QB mode. With each tap 
position change, the impedance locus ‘jumps’ to a different position which is 
reflected by a step change of reach error. 
In order to devise values for the parameters in (1), the results in Table 3-1 to 
Table 3-5 and corresponding Figure 3-10 to Figure 3-12 must be examined. 
Note that all values are based on the worst case scenario faults (i.e. line to line 
faults).        can be determined readily by measuring the distance between the 
normal fault impedance and the shifted fault impedance at a fault position of 0% 
and tap position of 5. Therefore the values for        can be found in Table 3-1 
under       error and are 0.69 Ω and 0.66Ω for boost and buck modes 
respectively. 
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To determine the value of          , first of all the average of the difference 
between impedance error magnitudes in consecutive tap positions is calculated. 
Secondly, this average is taken with the corresponding average for a different 
fault position and the difference between these two values is calculated. Finally, 
the calculated difference is divided by the percentage length difference between 
the compared fault positions. To illustrate this process, consider Figure 3-14 in 
conjunction with the presented simulation results. The average of calculated 
      and       is determined as      . This process is repeated to obtain the 
average       for the calculated values of       and      . Note that       to 
      should not to be confused with the reach error     . These are the 
difference between two reach error values for two consecutive tap positions. 
Finally, the difference between the averages       and       is then divided by 
   to obtain a per length percentage value of the offset.           essentially 
increases with each increment in fault position along the protected line. 
Based on the simulation results, the calculated values for           vary slightly 
across the range of simulated fault positions. The values chosen were for faults 
at 50% for buck and 70% for boost. These values represent the closest 
impedance points to the boundary of zone 2. As such, these can be used as a 
threshold to determine when an extension in the zone reach is necessary to 
compensate for the under reach caused by the QB. 
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Figure 3-14 Mho diagram illustrating process of determining |Zoffset| 
In addition to the offsets        and          ,   is used to reflect the ‘jumps’ in 
impedance error at different QB tap positions. Since the impedance positions 
between different taps are not equidistant, the values for   are obtained by 
assuming an initial value then fine tuning it while comparing the resulting      
with the values of “      error” in the previous results tables. The values for 
      ,             and are summarised in Table 3-8. 
Table 3-8 Variables used for the estimation of impedance error magnitude 
 Boost Buck 
|Zmin| 0.69Ω 0.66Ω 
|Zoffset| 0.004Ω/length % 0.011Ω/length % 
α (tap5) 1.8 1.5 
α (tap3) 2.2 2 
α (tap1) 3 3 
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3.5 Sensitivity and stability evaluation of loss of mains protection 
Loss of mains (LOM) protection is used to disconnect distributed generation 
(DG) should it become islanded from the main grid [12]. Islanded operation of 
DER is currently prohibited by policy as indicated by engineering 
recommendations ER G59/2 [41] and IEEE standard IEEE 1547 [42] due to the 
following reasons: 
 Safety hazard to personnel due the potential energisation of a network 
section that would otherwise be offline when isolated from the grid. 
 The possibility of out of phase reclosure between an energised islanded 
network and the main grid. 
 Inability of the DER to maintain power quality limits. 
Loss of mains protection can usually be easily detected by voltage and 
frequency protection due to the excursions these quantities may experience 
when local generation (DER) and load are mismatched. However, for situations 
when the DER is able to reliably meet the deficit in generation or when the load 
and local generation are mostly matched, the detection of LOM becomes more 
difficult. Other methods are then used for this purpose, the most common of 
which are rate of change of frequency (ROCOF) and voltage vector shift (VS) 
[12]. 
Although effective in detecting LOM events, ROCOF and VS under certain 
operating conditions suffer from spurious tripping following remote 
disturbances whether caused by faults or rapid frequency excursions [43]. 
Spurious tripping violates fundamental stable performance criteria required by 
all protection schemes. Increasing the pick-up setting can provide immunity 
against the causes of such spurious trips, but at the cost of LOM detection 
sensitivity. Another dimension to the problem is introduced by the different DG 
technologies that are becoming commonplace. To this end, this section reports 
on the investigation of the impact of different generating conditions coupled 
with different LOM or remote disturbance scenarios on the performance of LOM 
protection. 
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3.5.1 Methodology 
At the time of conducting these tests, they were the first of their kind in terms of 
providing a comprehensive study covering a wide range of scenarios, generator 
technologies and LOM protection relays. This work was then published in [43]. 
Two main performance criteria were evaluated. These are the sensitivity of LOM 
protection to true LOM events and the stability of LOM protection against 
system disturbances. Furthermore, four DG technologies were considered: 
 Synchronous machine (30MVA at 33kV and 3MVA at 11kV). 
 DFIG (30MVA at 33kV and 3MVA at 11kV). 
 Induction machine (0.86MVA at 11kV). 
 Inverter connected DC source (1.5MVA at 11kV). 
The generator output is set initially at 90% of rated MVA prior to islanding 
which is initiated by opening of the point of common coupling (PCC). A number 
of different loading scenarios were considered to examine the extent of relay 
sensitivity to generation-load imbalance post LOM event. The active and 
reactive power consumption of the local load was varied to give a net 
import/export range across the PCC of (0%, 2.5%, 5% and 10%) of DG rated 
MVA. Active and reactive power imbalance are considered in isolation, such that 
imbalance in net active power import/export is associated with 0% imbalance 
in reactive power and vice-versa. 
For stability testing, faults are applied at different locations in the network such 
that the retained voltage at the DER terminals is at 20%, 50% and 80% of 
nominal value which is then captured in COMTRADE format. It was necessary to 
modify the fault resistance in some of the scenarios to obtain these retained 
voltage levels. The faults applied were of single phase to ground, phase to phase 
and three phase type. To minimise the effect of generation-load imbalance on 
the stability tests, the net import/export of power across the PCC was set to 0% 
of the DG rated MVA. Furthermore, faults were applied for a maximum duration 
of 0.5s and 1s respectively for the 33kV and 11kV networks respectively. These 
are considered typical maximum fault clearance times for these voltage levels. 
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Commercial relays from three different manufacturers were used to assess the 
performance of the of the LOM algorithms – these are referred to as Relay 1, 
Relay 2 and Relay 3 due to commercial sensitivities. The obtained voltage 
waveforms from sensitivity and stability tests are injected into the relays to 
observe their response and tripping times were recorded. The boundary 
settings were determined for each test scenario. The testing procedure is 
depicted in Figure 3-15. 
 
Figure 3-15 LOM sensitivity and stability testing procedure 
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Set power import/export 
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3.5.2 Power system models 
The 33kV network used is an equivalent reduced network from the Scottish 
Power distribution network and is shown in Figure 3-16 with fault locations 
indicated. The 11kV test network and data was obtained from CE Electric and is 
shown in Figure 3-17. Associated network and generator data can be found in 
[43]. 
 
Figure 3-16 33kV test network 
 
Figure 3-17 11kV Test network 
Once the tests were completed, compromise settings were suggested for each 
DG size and technology. These compromise settings offer a balance between 
LOM protection sensitivity and stability. The full set of results can be found in 
[43]. But for the purposes of the discussion in this chapter two sets of results 
are emphasised in the following sections. 
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3.5.3 Compromise settings for DFIG based generation 
Table 3-9 shows the response of relay 1 for a range of tests and settings for a 
3MVA DFIG generator connected to the 11kV test network. In this case, the 
suggested best setting is 3Hz/s (highlighted in grey). Applying this setting can 
potentially desensitise the relay to true loss of mains events. So a compromise 
may be required at the expense of lower stability against remote disturbances. 
Such compromise settings may become obsolete with variable network 
conditions. 
Table 3-9 Compromise relay 1 ROCOF settings for 3MVA DFIG generator connected to 11kV 
network 
 
 
3.5.4 Performance discrepancies between different ROCOF algorithms 
The next set of results is related to the sensitivity of Relays 1-3 for a 30MVA 
synchronous generator based DG connected to the 33kV test network. The 
boundary settings for these relay are shown Figure 3-18 to Figure 3-20 for 
different amounts of active and reactive power imbalance. 
Setting 
Sensitive to 
LOM with 
5% active 
imbalance 
Sensitive to 
LOM with 
5% reactive 
imbalance 
Stable for 20% 
retained voltage 
faults (ph-e, ph-
ph, 3-ph) 
Stable for 50% 
retained voltage 
faults (ph-e, ph-
ph, 3-ph) 
Stable for 80% 
retained 
voltage faults 
(ph-e, ph-ph, 
3-ph) 
0.5Hz/s, 
0ms 
Y Y Y,N,N Y,N,Y Y,Y,Y 
0.5Hz/s, 
120ms 
Y Y Y,N,N Y,N,Y Y,Y,Y 
0.5Hz/s, 
240ms 
N N Y,Y,Y Y,Y,Y Y,Y,Y 
1.5Hz/s, 
0ms 
Y Y Y,N,N Y,N,Y Y,Y,Y 
1.5Hz/s, 
120ms 
Y Y Y,Y,N Y,N,Y Y,Y,Y 
1.5Hz/s, 
240ms 
N N Y,Y,Y Y,Y,Y Y,Y,Y 
3Hz/s, 
0ms 
Y Y Y,Y,Y Y,N,Y Y,Y,Y 
3Hz/s, 
120ms 
Y Y Y,Y,Y Y,Y,Y Y,Y,Y 
3Hz/s, 
240ms 
N N Y,Y,Y Y,Y,Y Y,Y,Y 
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Figure 3-18 Maximum sensitivity settings for 30MVA synchronous DG connected to 33kV network – 
relay 1 
 
 
Figure 3-19 Maximum sensitivity settings for 30MVA synchronous DG connected to 33kV network - 
relay 2 
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Figure 3-20 Maximum sensitivity settings for 30MVA synchronous DG connected to 33kV network - 
relay 3 
The results show that the maximum settings for 10% active power import 
ranges between 0.2 and 0.39Hz/s. Relay 2 does not respond to reactive power 
imbalanced under these test conditions. 
It is clear from these results that different manufacturer implementations of the 
same protection principle can result in varied performance. One of the main 
reasons that this can be attributed to is the implementation of frequency and 
rate of change of frequency measurement of the different relays. As such it is 
difficult to guarantee a consistent level of performance for ROCOF based LOM 
protection. This particular issue is discussed further in 3.6.3. 
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3.6 Robust vs. flexible protection scheme performance 
The discussion in the previous section has drawn out a very important 
conclusion. That is for a protection scheme to always perform according to 
specified requirements under all primary system operational conditions, it is at 
least required that the protection settings match the primary system condition. 
Meeting these performance requirements under all possible operational 
conditions necessarily means that the protection scheme behaviour needs to 
exhibit a degree of robustness. Flexible primary system operation results in 
uncertainty in operating conditions, and robustness in behaviour can cope with 
the risk of poor performance associated with uncertainty. The challenge herein 
lies in achieving robust behaviour. To this end, it is necessary to understand 
robustness from the point of view of protection scheme and in light of flexible 
primary system operation. 
3.6.1 Robust behaviour of protection systems 
[44] outline an important relationship between the robustness a system can 
exhibit and the specialisation it can provide in terms of functionality. 
Robustness entails a predetermination of behaviour against a large range of 
perturbations which inherently results in the system performing in a sub-
optimal manner. Protection schemes are mostly geared towards robust 
operation (this is different from gearing the protection towards dependable 
operation). To illustrate this concept, consider an overcurrent protection 
scheme. The primary system current  ( ) is monitored and a trip decision is 
based on the current in relation to the protection characteristic (IDMT, DT, etc.). 
As shown in Figure 3-21, the current trajectory   ( )    ( ) as a result of a fault 
condition leads to the correct tripping of the overcurrent relay. It can also be 
seen that both under healthy and faulty system conditions the system current 
 ( ) can vary based on loading, network configuration, fault impedance, etc. 
However, the protection remains robust against these variations. The main 
factor dictating the robustness in protection behaviour in this case is the 
protection setting which demarcates the healthy and faulty conditions. 
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Figure 3-21 Primary current trajectory under normal operating conditions 
If the network was operated in an islanded condition with inverter-interfaced 
DER, then the fault current    ( ) would reduce significantly which impacts the 
sensitivity of the installed overcurrent protection. In this case, the generalised 
operation of the protection functions leads to unsatisfactory performance with 
an increased risk of failure to detect the fault as shown in Figure 3-21. The 
protection setting being inappropriate in this case (non-specialised) resulted in 
the failure to of protection operation due to its desensitisation. 
This poses a further challenge to the one presented in the previous section. Not 
only does a protection scheme need to achieve robust behaviour but it also must 
ensure that existing protection settings are valid for increasingly variable 
primary system conditions. 
3.6.2 The need for flexible power system protection 
Flexible operation of the primary system, under specific conditions, requires the 
dynamic alteration of the scheme behaviour in order to maintain sought levels 
of performance. A means of making robust behaviour suited (or specialised) to 
different operating conditions is then required. This can be achieved through 
flexible operation of the protection system. To address the example given in the 
previous section, the setting is changed dynamically to reflect the different 
operational conditions as shown in Figure 3-22. 
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Figure 3-22 Flexible changes in protection setting and new system current trajectory 
This illustrates that the robustness of the system can be altered to suit specific 
operating conditions. And this is achieved through flexibly changing the 
protection scheme behaviour by changing to the most appropriate setting for 
the given situation. The protection system therefore can be immune to the 
performance impact of different operational conditions on the basis that it 
exhibits flexibility in behaviour to support its inherent robustness. The topology 
of the system can be used as means of determining the need to change the 
robustness boundaries of the system. At this point in the discussion, the QB 
example discussed previously can be invoked. Energising a QB and tapping it at 
different positions can have a detrimental impact on distance protection reach 
and so the robustness of the Mho zones can no longer deliver satisfactory 
performance. To rectify this, a flexible Mho characteristic can be achieved by 
altering the zone reaches through settings to meet the conditions dictated by 
the QB. This shows that flexible alteration of protection settings can achieve 
robustness against a defined set of primary system conditions. As a direct 
conclusion, it can be said that it is necessary for some protection schemes to be 
flexible to maintain specified performance levels under flexible power system 
operation. 
The delivery of this flexibility is out with the scope of this chapter and will be 
dealt with in chapters 4 and 5 as part of an adaptive protection strategy. The 
extent of possible/required flexibility and the system stimuli defining the 
boundaries of robust behaviour will also be examined. This will be taken a step 
further and formulated in chapter 6 such that effective verification of flexible 
behaviour is possible. 
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3.6.3 Robustness in protection measurement algorithms 
The previous section addressed the robustness of protection system behaviour. 
However, this does not take into account variations in the measurements made 
by the protection system. Obtaining measurements, with an acceptable error 
defined by the application is a prerequisite for correct protection operation. For 
example, the accurate measurement of frequency for some protection 
applications is critical to the correct operation to these functions. This is 
especially the case for off-nominal frequency measurements and those 
containing harmonic distortions [45]. Advanced filtering techniques have been 
used in addition to flexible measurement windows to enhance the robustness of 
information gathering by the measurement stage of the protection system. 
As shown in section 3.5, the disparity in LOM protection performance between 
different manufacturer offerings was mainly attributed to the frequency 
measurement algorithms’ different implementations. This is evidence to the 
lack of an appropriate level of robustness against a varied set of events (i.e. true 
loss of mains and remote disturbances with different initial conditions). Flexible 
alteration in the measurement algorithms’ dynamic response to frequency 
changes can be used to address this problem. However, the main challenge here 
lies in choosing an appropriate flexible course of action during the occurrence of 
an event. 
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3.7 Chapter summary 
 
This chapter reviewed the impact the variable power system topology, 
increased utilisation of DER, ubiquitous FACTS and more frequent occurrences 
of system wide disturbances have on the performance of existing protection 
practices. This revealed a wide range of performance issues that affect the 
sensitivity, selectivity, stability and speed of protection. The power system is 
not necessarily left in an unprotected state. Nevertheless, the deterioration in 
protection performance levels have been shown to lead to unnecessary loss of 
supply and in extreme cases the onset of cascade tripping events which can lead 
to blackouts. 
Further to the effects these aforementioned contributors have, the increasing 
trend of flexible power system operation presents its own array of challenges. 
Flexible power system operation leads to variability in conditions as seen by the 
protection systems. And consequently increases the risk of exposing their 
performance as they rely on fixed settings which are not designed to cope with 
such variable system conditions. To support the understanding of this impact, 
detailed simulations and relay testing were conducted to examine the 
performance of distance protection and loss of mains protection under select 
flexible power system operation conditions. 
An evaluation of distance protection performance was conducted to ascertain 
the impact that QBs have on this scheme. The analysis revealed that the distance 
protection can suffer a reach error of up to 5.68Ω. This extent of impact depends 
on the QB mode and tap position where the worst case scenario occurs for 
phase to phase faults. There is no evidence that operating grid QBs through a 
national coordinated control strategy has an additional impact on the reach of 
the relays. 
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The assessment of loss of mains protection performance revealed not only the 
disparity of performance between the different manufacturer relays, but also 
the effect that the type of generation has on the sensitivity and stability. 
Industry recommended ROCOF settings of 0.15Hz/s were shown to be prone to 
unstable LOM operation. Improved stability is better achieved through the 
introduction of time delays rather than raising the pick-up threshold which 
compromises sensitivity. LOM protection was shown to be largely ineffective in 
the secure operation of inverter-interfaced DG especially when fault ride-
through is required. In other words, when LOM mal-operates due to remote 
faults, the inverter-interfaced DG is disconnected denying the grid of this 
resource. An incremental improvement in LOM performance can be obtained by 
applying the compromise settings proposed in the chapter. This is seen as a 
short term solution to the performance issues experienced which is favourable 
by network operators as opposed to the deployment of communications based 
LOM protection or indeed unproven islanding detection techniques. 
In light of the performance issues reviewed and demonstrated, the chapter 
examined whether achieving robust protection behaviour is sustainable under 
flexible power system operation. It was revealed that flexible protection 
behaviour is necessary to sustain the required robustness. Although seen as 
conflicting objectives, robustness and flexibility can indeed coexist by 
dynamically changing the protection behaviour in a discrete manner to reflect 
prevailing power system conditions. Moreover, this flexibility must be exhibited 
in varying degrees by constituent elements of the protection scheme (i.e. 
measurements, protection characteristic and scheme logic). Ways to achieve 
flexible protection operation through adaptive relaying will be investigated in 
the next chapter. 
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4 Delivering Flexible Protection Schemes with Enhanced 
Performance using an Adaptive Protection Philosophy 
 
 
 
4.1 Chapter methodology and contributions 
daptive protection is an effective means of delivering the flexibility 
required for improving protection scheme performance. Dynamic 
alterations of protection IEDs or scheme configurations to suit 
prevailing power system conditions can deliver this improvement. This is 
especially true with a power system that is increasingly exhibiting complexity 
and variability in operating conditions. The validity of this hypothesis depends 
on understanding the extent to which adaptive protection functionality can 
provide the required flexibility in performance, and the required means of 
achieving that. 
The previous chapter presented and demonstrated the performance issues 
associated with some of the existing protection arrangements under existing 
and future power system operational conditions. It also discussed the need for 
flexibility in protection functionality to achieve robust performance under 
varying system conditions. 
This chapter investigates the suitability of adaptive protection as a means of 
achieving the required flexibility in protection functionality. The concept of 
adaptive protection will be discussed in this chapter along with the main 
protection system elements used to achieve protection functionality. The state 
of the art of adaptive protection techniques will also be reviewed. This review 
will cover those techniques which utilise intelligent systems, transient signal 
analysis, fuzzy logic and heuristic optimisation to achieve improved protection 
sensitivity or scheme coordination. 
A 
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Adopting an adaptive protection strategy to replace or complement existing 
practices comes with its own set of challenges. These are either technical or 
institutional barriers which hinder the integration of adaptive functionality with 
existing arrangements or utility policies and procedures. These challenges will 
be discussed and those challenges specific to different protection behaviour 
adaptation techniques will be detailed. However means of overcoming these 
challenges will be discussed and demonstrated in the following chapter. 
Finally, the distance protection performance case study in the previous chapter 
will be used as a basis to show how settings groups can be best calculated and 
used as a means of adapting the used distance protection functionality and 
improving its selectivity. The engineering implementation of the settings groups 
and setting selection strategy will be detailed in the following chapter. 
 
The main contributions of this chapter are: 
 Defines the scope for the use of adaptive protection functionality. This 
entails identifying the operational conditions of the power system where 
adaptive functionality is deemed suitable. 
 Identifies the technical and institutional challenges associated with 
adopting an adaptive protection philosophy. This involves identifying 
implementation challenges associated with novel adaptive protection 
approaches proposed in the literature. 
 Proposes a procedure for calculating and assigning protection settings 
groups for relays which offer a limited set of settings groups. This will be 
used for the adaptive distance protection scheme developed in the 
remainder of this thesis which takes into account the impact a QB has on 
the reach of plain distance schemes. 
 
111 
4.2 Adaptive protection concept review 
Adaptive protection is not a new protection philosophy. However, in its true 
sense, its application remains confined to academic work and was first 
proposed in [1]. The most widely used definition of adaptive protection can be 
found in [2]: 
“Adaptive protection is a protection philosophy that permits and seeks to make 
adjustments automatically in various protection functions to make them more 
attuned to prevailing power system conditions”. 
This definition identifies the two main characteristics of an adaptive protection 
philosophy – that is the adjustment of the protection scheme functions or 
configuration and the automatic nature of this adjustment. Both characteristics 
serve the objective of matching the protection scheme or behaviour to the 
prevailing power system conditions in order to improve the protection 
performance. Therefore, it is necessary for the adaptive protection scheme to 
monitor the power system to determine its state and adjust its configuration 
accordingly. In light of this definition, the following subsections will discuss the 
resulting requirements for adaptive protection schemes. 
4.2.1 Identification of prevailing power system conditions 
It is necessary to define what a prevailing power system state means from a 
protection system perspective. Consider a transmission line with series 
compensation for instance. As discussed in chapter 3, distance protection 
applied to this line can experience zone reach issues. This is also directly 
influenced by the mode of operation of the series compensation, the level of 
compensation and the relative positions of fault and compensation apparatus to 
the protection relay. Therefore it can be concluded that in this instance, the 
prevailing power system conditions are determined by the state of the series 
compensation. A further example would be identifying islanded or grid-
connected operation of sections of the distribution network (or microgrids). 
Chapter 3 also discussed the impact of islanding on the performance of 
overcurrent protection schemes especially when inverter-interfaced DER is 
112 
predominant in a microgrid. This means that that the prevailing power system 
condition, in this case, is related to the connection mode of the microgrid and 
the DER type and activity. There remains an element of uncertainty, however, 
related to the fault nature and location. Ideally, knowledge of this greatly 
enhances the knowledge of the system conditions. However, characterising the 
fault conditions to serve adaptive protection functionality can prove difficult 
especially due to the tight time frames involved in decision making. 
It is then clear that from a protection perspective, that knowledge of the 
prevailing power system condition is tied with the knowledge of the source and 
extent of performance impact network conditions has on a specific protection 
function. Consequently, adaptive protection functionality will need to infer 
these prevailing conditions by making the appropriate direct or derived 
measurements. Prevailing power system conditions, from a protection 
standpoint, can be inferred from information obtained from measurements 
made during fault conditions or after the occurrence of operational events pre-
fault conditions. System information obtained in both categories can be 
potentially used to adapt the protection system functionality. However, there 
are risks and challenges involved in their use when attempting to alter the 
behaviour of the protection. 
Consider the series compensation example once again. The knowledge of level 
of compensation can be directly used to alter the zone reach of the distance 
relay and avoid potential reach issues. However, mal-operation of the 
directional element cannot necessarily be dealt with in the same manner. Since 
voltage and current inversion are influenced by the fault location, it is difficult to 
initiate any corrective adaptive behaviour prior to the fault conditions. 
Therefore, any adaptive protection actions designed to deal with this condition 
must rely on the information gathered during the fault onset and development. 
This means that relying on pre-fault information is largely ineffective in dealing 
with any protection performance impact caused by fault location or type. 
Conversely, attempting to adapt protection behaviour during fault conditions 
can be seen as a risky strategy. Measurements during fault conditions may not 
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provide a completely reliable view of the system status especially when 
protection is expected to operate within very small timescales. Furthermore, 
dynamic changes to the protection system during a fault event can in itself be 
seen as a cause of mal-operation especially if obtained information is 
misinterpreted by the adaptive scheme. Relying on pre-fault information to 
adapt the protection functions will usually involve the use of communications to 
obtain the relevant measurements from remote information sources. Having 
said that, communications can be seen as a vulnerability if it is to fail and the 
adaptive protection scheme has no fall back strategy to cope with it. 
4.2.2 Adaptable protection functions 
Given the capabilities of existing relaying platforms, there are three possible 
approaches to adapt the behaviour of the protection functionality in accordance 
with prevailing power system conditions: 
 Modification of active settings. 
 Use of programmable scheme logic (PSL). 
 Inherent protection element adaptive behaviour. 
Modification of active settings is seen as the most direct way of altering 
protection behaviour. Furthermore, this method is more understood by 
protection scheme users. Modifying protection settings can be approached in 
two ways – selection of active settings from a set of pre calculated settings 
groups or the calculation of settings as and when necessary while the scheme is 
in service then applying these settings to the appropriate protection IEDs. 
The first method of settings modification may be seen as less flexible compared 
to the second one due to the restriction of limited available settings to choose 
from. The risk in this case is the potential lack of an appropriate settings group. 
That said, a limited number of settings groups may be appropriate to reasonably 
cover for all foreseen power system conditions as will be seen in the case study 
in 4.5. Furthermore, relying on settings groups can facilitate the validation of 
the adaptive scheme since there is a known set of possible settings. Commercial 
protection IEDs provide several settings groups (typically 4-6 groups) that can 
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be easily switched between remotely. Calculating protection settings on the fly 
(or online) would be conducted in a similar manner to that performed by an 
engineer (e.g. an over current protection scheme grading study). An algorithm 
performing such functionality automatically requires several input 
measurements, an equivalent power system model and protection setting 
constraints to perform the calculations. 
A PSL can be setup in such a way that the output from a protection scheme can 
be influenced by system conditions. Binary indications from primary system 
plant can be used as additional inputs to the scheme logic. Also, more elaborate 
scheme logic circuits can be developed to deal with a wider range of system 
operating conditions as opposed to what is being used at the moment. None of 
the existing commercial offerings allow changing between different PSL circuits 
in a similar manner to settings groups. However, the need for such functionality 
is yet to be demonstrated. As protection IEDs become more feature rich and 
offer more advanced functionality, accurate documentation of PSL becomes ever 
more important. This is especially challenging when attempting to compare PSL 
between devices from different vendors and indeed under adaptive protection 
operation. 
The approaches described so far can be used to adapt the behaviour of existing 
protection scheme functions without changing the protection element 
functionality (e.g. overcurrent, distance elements). Conversely, changes to the 
existing functionality can be used to adapt scheme behaviour. This results in 
introducing new protection elements or modifying existing elements. Examples 
of such functionality are discussed in section 4.3. Should some of these 
techniques rely on settings to determine their operation, then modifying these 
settings can still be a valid means of adapting the behaviour of the scheme.  
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4.2.3 Automatic adjustments of protection functions 
Having no operational user intervention is a requirement for a functioning 
adaptive protection scheme. Therefore, it is necessary to provide some form of 
functionality (logic) which bridges the gap between the identification of 
prevailing system conditions and the appropriate adaptive scheme action. 
This gap can be filled with functionality which identifies the extent of impact 
that a change in network conditions has on the performance of the protection 
scheme operating with some given setting. This and the minimum performance 
requirements are used to inform the decisions made by the adaptive setting 
logic (settings group selection or online calculation). This exchange of 
information between different functional elements should be defined in terms of 
content and frequency of occurrence. These are defined in the following chapter 
when an architecture encompassing these functions is developed. Figure 4-1 
illustrates the functionality of an adaptive protection scheme based on the 
definition above. An adaptive protection action is initiated by a change in power 
system prevailing conditions. This needs to be monitored and its impact on the 
performance of the protection at the active setting identified. Then a suitable 
course of action (in the form of setting change or otherwise) is sanctioned. 
 
Figure 4-1 Adaptive protection scheme composition 
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4.3 Review of techniques to achieve adaptive protection 
functionality 
As discussed in the introductory section of this chapter, the examination of 
adaptive protection schemes proposed in the literature will be limited to those 
functions which aim to improve scheme sensitivity or coordination. It should be 
emphasised that coordination in this case encompasses ensuring the selective 
operation of the protection scheme. Other examples exist to address protection 
stability and speed of operation, but the scope of the first set of examples best 
matches the scope of the thesis and indeed the developed adaptive distance 
protection scheme. The review will not delve into the problems that these 
adaptive schemes address as the need for adaptive protection has already been 
established in the previous chapter. Nor will it discuss the intricacies of the 
techniques used as this is out with the scope of the thesis. The schemes 
reviewed fall under one of the following categories in terms of techniques used 
to achieve adaptive functionality: 
 Artificial neural networks (ANN): neural networks are used to recognise 
patterns in measured power system quantities that reflect its prevailing 
operational state [3]. Based on this pattern recognition, a decision can 
be made to alter the behaviour of the protection accordingly. An ANN 
requires offline training to tune its functionality [4]. 
 Optimisation techniques: linear or heuristic optimisation techniques [5, 
6] are used to achieve an objective function which usually aims to 
minimise operating time or maximise selectivity based on network 
conditions. 
 Fuzzy logic: a fuzzy membership function is used to determine the 
primary system state [7] which affects the setting of the adaptive 
protection. 
 Data mining: offline analysis of power system data is used to classify its 
operation into states (e.g. islanded and grid connected network). This 
analysis is then used to create a ‘decision-tree’ logic for online use to 
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infer the state of the system and feed it into the adaptive protection 
algorithm for decision making. 
 Multi agent systems (MAS): Distributed ‘intelligent’ functions operate 
cooperatively over a communications network to achieve a performance 
objective [8] which is usually related to the coordination of a multi-relay 
scheme. 
 Expert systems: the expertise of a protection engineer or power system 
operator is captured in an algorithm to provide decision making 
functionality [9]. This aims to alter the protection behaviour to deal with 
varied power system operating conditions, the same way an expert 
would do. 
 Numerical techniques: these techniques usually implement an online 
form of protection setting calculations that are normally performed 
offline [10, 11]. Other approaches involve the use of multiple prioritised 
objectives to inform the operation of the protection functions [12]. 
 Hybrid techniques: these use a combination of two of the above 
techniques to adaptive the protection behaviour [13]. 
4.3.1 Adaptive protection to improve scheme sensitivity 
As discussed in the previous chapter there are situations when the pick-up 
threshold of the protection is not sufficiently tuned to deal with varied power 
system conditions such as varied fault levels, distinguishing between islanding 
and grid connected states or detecting resistive faults. To this end, a number of 
adaptive protection schemes have been proposed to deal with these situations.  
The use of ANN has been proposed to detect resistive faults and alter the 
tripping logic of distance protection schemes [14]. Self-organising ANNs are 
used to alter the operating characteristic of the distance protection such that a 
temporary extension that encompasses resistive fault impedances is achieved.  
A common problem with ANN based adaptive schemes is that the response is 
always specific to the training data set for the ANN. Therefore the impact of 
transducer errors or different fault impedances is not fully understood or 
catered for. 
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Adaptive scheme examples based on numerical techniques are plentiful. The 
underlying principle of operation however remains largely similar – that is the 
use of power system measurements as inputs to a short circuit calculation or 
state estimation which is then used to tune the protection accordingly. In [15], 
generator infeeds in a multi terminal transmission circuit are measured to alter 
the reach of zone 2 distance protection. Short circuit simulations are performed 
offline calculate the seen impedance by zone 2 under different infeed levels. 
Based on the results, the reach of zone 2 is minimised to avoid overreaching into 
adjacent lines. In [16], another numerical algorithm is proposed to deal with the 
reach error effect mutual coupling has on distance protection. The measured 
impedance is compensated based on the current flowing in the parallel circuit. A 
number of states are defined according to the loading of the parallel circuit and 
fault impedance locus. These determine the appropriate action for the distance 
protection scheme. An adaptive load encroachment algorithm has been 
proposed in [11].  Based on system wide measurements, the relay at most risk 
of load encroachment is identified. This is used to apply an anti-encroachment 
zone (AEZ). Then a simple binary logical operation is performed to combine the 
distance characteristic and AEZ responses to a fault locus to produce the trip 
command. 
Data mining is increasingly finding new applications in power systems [17, 18]. 
In [19], data mining is used as a means to bias the operation of existing 
protection schemes towards dependability or security according to power 
system conditions (i.e. normal or stressed operations). Data mining is used to 
classify the power system measurements that reflect normal or stressed 
operation. A voting logic based on a decision tree derived from the classification 
process is introduced between feeder protection relays and the final trip 
command. Whenever significant changes are made to the network the logic 
must be revised. So it is unclear how the logic would perform if the system 
topology changed often or its dynamics change due to changes in connected 
generation. 
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4.3.2 Adaptive protection to improve scheme coordination 
Coordination in a multi-relay scheme is an important issue when their 
behaviour is being altered dynamically. There are a number of adaptive 
protection techniques that ensure coordination is maintained. For instance, 
optimisation techniques have been used to this effect. In [20], particle swarm 
optimisation (PSO) has been used to coordinate overcurrent protection relays 
using the grading margins as a constraint. Several hundreds of iterations are 
usually required to reach convergence. It is not clear whether the computing 
requirements and time to achieve convergence are suitable for an online 
application of the method to adapt the overcurrent settings. Another 
optimisation method based on genetic algorithm (GA) is proposed in [21] to 
alter the operation of load shedding schemes. The amount of load shed is 
reduced with each stage to minimise customer interruptions. 
Numerical approaches have also been used to achieve adaptive protection. Both 
[12] and [22], propose an approach to load shedding using multiple criteria. A 
combination of bus voltage calculations and rate of change of frequency 
measurements determine the load priority and speed of disconnection to best 
serve the system stability. Although high-speed communications are a 
prerequisite for the effective operation of the scheme, no specific requirements 
have been given. At the distribution level, numerical approaches rely on 
calculating short circuit levels for a given network configuration and applying 
the appropriate settings to the overcurrent relays as in [23]. 
The nature of MAS lends itself to address the coordination problem since it 
relies on peer to peer communication to achieve an overall objective. A MAS 
based load shedding scheme has been proposed in [24]. Loads are continuously 
monitored and when the need for disconnection arises, the scheme prioritises 
attempts to minimise the amount of load disconnected. Different agents take the 
responsibility of system monitoring. In [25], overcurrent relays form part of a 
MAS to coordinate the settings of overcurrent relays in the presence of DG. The 
literature, however, tends to focus on the MAS architecture as opposed to the 
intricacies of the coordination algorithms. Finally hybrid techniques such as that 
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proposed in [9] rely on expert system and fuzzy logic to determine the faulted 
section of a network. Initial operation of protection elements surrounding the 
fault is used to define a search region. The hybrid approach is then used to zoom 
in on the faulty feeder. 
4.3.3 Shaping the research direction for adaptive protection 
It is clear that there is no shortage of advanced adaptive protection schemes 
proposed in the literature that rely on intelligent systems techniques or 
otherwise to achieve improved performance levels. But why has none of these 
or many others previously proposed have never been deployed in the real 
power system despite a clear need for such improved performance and a clear 
advantage offered by these proposals? In fact therein lies the problem with 
adaptive protection. The problem of its applicability and not the problem of 
gaining an ‘X’ performance enhancement for a ‘Y’ network that is operated 
under ‘Z’ conditions. Furthermore, with the exception of MAS based schemes, 
there is a lack of consideration to the scalability and future proofing of these 
schemes. What should be done when the scope of the adaptive scheme needs to 
be expanded to encompass more relays? What if more DG has been added to the 
network? How does the utility manage and maintain the settings of these 
schemes? More importantly, what if these schemes do not rely on crisp settings 
in the conventional sense? 
So it seems that the performance problems facing static protection (that is 
uncertainty and variability in the power system) remain so with some of the 
advanced techniques being proposed. Some of the performance problems are 
being effectively addressed. But the problem of being able to cope with system 
variability keeps recurring even with the use of adaptive techniques. Perhaps 
problem of producing a truly universal adaptive scheme is an unwieldy one. To 
this end, the remainder of this thesis will not focus on adding to the pool of 
existing adaptive algorithms, but it will attempt to understand the bigger 
picture issues related to adaptive protection, thus establishing the scope, 
requirements and approaches that make adaptive protection a credible solution. 
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4.4 Challenges to adopting adaptive protection 
Adaptive protection can offer performance advantages compared with 
conventional schemes. However, there are technical and institutional challenges 
that must be overcome beforehand. This section discusses the main challenges 
associated with the adoption of an adaptive protection philosophy. Three main 
challenges are discussed in this section. 
4.4.1 Integration with existing protection arrangements 
An overhaul of existing protection arrangement to accommodate adaptive 
functionality is not an attractive option. This is especially the case with older 
substation installations. New substations may be more suited for introducing 
adaptive functionality. That said, there must be an assessment of the impact 
such introduction can have on the wider system protection. This includes the 
requirement for coordination with adjacent circuits and/or other protection 
functions as well as any requirement to exchange information with existing 
substation systems. 
Communication standards such as IEC 61850 have created a vehicle to facilitate 
the interoperability between protection functions from different vendors and 
potentially the interchangeability of those functions. Similarly, adaptive 
protection functions to be integrated into existing protection arrangements 
must adhere to interfaces offered by existing functions. As discussed in section 
4.2.1, inferring the system state by an adaptive scheme may require access to 
remote signalling to determine primary plant status. If this information is to be 
made available from the existing substation communication network (LAN), 
then the integration exercise becomes easier. More issues lie in furnishing the 
adaptive protection functionality with signals from remote substations. The 
absence of suitable communication infrastructure will then need to be 
remedied. Factors affecting the choice of a suitable communications 
infrastructure include the required reliability and timeliness of the information 
a communications link can offer. The change of settings will take a finite time to 
achieve which will be added to the time delays caused by communications 
overhead. This must be considered in the context of the application. It may be 
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the case that critical circuits (e.g. major transmission corridors) will have more 
stringent information timeliness requirements. 
4.4.2 Adaptive scheme testing 
Testing of protection schemes has always been an important aspect in a 
scheme’s lifecycle. The testing of adaptive protection schemes is not different 
and in fact is of greater importance. This is mainly due to the increased 
complexity in scheme behaviour due to the introduction of adaptive functions. 
The behaviour of the scheme is perceived to be less deterministic especially 
with the use of some of the advanced techniques described in section 4.3. 
Furthermore, adaptive protection functions respond to an extended range of 
events. In other words the testing of the scheme functionality should not be 
limited to verifying the response of the protection elements to faults. Tests must 
also verify the correct change of settings (or scheme configuration) in response 
to changes in prevailing network conditions. Generally speaking, tests 
performed on adaptive protection schemes must complement those defined in 
international standards (e.g. IEC 60255 [26]) but not replace them. More 
emphasis will be on stimulating the adaptive protection logic rather than 
verifying the performance of conventional protection elements. The following 
two chapters discuss the requirements for testing and different testing methods 
for adaptive protection schemes and demonstrated developed testing 
methodologies using the adaptive distance protection algorithm. 
4.4.3 Inadequacy of utility policies and procedures 
A typical utility protection scheme specification for a distance protection 
scheme can take the following form: 
 Main 1 protection: Unit type sensitive for minimum in 
zone fault current and for all types of faults with a 
minimum fault resistance of 100Ω. 
 Main 2 protection: Non–unit type distance protection 
(Mho or quadrilateral) with 80% zone 1 reach and 0s 
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time delay, 150% zone 2 reach and 0.5s time delay and 
220% zone 3 reach and 1s time delay. 
 Back-up protection: Standard inverse overcurrent 
protection for phase and earth faults set to 
coordinate with main 1 and 2 protection. 
Distance protection zones 2 and 3 are not to detect 
faults onto 275kV feeders. Main 1 and 2 protection scheme 
logic is to operate in a 1 out of 2 configuration. Main 2 
relay characteristic angle (RCA) is to be set in 
accordance with relay manufacturer instructions. 
It can be noted from the above policy excerpt that some of the specifications can 
be lose in terms of specifying minimum performance and relying on the 
discretion of the manufacturers. This is perfectly adequate for well-established 
protection practices. However, if further complexity is to be added to the 
substation in the form of adaptive protection schemes, then the specifications 
will need to be improved (i.e. better quantified) to reflect the impact of such 
schemes on existing operational practices. 
Furthermore, the utility must manage the transition from conventional 
protection schemes to those with adaptive features without jeopardising the 
stability of the system. Furthermore, adaptive schemes must be able to coexist 
with legacy schemes without affecting their coordination. This is in addition to 
the testing and commissioning requirements for each type of scheme. All of 
these concerns are not addressed by existing utility policies and must be 
addressed by defining additional functional and performance requirements and 
acceptable testing procedures in light of relevant standards (e.g. IEC 60255 
[26]) if possible. 
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4.5 Using settings groups to enhance distance protection 
performance in QB presence 
The first step in realising an adaptive protection scheme based on settings 
group changes is to determine these settings groups for the given application. In 
this case, the problem of distance protection reach error caused by QBs and 
introduced in the previous chapter is revisited. The extent of reach error 
previously quantified will be used to calculate suitable settings groups while 
ensuring that mis-coordination with adjacent lines does not occur. Furthermore, 
the calculation will take into account the limited number of settings groups that 
relays offer at the moment. However, a method to overcome this limitation is 
also proposed. 
4.5.1 General strategy for the adaptive distance protection scheme 
The full design and implementation details of the adaptive distance protection 
scheme dealing with the presence of the QB on a transmission circuit will be 
presented in the following chapter. Nevertheless, for the purposes of clarity, a 
general description of the scheme functionality will be discussed in this section. 
As identified in the previous chapter, the distance protection can under reach 
when the QB is engaged into the circuit. Over reach is also possible, when the QB 
is bypassed while the protection is set to compensate for its presence to protect 
the remote busbar. The affected zones of protection will then need to be 
adjusted (reach expanded, reduced or changes blocked) accordingly with the 
aid of status indications obtained from the QB controller. The flowchart in 
Figure 4-2 illustrates the approach to the setting changes. 
The adaptive scheme must determine the extent of reach error for an active QB 
state. This is based on the relation derived from the reach error analysis in 
chapter 3 and was shown to be deterministic. The reach error magnitude      is 
compared to a pre-calculated threshold δ over which an under reach is 
considered unacceptable. Since operating the QB in a bucking mode results in 
more under reach than when a boosting mode is employed, settings group 4 
(SG4) will provide a larger reach than setting group 3 (SG3). Furthermore, 
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expanding the reach of the affected protection zones while a short adjacent 
transmission line exists can result in zone 2 mis-coordination (as discussed in 
chapter 2). Therefore, the default setting is preferred in this case (SG1). 
Alternatively, zone 2 of the remote relay can be extended in line with the local 
relay zone extension to avoid mis-coordination. The first method is preferred to 
minimise potential mis-coordination with relays downstream of the short 
adjacent line. Finally, load encroachment on heavily loaded transmission lines 
can present a risk of mal-operation especially for zone 3. Extending the zone to 
cope with the presence of a QB can increase this risk. Therefore, similar to the 
mis-coordination case, the default settings group is activated during this 
situation. Load blinders can be used to minimise load encroachment. But with 
adaptive extensions of the zones, the load blinders must also be adjusted. 
The approach to changing the settings depicted in Figure 4-2 reflects the 
adaptive protection scheme composition shown previously in Figure 4-1. This 
means that it consist of three main functional stages: 
 Power system state monitoring: the state of the QB and circuit is 
determined through the interpretation of related status measurements. 
 Protection performance impact evaluation: the impact of QB state on 
distance protection reach is determined. 
 Adaptive protection action: the new protection settings are selected and 
applied to improve the performance where necessary. 
This sequence of functions is more formally defined in chapter 5 when the 
adaptive protection architecture is introduced and corresponding functions are 
mapped to the architecture. 
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Figure 4-2 Adaptive distance protection general strategy 
4.5.2 Settings group calculation and mapping to power system states 
The factors affecting the distance protection reach and setting constraints are 
determined first: 
 Mode of QB operation and its tap positions. 
 Minimum distance zone reaches based on minimum performance criteria 
specified in the utility protection policy. 
 Maximum allowable zone reaches taking into account coordination 
constraints with adjacent lines. 
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Figure 4-3 shows the measured impedance locus for different phase to phase 
fault locations and for different QB operational modes and tap positions 
(detailed results can be found in chapter 3). Taps 1, 3 and 5 are used where tap 
position 1 provides the worst case scenario. The busbar names indicate the 
substation names and the faults are positioned between HIGM and RATS 
substations at 0%, 30%, 50%, 70% and 100% line length. The distance 
protection zones depicted are zones 1-3 at WBUR substation and zones 1-2 at 
HIGM substation. The purpose of showing the protection zones at HIGM is to 
illustrate potential coordination issues. 
 
 
Figure 4-3 Phase to phase fault impedance locus mapping on Mho diagram with different QB modes, 
tap positions and fault positions 
Figure 4-4 shows an extended zone 2 (AZ, dotted zone) to provide coverage for 
worst case under reach when the QB is operated in boost mode. The default 
protection zones are left in the figure for comparison. All reach values are 
quoted at the transmission line angle of 84.7˚. The zone reach in this situation 
would be 4.3Ω – an increase of 9.7%. Extension of zone 3 is not necessary in this 
case. 
-2
0
2
4
6
8
-6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6
BYPASS
BOOST
BUCK
Busbars
TL
Z1
Z2
Z3
Z1B
Z2B
WBUR (adaptive relay) 
HIGM 
RATS 
WILE 
R (Ω) 
X (Ω) 
128 
 
Figure 4-4 Mho diagram showing extended zone 2 (AZ) for QB boost mode 
While the QB is in buck mode, zone 2 reach will need to be increased further. To 
fully compensate for the under reach, its reach will need to be extended to 7.6Ω 
as shown in Figure 4-5. The new reach results in mis-coordination with zone 2 
of the adjacent circuit which is unacceptable. It also provides the same coverage 
as that of zone 3 which diminishes zone 2 purpose of remote back up while at 
the same time providing reasonable selectivity. The extent of the reach will need 
to be limited to a maximum of 180% to coincide with zone 1 reach of the 
adjacent line. This is depicted in Figure 4-6 and the resulting reach is 5.5Ω – an 
increase of 40.3%. Zone 3 is also extended by 44.1% to obtain a reach of 11.4Ω 
as shown in Figure 4-7. The obtained settings group are summarised in Table 
4-1. 
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Figure 4-5 Mho diagram showing extended zone 2 (AZ) for QB buck mode to fully offset under reach 
issue 
 
Figure 4-6 Mho diagram showing extended zone 2 (AZ) for QB buck mode to partially offset under 
reach issue 
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Figure 4-7 Mho diagram showing extended zone 3 (AZ) for QB buck mode 
 
Table 4-1 Settings groups selected for the adaptive distance protection scheme 
SG Protection zone Reach (Ω) Reach increase (%) 
1 (default) 
Zone 1 0.994 - 
Zone 2 3.918 - 
Zone 3 7.663 - 
2 Not used 
3 
Zone 1 0.994 0 
Zone 2 4.3 9.7 
Zone 3 7.663 0 
4 
Zone 1 0.994 0 
Zone 2 5.5 40.3 
Zone 3 11.4 44.1 
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4.5.3 Settings group for a fall back situation 
The adaptive settings selection logic is independent of the protection IED. This 
means that failure in the logic due to communications failure or otherwise may 
result in the activation of a settings group that is inappropriate for a given 
primary system condition. Therefore it is necessary to put in place a fall back 
mechanism which can be in the form of a default settings group that the IED 
reverts to when the communication with the adaptive logic is lost. 
In this particular case, there are three options: 
 Use the default reach settings group. 
 Use the extended reach settings group. 
 Use a dedicated settings group for the fall back situation. 
Using the third option is not meaningful since the first two settings groups have 
been designed to cope with all envisaged primary system conditions (e.g. QB 
states). Therefore, a new settings group will not map to any of the states 
identified in the design stage. The second option can result in over reaching 
when the QB may be disengaged or short adjacent short circuits are energised. 
This is not preferred as loss of coordination is worse than a temporary under 
reach. The first option, as explained earlier, was selected by design to cope with 
situations where mis-coordination with adjacent short feeder and potential load 
encroachment are possible. These are the situations where protection mal-
operation may occur when communication between the adaptive logic and the 
IED is lost. Therefore, the use of the default settings group as a fall back strategy 
is preferred. 
A fail safe approach to implementing this fall back mechanisms can be achieved 
using the IED PSL. The PSL can be configured to revert to the default setting 
when communication failure is detected. 
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4.5.4 Settings group selection implementation with a physical relay 
Figure 4-8 illustrates the implementation of the settings group selection 
mechanisms using a commercial protection relay (Alstom MiCOM P446 distance 
protection IED [27]). This IED offers four settings groups that can be activated 
through the programmable scheme logic (PSL). The two binary inputs SGx1 and 
SG1x are used for this purpose where the ‘x1/1x’ suffix denotes the active bit 
which determines the settings group to be activated as shown in Figure 4-8. To 
configure the PSL, Alstom MiCOM S1 Studio IED configuration tool was used 
[28]. 
 
Figure 4-8 Settings group selection implementation 
 
Table 4-2 Active settings groups using the relay binary inputs 
Active Settings Group SGx1 SG1x 
SG1 0 0 
SG2 1 0 
SG3 0 1 
SG4 1 1 
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The PSL specific to the settings group selection is shown in Figure 4-9. The PSL 
contains mappings of the physical binary inputs and the internal accessible 
variables – in this case SGx1 and SG1x. IED LEDs can also be configured for a 
visual indication of the active settings group. The adaptive logic requires 
knowledge of the active settings group for verification purposes. Details of the 
adaptive logic are left for the following chapter but are in line with the general 
setting selection strategy depicted in Figure 4-2. 
 
Figure 4-9 Alstom P446 PSL for settings group selection 
If more settings groups are required than the relaying platform is capable of, 
then the settings group selection mechanism depicted in Figure 4-10 can be 
implemented. Implementing this method is out with the thesis scope and is for 
illustration purposes. The mechanism relies on storing the pre-calculated 
settings groups external to the relay. The adaptive logic would then select the 
appropriate settings group from the available pool and the chosen settings 
group parameters would then be written to the relay’s active settings group. 
The relay’s proprietary communications protocols (in this case Courier 
protocol) can be used for the data exchange. However, settings group control 
mechanisms specified by IEC 61850 are preferred to achieve interoperability 
and replicate the configuration more easily. The adaptive logic requires an IEC 
61850 MMS client implementation to communicate the settings group 
configuration commands [29]. On the relay end, an IEC 61850 MMS server is 
required to receive and process these commands using an IEC 61850 settings 
group control block (SGCB) [29]. In this case the selected settings group from 
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the available pool will simply be written to the active settings group in the relay 
using an IEC 61850 write service. For verification purposes, the active settings 
group parameters can be interrogated using an IEC 61850 read service. In 
addition to editing the active settings group, a settings group selection may also 
be implemented as a fall back mechanisms in the case of communications 
failure. The setup would require two settings groups in the IED. The first 
contains default parameters and cannot be remotely edited. The second settings 
group can be written to and remains active as long as the communications 
remains healthy. The SGCB can be configured to switch to the first settings 
group in case the communications fail. The rationale for using the default 
settings group as a fall back strategy has already been explained in section 4.5.2. 
 
Figure 4-10 Using IEC 61850 for selecting between a large number of settings groups 
4.6 Choosing the number of settings groups for adaptive protection 
So far the number of settings groups was chosen based on two factors – the 
protection application and the platform capabilities. However, the latter should 
not pose a significant limitation in the number of possible settings groups with 
the aid of additional engineering effort (as shown in Figure 4-10). Having said 
that, additional bespoke functionality to increase the available number of 
settings groups increases the complexity of the solution and consequently 
verification requirements are increased. Therefore, a relaying platform with a 
larger number of settings groups is preferred. 
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Using a larger pool of settings groups increases the flexibility of the scheme by 
providing a finer resolution response for variable power system conditions. 
This, however, blurs the boundary between settings groups and online 
calculation of settings, thus diminishing the value of using settings groups in the 
first place. This coupled with the fact that it is unlikely for short circuit 
protection to experience an infinite number of power system variation that 
warrant a setting change with a marked improvement in performance. 
The first factor, that is the application, can be reliably used to determine the 
maximum number of setting groups necessary. For the distance protection 
reach the international standard IEC 60255 [26] specifies that the MHO 
characteristic should exhibit at least +/-5% accuracy in terms of its reach. To 
this end, this can be used as a guideline to determine the realistic performance 
gains obtained from each additional settings group. 
With reference to Table 4-1, SG 3 increases the reach by 9.7%. This means that a 
single settings group for this situation is sufficient. However, for SG4 a reach 
increase of 40.3 and 44.1% for zone 2 and zone 3 are achieved respectively (see 
Table 4-2). Based on the 5% accuracy discussed earlier, the maximum reach 
increase of 44.1% can be achieved with eight 5% reach increments. This 
translates into eight settings groups for this particular case study. As such a 
total of 10 settings groups can be used including SG1. The suggested 10 settings 
groups are summarised in Table 4-3. This shows the percentage increase of 
reach for each settings group relative to the default settings group SG 1. The 
associated accuracy range for each settings group is also given. Note that these 
settings groups are only for guidance purposes since the implementation (as 
shown in chapter 5) is limited to the 3 settings groups summarised in Table 4-1. 
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Table 4-3 Recommended number of settings groups indicating reach improvement 
Settings group Reach increase (%) 
Accuracy range for  
increased reach (%) 
SG 1 (default) 0 N/A 
SG3 5 0-10 
SG 4.1 5 0-10 
SG 4.2 10 5-15 
SG 4.3 15 10-20 
SG 4.4 20 15-25 
SG 4.5 25 20-30 
SG 4.6 30 25-35 
SG 4.7 35 30-40 
SG 4.8 40 35-45 
 
4.7 Chapter summary 
Following on from the previous chapter’s argument of the necessity to provide 
flexibility in protection functionality, this chapter examined the use of adaptive 
techniques to achieve this goal. This chapter reviewed the wealth of literature 
available on the subject while limiting the scope to schemes that address 
protection performance issues of sensitivity or coordination. The adaptive 
techniques proposed in the literature varied in terms of performance 
advantages, implementation complexity and speed of operation. However, no 
particular technique stood out as being favourable.  
The chapter did not attempt to address deficiencies in proposed adaptive 
protection techniques. Alternatively, it focussed on identifying problems 
associated with their applicability in a real power system. To this end a number 
of technical and institutional challenges to adopting the adaptive protection 
philosophy were defined. 
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With the aid of common definitions of adaptive protection, the scope of its use 
or deployment has been defined. Adaptive protection schemes are argued to be 
best suited for enhancing the performance of conventional protection schemes 
in response to pre-fault events such as topology changes or FACTS device mode 
changes. 
The adaptive protection approach adopted by this chapter relied on the use of 
three settings groups that can be dynamically activated to enhance the 
performance of the distance protection scheme in question. The example 
provided was based on the case study presented in the previous chapter. A 
general strategy for an adaptive settings group selection was presented which 
relies on measuring the state of the QB in the studied circuit. Strategies to cope 
with potential mis-coordination, load encroachment and communications 
failure were also presented. The chapter also proposed an implementation 
based on IEC 61850 to enable the use of more settings groups than the relating 
platform of choice can offer. 
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5 Requirements specification, architectural design and overall 
validation of adaptive protection schemes 
 
 
 
5.1 Chapter methodology and contributions 
t is necessary to shift some of the emphasis of adaptive protection scheme 
development from algorithm focused design to system based design. This 
facilitates improved integration of such schemes into digital substations as 
well as the application of more effective testing strategies based on traceable 
requirements. This underlying hypothesis will be tested through the design and 
implementation of the adaptive distance protection scheme proposed in the 
previous chapter. In doing so, the following main chapter contributions will be 
made: 
 Demonstration of the effectiveness of the proposed adaptive distance 
protection scheme under varied QB operating conditions while utilising 
multiple settings groups. 
 Unique application of systems engineering based specification, design, 
implementation and validation to adaptive protection schemes. This 
takes into account the lifecycle requirements associated with the scheme. 
This process is seen to be essential if adaptive protection is to be 
considered as a viable and practical solution. 
 Identification of the shortcomings of simulation based validation of 
adaptive protection schemes. Such limitations stem from test case 
definitions. 
 
I 
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5.2 Overview of adaptive protection design and architectures 
As discussed in chapter 4, there are numerous examples of adaptive protection 
schemes which demonstrate their ability to deal with flexible network operation 
with varying degrees of success. However, up until recently, no reported efforts 
have been made to formally define and design the functions constituting an 
adaptive protection scheme, nor the interaction between such schemes and the 
surrounding operating environment (e.g. substation environment including 
automation functions). These are important matters that should be taken into 
consideration as will be discussed and demonstrated in the remainder of the 
chapter. 
Architectural design of adaptive protection is one of the focal points of this 
work. The adaptive protection architecture (APA) developed here was first 
proposed by Tumilty in [1]. This presented an ‘implementation architecture’ 
which facilitates the mapping between function of the scheme and the physical 
elements (or devices) that constitute the scheme. This abstraction is achieved in 
a similar fashion to that used by communications architectures that separate 
data objects from low level protocols, but use mappings between these to 
achieve the required functionality in a more flexible manner. The architecture 
assumes three functionally abstract layers as shown in Figure 5-1. 
 
Figure 5-1 Original proposed adaptive protection architecture [1] 
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The functionality that each layer represents can be summarised as follows: 
 Execution layer: this constitutes the conventional protection functions 
that execute well established algorithms to detect and isolate faults in 
typically under a second. 
 Coordination layer: this layer maps settings groups used by the 
execution layer to the power system state. It then activates new settings 
group when necessary and verifies that the activation has been 
successful. 
 Management layer: this layer interacts with the energy/distribution 
management system (EMS/DMS) to provide system wide information of 
relevance to the adaptive protection scheme. Such information includes 
blocking protection operation under certain disturbances if protection 
operation is deemed detrimental to the performance of the power 
system. Such blocking signals usually only operate with non-short circuit 
type protection (e.g. frequency protection). 
The work in this thesis develops the APA further to address the following two 
main issues in the original treatment of the APA: 
 Conceptual applications for the APA were proposed for a distribution 
network application related to frequency protection and islanding. 
Therefore it is not clear if it is applicable to a transmission protection 
application or indeed a wide area based protection scheme. This is 
because the presentation of the APA was mostly implementation driven, 
which although aiding the understanding of the APA, can limit the 
appreciation of its usefulness to other applications. 
 The boundaries of coordination and management layers were not clearly 
defined in terms of constituent functions, minimum interfaces and extent 
of authority. Furthermore, the approach to the adaptation of protection 
was limited to settings group changes, which does not accommodate 
other potentially viable approaches. 
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The treatment of the APA in this chapter will therefore address the above issues 
with the aid of the developed adaptive distance protection scheme. Specifics will 
be examined in the following sections. 
5.3 Adaptive protection lifecycle requirements 
Similar to any engineering system, adaptive protection schemes undergo a 
series of lifecycle stages, each of which dictate a unique yet highly 
interdependent set of requirements. These life cycle stages are scheme design 
and implementation, scheme installation and commissioning, scheme operation 
and maintenance and finally scheme decommissioning and replacement. The 
requirements for each stage are developed in the following section based on 
standard systems engineering approaches [2]. It is first necessary to distinguish 
between the different types of requirements and how these apply to adaptive 
protection schemes. 
The process of determining the scheme requirements starts with the elicitation 
of the user (system operator) requirements [2]. This reflects the expectations of 
the scheme user and these are mainly driven by their protection policy. One of 
the main barriers to the adoption of an adaptive protection philosophy is an 
institutional one and is manifested by the inadequacy of utility policy in 
accommodating such functionality. Consequently, determining the related user 
requirements is one of the first steps in embracing the adaptive protection 
philosophy. It is imperative that the additional functionality offered by adaptive 
protection does not cause degradation in scheme performance. The 
consequences of additional complexity in scheme implementation as a result of 
added flexibility in operation must be understood. De-risking these 
consequences can be managed by adopting effective testing strategies and 
ensuring that the user requirements are always taken into account during 
scheme development. A subsequent set of system requirements are devised 
accordingly taking the form of non-functional, functional and performance 
requirements as shown in Figure 5-2 [2]. Non-functional requirements refer to 
aspects such as the reliability of the scheme [3], redundancy measures and 
compliance with EMC (electromagnetic compatibility) specifications. Non-
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functional requirements considered in this chapter in relation to adaptive 
protection are related to the layout and relationship between the constituent 
elements of the scheme. 
 
Figure 5-2 Development of requirements for a system 
Minimum functionality required by an adaptive protection scheme will be 
detailed in the APA developed in section 5.4. This will specify the interfaces and 
interactions between the constituent functions. Some of the minimum 
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of executing a specific function. The performance in terms of delivering 
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on a fundamental requirement – that is the performance expected of existing 
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5.3.1 Scheme design and implementation requirements 
The introduction of adaptive protection functions into substations should take 
into account existing protection arrangements that will coexist with adaptive 
protection functionality. This should also consider methods to integrate such 
functions into existing substations with full view of future digital substations. 
Practically, these considerations entail the following requirements: 
 Adaptive functions should support existing data exchange mechanisms in 
a substation while being able to accommodate future mechanisms for 
data exchange in light of emerging standards (e.g. IEC 61850 [4]). 
 Adaptive protection functions should capitalise on existing and 
established protection functions if these functions provide an effective 
route through which adaptive functionality improves the performance of 
these functions. 
 Adaptive protection functionality should only be sanctioned when the 
performance of the existing conventional ‘static’ protection functions 
does not meet performance requirements specified by the scheme user. 
 The process of designing adaptive protection functionality should ensure 
requirements traceability to facilitate the process of verification and 
validation of the adaptive protection functions and scheme. 
The requirements above emphasise the necessity of minimising disruption to 
existing protection functions both during integration into the substation and 
during scheme operation. The capabilities of the scheme will always be bound 
by the hardware and software implementation limitations. This is perhaps less 
of an issue with modern computing platforms and new generation IEDs from a 
performance point of view. Having said that, it is necessary to recognise which 
of the requirements should be platform independent and which should be 
constrained closer to the implementation phase. For instance, adopting an IEC 
61850 data model should be independent of the platform of choice. In fact, this 
requirement should dictate the platform specification. However, realising 
transient based protection functions requires a mature gigabit Ethernet solution 
at the IED end, which is a platform and standardisation limitation [5]. 
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5.3.2 Scheme installation and commissioning requirements 
Requirements for installing an adaptive protection scheme draw heavily from 
the design and implementation requirements, especially those related to the 
integration within a substation. However, one of the most significant challenges 
associated with this lifecycle stage, is the site commissioning tests (SCT) 
conducted on the scheme after installation. These ensure that the scheme is 
installed correctly and functions perform as specified during tests. As such the 
following requirements can be specified: 
 Adaptive protection schemes shall provide an SCT mode where tripping 
commands and other interaction with the rest of the substation are 
logically disabled to avoid causing a mal operation. Furthermore, the 
adaptive functions shall also identify input signals which are specified as 
test inputs which do not warrant a reaction from the adaptive scheme. 
To minimise the requirement for substation outages, an SCT mode can 
operate in parallel with the normal scheme operation without affecting 
the scheme performance or as shown in Figure 5-3. 
 A new generation of toolsets are required to generate and monitor 
virtual (i.e. LAN based) test signals according to a predefined set of 
commissioning tests. These tests shall be designed to verify general 
adaptive protection functionality such as settings changes as well as 
scheme specific functionality (e.g. performance evaluation of distance 
protection reach). 
 
Figure 5-3 Behaviour of adaptive scheme under SCT and normal operating modes 
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5.3.3 Scheme operation and maintenance requirements 
Settings management plays an important role in the operation of adaptive 
protection schemes. Although adaptive schemes by definition alter their settings 
or configuration to deal with changes in the power system, ensuring that the 
mechanism through which these settings are altered remains fit for purpose is 
important. Protection diagnostics are critical to the effective operation of and 
maintenance of protection schemes in general. This is no different with adaptive 
protection. However, the process of fault reporting and subsequent diagnostics 
should take into account the additional capabilities offered by the adaptive and 
supporting functions. Both these aspects require performing self-verification at 
different functional levels of the scheme. As such the following is required: 
 The adaptive protection scheme shall perform a self-verification function 
which aims to identify performance shortfalls in the scheme for a given 
power system condition and trigger an adaptation accordingly. The aim 
of the adaptation is to align the performance of the scheme at any given 
time with that specified by the system operator. 
 Regular high level reporting of scheme performance shall be conducted 
by passing self-verification function outputs to the system operator for 
ongoing diagnostics and refinement of the scheme where necessary. The 
high level reporting is performed to ensure that the adaptation does not 
have adverse effects on the system level (in addition to circuit level). 
 The adaptive protection functions shall allow modification to the scheme 
to be conducted online by means of software/firmware upgrades. This 
cannot disrupt the operation of the scheme nor result in degraded 
performance over this upgrade period. 
One of the key operational features of an adaptive protection scheme in this 
lifecycle stage is possessing self-verification functions. This means that the built-
in functionality is capable of identifying instances of degraded performance and 
act upon them either by reporting these incidents to the operator (by means of 
an alarm) or by altering the scheme settings as determined by the design of the 
scheme. This can be thought of as an advanced ‘watchdog’ functionality with 
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corrective measures that seek to improve the performance of the adaptive 
scheme and/or seek operator intervention. 
The level to which some of this functionality can be delivered is dependent on 
the capability of the adaptive protection platform. The number of tasks 
performed such as the self-verification, reporting, test signal handling (in SCT 
mode) may warrant a co-processor to handle these functions while freeing the 
main platform processor capacity to perform more time-critical protection 
functions. Alternatively, these functions can be deployed on a separate platform 
where data is exchanged between platforms as necessary over a 
communications network. In any case, this should not be taken as a guideline for 
the number of physical ‘boxes’ required. On the contrary, the adaptive functions 
should be platform agnostic and only implementation constraints should dictate 
specific deployment platform requirements. 
5.3.4 Scheme decommissioning and replacement requirements 
Requirements are refined continuously for adaptive protection schemes in light 
of their performance in the previous lifecycle stage. Moreover, evolving power 
system operating conditions may dictate that new functions should be added. 
Similar to the requirements associated with scheme maintenance, scheme 
replacement should not necessarily require physical replacement of associated 
secondary equipment. Software/firmware upgrades should be possible to 
minimise interruption and performance degradation of the scheme. The 
duration of the secondary system’s operational lifecycle is much shorter than 
that of primary system equipment (typically 15 and 40 years respectively). As 
such it is necessary to put in place suitable interfaces between these systems to 
facilitate the replacement process. 
5.3.5 Validation vs. verification of adaptive protection schemes 
According to the IEEE standard for systems and software verification and 
validation (IEEE std. 1012-2012 [6]), the processes of verification and 
validation (V&V) involve the following: 
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 Verification provides objective evidence for whether a system satisfies 
the following: 
 Conforms to requirements during each life cycle stage. 
 Satisfies the relevant standards, practices and conventions during 
each lifecycle stage. 
 Successfully completes each lifecycle stage and satisfies the criteria 
for initiating a subsequent life cycle stage 
 While validation provides objective evidence for whether a system 
satisfies the following: 
 Satisfies system requirements at the end of each life cycle stage. 
 Solves the right problem by correctly modelling and implementing 
the laws, rules and assumptions of problem or application domain. 
 Satisfies the intended use and user needs in the operational 
environment. 
Verification is commonly referred to as ‘building the thing right’ and validation 
is ‘building the right thing’. The V&V during the design and implementation 
lifecycle stage is usually represented using a V-Model as shown in Figure 5-4 [2, 
7]. Each phase of development requires a specifically designed test to verify that 
outcomes of the stage comply with specifications. At the end of the development 
lifecycle stage, a complete system validation is performed to provide the 
objective evidence required as mentioned above. 
 
Figure 5-4 V-Model for the V&V of a system’s design and implementation 
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But what does V&V mean for adaptive protection schemes and how can these 
processes be applied effectively? By taking the adaptive distance protection as 
an example, the process of verification must encompass all the constituent 
elements of the scheme. The distance protection elements for instance must 
comply with requirements specified by standards such as IEC 60255 [8]. 
Verifying the performance of the adaptive functions responsible for changing 
the active settings, however, is not as straightforward. In other words, no 
standard methods or policies provide guidance to achieving their verification. 
These questions are addressed in section 5.7 and in chapter 6. 
5.4 Development of a detailed adaptive protection architecture 
As mentioned earlier, the concept of an adaptive protection architecture (APA) 
was first proposed in [1]. To test the validity of the APA for the transmission 
protection application in this thesis and to determine its general applicability, it 
is necessary to achieve the following [9]: 
 Define the functions that each of the architecture’s layers perform. 
 Define the breadth of influence that a higher functional layer of the 
architecture has on functions belonging to a lower layer. 
 Determine the nature, frequency and timeliness of information 
exchanged between the architecture’s layers. 
For reference the APA developed in this thesis is shown in Figure 5-5 and each 
of its constituent elements is discussed in the following subsections. 
5.4.1 The role of execution layer functions 
As mentioned earlier, execution layer functions constitute conventional 
protection elements such as distance, over current and frequency protection 
relays. These react to faults or disturbances in the usual manner and their 
response time usually takes under 1s but more typically tens of milliseconds 
especially at the transmission level. 
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Figure 5-5 Developed adaptive protection architecture 
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draw back in this approach is that it is difficult to correct for protection 
performance shortfall that only manifest themselves during transients (e.g. 
current and voltage inversion effects in the presence of series compensation 
[10]). This role can be filled by more advanced transient based protection 
functions [11]. The implementation of such functionality is out with the scope of 
this thesis. However, to maintain the logical hierarchy of the APA it is necessary 
that any kind of protection functions operating at the execution level possess a 
degree of configurability (through settings or otherwise) to ensure flexibility in 
performance that can be fine tuned by the upper layers of the APA. 
5.4.1.1 Scope and time response of the execution layer 
The scope of the execution layer functions is defined by the scope of the scheme 
which is usually of a local nature. Only communications based protection 
schemes that incorporate protection signalling extend beyond the local scope of 
this layer. The execution layer has no direct influence on the operation of the 
upper APA functions, as their performance is purely based on the information 
reported by this layer. 
The time response of these functions is defined by the application. Normally, 
faster operation (tens of milliseconds) is associated with transmission level 
protection. Distribution level short circuit protection may take just over a 
second to operate in extreme cases. In such cases, there is actually room for 
adaptive protection functionality to better optimise such occurrences for faster 
operation. 
5.4.1.2 Execution layer interfaces 
A minimum logical interface is defined to not restrict implementation options 
and at the same time ensure consistency between different implementations. 
The inputs to the layer are: 
 Measurements from instrumentation sources for achieving specific 
protection functionality in addition to remote and local protection 
signalling (e.g. inter trip and breaker status respectively). 
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 A configuration change command, which can take the form of either a 
settings group selection or a direct settings write operation. This is 
triggered by the coordination layer and its frequency depends entirely 
on the frequency of changes in the network that warrant a change in 
settings. The configuration change can be extended to a change in 
scheme logic (PSL), but as discussed in the chapter 4, no evidence exists 
as to how this can be useful. 
5.4.2 The role of coordination layer functions 
The response of coordination layer functions is limited to pre-fault events. That 
is changes in the network conditions that warrant a change in execution layer 
configuration. To ensure that a change in network conditions is reflected 
accordingly in a new protection IED configuration, four functions are required: 
 System state acquisition: the nature of information generated by this 
function takes the form of a status indication. This does not mean that 
this information is restricted to circuit breaker or tap changer position. 
In fact other types of information can be incorporated in this way such as 
the level of DG penetration reaching a predetermined critical level. 
 Online protection performance verification: The expected and actual 
performance of the execution layer functions based on system conditions 
is performed here. System status information generated by the previous 
functions is utilised. 
 New protection configuration selection: Whether settings are calculated 
on the fly or selected from a predetermined pool of settings groups, the 
associated logic selects the most appropriate setting to minimise the 
performance shortfall (e.g. reach error) reported by the performance 
verification function. 
 New protection configuration activation and verification: this function 
deals with low level communications to activate the new protection 
configuration. Once the activation is performed, it is verified by 
interrogating the status of the execution layer IEDs. 
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5.4.2.1 Scope and time response of the coordination layer 
Since coordination layer functions operate directly on execution layer functions, 
their scope of actions does not go beyond that of the execution layer’s 
protection scheme. The scope of the information required by its functions is 
determined by offline studies that quantify the impact of different network 
conditions on the scheme (short of wide area disturbances). The time frames 
involved from condition changes to settings changes can take up to a few 
seconds depending on the type of performance verification conducted. 
5.4.2.2 Coordination layer interfaces 
One of the important issues that need to be taken into account is the timeliness 
of the configuration changes sanctioned by the coordination layer. An 
acceptable finite amount of time required for these changes in governed by: 
 The likelihood of a fault or disturbance occurring this time. 
 The criticality of the protected network and the impact that leaving the 
network in a degraded protection state has on this network. 
5.4.3 The role of management layer functions 
The goals of verifying protection performance and initiating adaptive 
configuration of protection are echoed in the management layer. But this is 
where similarities with the coordination layer end as this layer has a wider 
system scope and different emphasis in operating time scales and performance 
improvement objectives. 
In the case of the coordination layer, the impact on scheme performance is 
evaluated at the scheme level and can be potentially implemented for all 
protection schemes. However, the evaluation of system wide information for 
protection purposes during wide area disturbances is less feasible at the scheme 
level. Therefore, it is necessary to rely on wide area measurements to achieve 
this evaluation. This is then followed by identifying the protection schemes that 
are most vulnerable to these disturbances and adapt their configuration 
accordingly. Protection vulnerability has been discussed in literature as a means 
of identifying relays which are most likely to mal-operate under stressed 
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conditions due to load encroachment for instance. A number of indices have 
been proposed to quantify such vulnerability [12-14]. By employing a similar 
approach, the response of the management layer can be more targeted and no 
fixed associations with protection scheme are required. The functions 
constituting the management layer generally operate in the same way their 
counterparts in the coordination layer do. This in essence identifies the 
potential performance shortfalls in protection and reacts by issuing corrective 
measures. 
5.4.3.1 Scope and time response of the management layer 
The nature of protection issues that the management layer deals which lends 
itself to close integration with system integrity protection schemes (SIPS) [15]. 
Consequently the management layer requires information produced by the 
system operator (EMS, energy management system) to identify stressed power 
system conditions and how these conditions are evolving over time in different 
parts of the system. The nature of power system phenomena dictates the 
response time frames of the management layer which can be in the order of 
several seconds or even minutes when dealing with slow stability issues (e.g. 
voltage instability) and the potential for cascade tripping. This brings forward a 
requirement to possess predictive protection impact capabilities not too 
dissimilar to predictive out of step functionality [7]. 
The management layer will have a more varied set of options when issuing an 
adaptive protection action depending on the developing power system 
situation. Actions can range between scheme blocking signals to defining 
maximum and minimum boundaries for the possible settings options selected 
by the coordination layer. When several actions are possible, then these can be 
ranked in terms of their effectiveness in achieving increased protection security 
or dependability before issuing the appropriate command [16]. 
5.4.3.2 Management layer interfaces 
While the management layer has significant interactions with the system 
operator (EMS), it does not necessarily need to physically reside in a control 
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room. Access to the required information is what counts. The minimum 
information necessary is obtained from wide area measurements, state 
estimation functions and manual operator overrides. 
5.5 Design and implementation of the proposed adaptive distance 
protection scheme 
In chapter 4, the algorithm for the proposed adaptive distance protection 
scheme was presented in Figure 4-2. The flowchart focuses on the processes 
associated with identifying distance reach errors due to different primary 
system triggers. This section will present how this core functionality is realised 
in line with the APA functional layers. From the outset, the required 
functionality is organised to reflect the APA layers and as such the following 
subsections will discuss the associated functions individually. 
The distance protection algorithm was implemented in Simulink for subsequent 
deployment in a substation computer (PC target). This choice was influenced by 
the following [17]: 
 The ability to generate code and deploy the algorithm on a variety of 
targets (embedded or otherwise). This is critical for a model based 
design methodology which facilitates the verification and validation of 
developed algorithms. Furthermore, errors introduced by the user are 
minimised during the automatic code generation. 
 Potential for integrating advanced Simulink functionality such as 
additional component libraries, model checking, code optimisations and 
hardware in the loop capabilities. 
Only coordination and limited management layer functionality are implemented 
in Simulink. Execution layer functionality is provided by a physical distance 
protection IED. The distinction between prototype and field adaptive scheme in 
terms of implementation decisions is discussed in 5.6.3. Figure 5-6 shows the 
structure of the Simulink model and how it interacts with the other elements of 
the scheme under different testing stages. The full Simulink model is presented 
in Appendix B for reference. 
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Figure 5-6 High level structure of the Simulink model and interaction with testing 
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scope of this is defined by dotted red area in Figure 5-6). Details of this test are 
in section 5.6. Formal testing (as will be described in chapter 6) will be 
conducted on the adaptive functions within the Simulink environment itself. For 
reference the implementation of the scheme is depicted in Figure 5-7. The target 
used to implement the adaptive protection functions and communications 
interfaces is the ABB COM600 substation gateway [18]. Furthermore, the RTDS 
was used to implement the power system model. The target and RTDS are 
indicated within the implementation diagram in Figure 5-7. The physical 
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functions and communications interfaces. 
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Figure 5-7 Adaptive distance protection scheme implementation 
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Figure 5-8 Physical equipment used for HIL testing of the adaptive distance protection scheme 
5.5.1 Primary ‘system state acquisition’ function 
In this case the adaptive protection functions monitor the primary system 
quantities that may require an adaption of settings. These quantities are based 
on indications derived from the following events: 
 Change of QB connection (bypassed or engaged): reach errors may be 
introduced due to this change. The source of this information is the QB 
controller in the RTDS simulation 
 Change of QB mode (boost or buck): reach errors may be introduced due 
to this change. The source of this information is the QB controller. 
 Change of QB tap position: reach errors may be introduced by this 
change. The source of this information is the QB controller. 
Simulink Stateflow has been used to enumerate the QB status based on the 
measured quantities above. Figure 5-9 shows the Stateflow diagram for 
acquiring the QB connection and mode status. 
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Figure 5-9 QB connection and mode state acquisition 
There are two approaches to determining the above changes when the adaptive 
scheme is operational. The first approach requires regular polling of the sources 
of information identified above. The second approach relies on the sources of 
information broadcasting the status change events as soon as they change. The 
first approach is implemented in this case. When regular polling is utilised, the 
amount and frequency of data is more deterministic. This is helpful when 
determining the minimum requirements for the communications networks that 
carry this data. Furthermore, regular polling is inherently more robust against 
communications failure as failure to report data during a poll can be an 
indication of potential communications or component failure. Whereas if event 
reporting is used, the absence of data reports does not necessarily reflect the 
health of communications channel or data sources. 
5.5.2 ‘Online protection performance verification’ function 
The operation of this function is based on the quantification of QB impact on 
distance reach performance presented in chapter 3. Thus QB state information 
is used to assess the performance of the distance protection at any given time. 
In other words, it determines whether reach errors occur as a result of primary 
system changes, whether these errors are acceptable and whether settings 
changes are required. To ensure flexibility in the implementation, this function 
relies on two configurable error ‘settings’. This means that the function can be 
applied to scenarios where the impact on distance protection reach requires 
fine tuning due to different QB parameters or indeed different kinds of FACTS 
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devices with a similar impact (e.g. phase shifting transformers, line 
compensation, etc.). These settings are the reach error magnitude |∆Z| and the 
reach error threshold δ. The value of |∆Z| is determined by the relation 
presented in chapter 3 (section 3.4.5) which is empirically derived from the 
offline evaluation of the circuit in question. While δ determines the ‘buffer zone’ 
before an error becomes significant and thus triggers a change in settings. An 
error is deemed significant if the measured impedance lies out with the 
appropriate protection zone which does not occur for all reach error values. 
This depends on the network in question. These configurable error settings 
mean that the adaptive protection response can be characterised given that the 
inputs and the reach error relations are known. This is beneficial when testing 
the scheme since the adaptive protection response can be verified against an 
expected response that is based on this characterisation. 
 
Figure 5-10 Initiating or blocking settings changes based on reach error for a given QB state 
 
5.5.3 ‘New protection configuration selection’ function 
Three settings groups were implemented as discussed in the previous chapter 
and presented here again in Table 5-1 for convenience. This presents the pool of 
settings that the settings selection logic draws from once triggered to do so. 
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Table 5-1 Implemented settings groups 
SG Protection zone Reach (Ω) Time delay (S) 
1 (default) 
Zone 1 0.994 0 
Zone 2 3.918 0.5 
Zone 3 7.663 1 
2 Not used - 
3 
Zone 1 0.994 0 
Zone 2 4.3 0.5 
Zone 3 7.663 1 
4 
Zone 1 0.994 0 
Zone 2 5.5 0.5 
Zone 3 11.4 1 
 
5.5.4 ‘New protection configuration activation and verification’ function 
The newly selected settings groups are written to the communications channel 
for activation using the communications gateway interface described in the 
following subsection. The low level implementation of the settings group 
activation logic is depicted in Figure 5-11. This translates the enumerated 
settings groups into signals for activation on the distance relay. 
 
Figure 5-11 Settings activation low level implementation 
 
5.5.5 Implemented communications interfaces 
A substation gateway (ABB COM600) has been used to provide the 
communications capability for transferring data between the RTDS and the 
adaptive protection scheme [18]. DNP 3.0 was used to exchange this data via the 
RTDS GTNET card [19]. The gateway utilised an OPC (object linking and 
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embedding for process control) server to achieve the communication. This 
presented limitations in the speed and frequency of data exchange as will be 
seen in the testing results later on. When reading and writing data from and to 
the OPC server (QB status and setting group respectively), synchronous 
read/write operations were used which guarantee order of operation but are 
slower compared to asynchronous read/write operations. Furthermore, the 
frequency of read/write operations had to be reduced to once every 5s, 
otherwise software exceptions would occur. An excerpt of the synchronous 
write operation to activate a new settings group is shown below. 
switch (setting_group) 
{ 
    case 1: sg_x1.iVal = 0; 
            sg_1x.iVal = 0; 
            break; 
    case 3: sg_x1.iVal = 0; 
            sg_1x.iVal = 1; 
            break; 
    case 4: sg_x1.iVal = 1; 
            sg_1x.iVal = 1; 
}        
writableItem2->writeSync(sg_x1); 
writableItem3->writeSync(sg_1x); 
 
5.5.6 Management layer functions implementation 
A discussed in chapters 3 and 4, national coordinated QB control functionality 
forms the link between the system operator and the adaptive protection 
functions. In this case, this link is realised through the management layer. 
Implementing a coordinated system wide QB control scheme is out with the 
scope of the thesis. In this case, only the global configuration constraint (see 
Figure 5-5) has been implemented as an enable signal for coordination layer 
functions. 
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5.6 Hardware in the loop (HIL) adaptive distance protection 
scheme validation 
5.6.1 HIL validation methodology 
Dynamic testing of the developed adaptive distance protection scheme has been 
conducted using hardware in the loop arrangement. This has already been 
illustrated in Figure 5-7. The scenarios that have been tested are summarised in 
Table 5-2. The tests presented are for phase to phase faults which cause the 
worst case under reach. Three sets of results are presented for each of the test 
cases: 
 A control case: this shows the response of the distance protection IED 
without adaptive functionality. The QB status is shown for each case. 
 Adaptive protection response: this shows the response of the distance 
protection IED with adaptive protection functions enabled. The QB status 
and settings groups selected for each test are also shown. 
 IED disturbance record: the record shows the relay trip commands of the 
individual distance protection zones. 
Table 5-2 Summary of hardware in the loop test cases for the adaptive protection scheme 
Test case QB mode Tap position Fault position Tested zone Fault type 
1 Boost 4 50% Zone 2 
Two phase fault 
2 Buck 4 30% Zone 2 
3 Buck 5 50% Zone 2 
4 Buck 1 70% Zone 3 
5 Buck 4 100% Zone 3 
 
The primary system used for testing is the same one illustrated in Figure 3-6 
which was used originally to determine the impact of QBs on distance 
protection reach. Figure 5-12 shows a section of this network with the 
simulated fault positions indicated. For scenarios testing zone 2, the simulated 
fault duration was 0.8s. This duration is increased to 1.3s for zone 3 test 
scenarios. 
165 
 
Figure 5-12 Test network showing fault positions and distance protection relay 
With adaptive protection disabled, the total simulation time captured is 2s. This 
is increase to 40s for when the adaptive protection is enabled. This is to ensure 
that enough time is made available for the OPC server to propagate the QB 
status and settings changes as discussed previously. Also the plot sampling in 
RSCAD was reduced to every 8th sample to remain within the maximum limit of 
available samples for plotting waveforms over a longer period of time. 
Therefore the resolution of the captured waveforms is slightly reduced as a 
consequence of increased simulation time – this does not affect the fidelity of 
the secondary injection. 
5.6.2 HIL validation results 
5.6.2.1 Test case1 results 
Figure 5-13 shows the failure of the distance relay to detect the fault by the 
absence of the trip signal. Under normal circumstances zone 2 is expected to 
trip after a time delay of 0.5s. 
In Figure 5-14, the adaptive functions are enabled. After engaging the QB at 10s, 
the active settings group is changed to SG3 at 24s. A fault is applied at 35s which 
is cleared after the 0.5s zone 2 delay. The associated disturbance record shown 
in Figure 5-15 confirms the tripping of zone 2 while the other zones do not trip. 
When the QB is engaged at 10s, a transient inrush current can be observed 
(Figure 5-14). This can be avoided by switching in the QB at minimum tap and 
then gradually tapping up the transformer to achieve the desired tapping 
position. However, this would have increased simulation time further. 
WBUR
HIGM
RATS
21
fault 
position 
100%
fault 
position 
30-70%
166 
 
Figure 5-13 Test case 1, adaptive protection disabled 
 
Figure 5-14 Test case 1, adaptive protection enabled 
 
Figure 5-15 Test case 1, IED disturbance record 
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5.6.2.2 Test case 2 results 
In a similar fashion to the previous case, Figure 5-16 shows the failure of the 
distance protection to trip for an in-zone 2 fault when adaptive functionality is 
disabled. A correct operation of the relay is obtained when the adaptive scheme 
is enabled as shown in Figure 5-17. In this case, the settings change takes 19s to 
take effect. The associated disturbance record where zone 2 trips is shown in 
Figure 5-18. 
 
Figure 5-16 Test case 2, adaptive protection disabled 
 
Figure 5-17 Test case 2, adaptive protection enabled 
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Figure 5-18 Test case 2, IED disturbance record 
5.6.2.3 Test case 3 results 
The final test case for zone 2 operation is shown in Figure 5-19 when adaptive 
protection is disabled. Correct operation of the zone 2 relay is obtained and 
depicted in Figure 5-20 where the settings change takes effect in 14s. The 
associated disturbance record is shown in Figure 5-21. 
 
Figure 5-19 Test case 3, adaptive protection disabled 
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2
-2
0
2
x 10
4
P
ri
m
a
ry
C
u
rr
e
n
t 
(A
)
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2
0
Trip
Z
o
n
e
 1
T
ri
p
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2
0
Trip
Z
o
n
e
 2
T
ri
p
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2
0
Trip
time (s)
Z
o
n
e
 3
T
ri
p
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2
Engaged
Bypassed
Q
B
C
o
n
n
e
c
ti
o
n
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2
Buck
Boost
Q
B
M
o
d
e
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2
2
4
6
T
a
p
P
o
s
it
io
n
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2
-20
0
20
S
e
c
o
n
d
a
ry
C
u
rr
e
n
t 
(A
)
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2
0
Trip
time (s)
R
e
la
y
T
ri
p
169 
 
Figure 5-20 Test case 3, adaptive protection enabled 
 
Figure 5-21 Test case 3, IED disturbance record 
 
5.6.2.4 Test case 4 results 
Zone 3 operation is tested in this case. Figure 5-22 shows that the relay fails to 
trip for an in zone fault when adaptive functionality is disabled. Successful fault 
clearance post adaptive settings group change is shown in Figure 5-23. In this 
case, the settings changes took 16s to take effect. The relay trips after 1s zone 3 
time delay. The associated disturbance record is shown in Figure 5-24. 
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Figure 5-22 Test case 4, adaptive protection disabled 
 
Figure 5-23 Test case 4, adaptive protection enabled 
 
Figure 5-24 Test case 4, IED disturbance record 
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5.6.2.5 Test case 5 results 
The final zone 3 test case is shown in Figure 5-25 - Figure 5-27. Successful zone 
3 operation is obtained with setting change taking 15s to be activated. 
 
Figure 5-25 Test case 5, adaptive protection disabled 
 
 
Figure 5-26 Test case 5, adaptive protection enabled 
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Figure 5-27 Test case 5, IED disturbance record 
5.6.3 Discussion of HIL validation results in light of APA design and 
scheme implementation 
In view of the validation results obtained in the previous section, the following 
three main issues will be examined: 
 The time delay associated with the settings group changes. 
 The performance impact of adaptive protection functions interactions on 
that of the conventional protection functions. 
 Implementation constraints of prototype vs. production adaptive 
protection schemes. 
The results have shown that a changing between settings based on the 
implementation of the scheme takes 14-19s from the point at which the primary 
system changes. As discussed earlier, this variability is due to the use of the 
synchronous read/write operations for the OPC server. Although asynchronous 
operation can provide better performance, the synchronous approach offers a 
critical feature. This feature is the guarantee of order read/write operations. 
The order in which read (system state acquisition) and write (settings 
activation) operation are performed is important from the point of view of 
reliable and deterministic adaptive protection functionality. The APA specifies 
that these operations are performed in a certain order to fulfil the required 
functionality. As such, an incorrect setting may be selected temporarily until the 
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status values settle. Therefore, the synchronous approach offers a form of 
‘logical interlocking’ when attempting to change settings groups. 
Not acting to primary system changes with the appropriate settings leaves the 
back-up protection vulnerable to reach errors. The duration of this vulnerability 
has been reduced by applying the adaptive protection functions. In this 
particular case, a delay of 14-19s in new settings activation should be 
acceptable as it is unlikely that the QB would change states at a rate faster than 
this delay. Generally speaking, however, there leaving the primary system in a 
degraded protection state may not be acceptable especially when the system is 
operating in a stressed state. This is where management layer functionality 
becomes more important. The ability to determine the stressed state of the 
system, coupled with predictive state estimation capabilities, enables adapting 
relays most at risk. Once target relays are identified, new settings can be pre-
determined but only activated once the need for a change occurs from the 
power system point of view. Thus reducing the time required for changes to 
take effect. 
The use of industry standard communications gateways (ABB COM600) to host 
the adaptive protection functions and required data communications facilitates 
their integration into digital substations. However, the APA dictates that the 
deployment of these functions is platform agnostic. This should be taken into 
account when planning the migrating of the developed adaptive functionality 
from a prototype phase to a production (substation-ready) phase. As such, 
experience with the prototyping phase must dictate the requirements for the 
next generation of relaying platforms including faster (and more reliable) data 
exchanges at the interface between the coordination and execution layers.  
The APA dictated that the performance of existing protection relays (as set) is 
preserved by specifying the functional separation between execution and 
coordination layers. This has been validated in the results. The action of the 
adaptive functions did not interfere with the operating time of the distance 
protection zones. Indeed, the reach of the relays has been improved by the 
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adaptive functions when the QB was in use. The APA further ensures that the 
execution layer performance (as set) is unaffected by inherently limiting the 
frequency of interactions between it and the coordination layer. This is achieved 
by dictating that the nature of information the coordination layer reacts to is of 
a discrete nature Consequently, marginal changes in the power system do not 
cause continuous new setting activation requests or potential ‘hunting’ in the 
process of doing so. 
5.7 The role of hardware in the loop approach to validating 
adaptive protection schemes 
The previous section demonstrated how HIL testing can be used to validate the 
performance of the overall scheme while incorporating all the elements of the 
adaptive protection functionality as well as the primary system components. 
One of the major advantages of this approach is the ability to unearth issues 
with system integration especially those stemming from the exchange of 
information between the constituent elements of the scheme and the power 
system. However, one of the inherent issues with HIL is that there is a major 
dependency on the design of test cases. In other words, observations obtained 
from the testing are limited by the scope of test scenarios and their ability to 
sufficiently stimulate a wide spectrum of responses from the adaptive 
protection functions. With an adaptive protection scheme in place, measures 
must be taken to ensure that levels of confidence in their performance derived 
from testing are similar to those for conventional schemes. This level of 
performance should be consistent for all network operating conditions that the 
adaptive scheme reacts to. Furthermore, HIL testing remains a black box 
approach to the testing which may not reveal performance issues at the 
algorithm level. Examining the behaviour an adaptive protection algorithm 
more closely is important as it is generally less understood compared to well 
established conventional protection algorithms. 
To this end, a complementary methodology to the testing of adaptive protection 
schemes will be examined in the following chapter. This is based on a more 
formal approach to the testing which utilises the characterisation of the 
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behaviour of the adaptive functions under different network operating 
conditions. It is important to emphasise the different approaches to the testing, 
as will be seen, should be complementary to capitalise on the strengths of the 
different approaches to the testing. One of the main questions that remain, 
however, is how much emphasis should be placed on each approach? 
5.8 Chapter summary 
This chapter presented the engineering process of the design, implementation 
and testing of adaptive protection schemes. This is a requirements driven 
process which takes into account the different lifecycle stages an adaptive 
protection scheme goes through. To facilitate the design and implementation, a 
previously proposed architecture (structural model) for adaptive protection 
scheme has been further developed to formally define the required interactions 
to achieve acceptable scheme performance. The architecture elements were 
then realised through the model-based design and implementation of a 
prototype adaptive distance protection scheme. A hardware in the loop (HIL) 
approach was used to validate the overall scheme performance in terms of 
reach selectivity under different QB operating scenarios. The scheme proved 
successful in compensating for the under reach caused by QB operation. By 
design (settings group range), zone 2 reach compensation is limited to up to 
20% in order to avoid mis-coordination with adjacent lines. The 
implementation and testing focussed on the coordination and execution layer 
functions. To this, end the relevant parts of the architecture have been validated 
for a transmission level protection application. This can be generalised to 
applications involving FACTS devices with an impact on distance protection that 
can be characterised with high certainty. Furthermore, the HIL approach to 
testing can be limited by the design of the test case. Therefore it was 
recommended that further testing of a different nature is required to reveal any 
performance shortfalls in the scheme not immediately observable via HIL 
testing and this will be discussed in the following chapter. 
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6 Formal approach to the verification of adaptive protection 
scheme performance based on hybrid systems modelling 
 
 
 
6.1 Chapter methodology and contributions 
daptive protection can be effectively tested when its behaviour is 
formally described and verified against a set of predefined 
performance criteria. This should take into account interactions 
between the adaptive scheme and the primary system which ultimately triggers 
adaptation in the protection behaviour when necessary. This is the underlying 
hypothesis of this chapter, which requires a formal representation of the 
behaviour of an adaptive scheme. A formal testing methodology that utilises this 
representation is then possible. 
The previous chapter outlined the different methods that can be used to test an 
adaptive protection scheme’s functionality and performance, but focuses on the 
overall validation of the scheme. This chapter focuses on the verification of the 
adaptive protection logic. That is the logic which selects a new protection 
configuration (a new setting in this case) which suits the primary system’s 
prevailing conditions. By formally modelling the behaviour of the adaptive 
distance protection scheme presented in previous chapters, the verification of 
its performance has been shown to be possible. This chapter demonstrates the 
use of reachability analysis as a means of verifying the safety property of the 
adaptive protection logic. This is a formal description of ‘undesirable’ states that 
the logic may reside in and the possible operational conditions that lead to 
residing in these states. 
 
 
A 
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The main contributions of this chapter are: 
 Development of a novel methodology where the behaviour of adaptive 
protection functions interacting with conventional protection 
functions and the primary system is described in the hybrid systems 
domain. The use of this behavioural modelling approach for the stated 
application is the first of its kind. 
 The standard hybrid system discrete event abstraction has been 
redefined to overcome limitations in describing hierarchical control 
structure. This was necessary to encompass the additional control loop 
introduced by the adaptive protection functionality.  
 A unique methodology of conducting the reachability analysis has been 
developed. This relies on creating two concurrent state spaces of the 
hybrid system – operational states and performance states. 
Consequently, a more direct mapping between the active configuration 
of protection scheme and its behaviour under test can be achieved. The 
reachability analysis conducted verifies the safety property for 
adaptive protection schemes (specifically settings selection functions). 
 More efficient safety verification of the adaptive protection logic was 
achieved by eliminating the need for time consuming continuous state 
space computations. This is possible by inferring the safety state of the 
primary system from operational and performance states mentioned 
above. 
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6.2 Power system modelling in the hybrid system domain 
6.2.1 Hybrid dynamical systems overview 
Hybrid dynamical systems (HDS) are those systems which exhibit both discrete 
and continuous dynamics [1]. In such systems, discontinuities in their state 
space trajectories result in jumps between a set of discrete continuous 
dynamics. An HDS is represented using an automaton   which is formally 
expressed in (1) [2]: 
  (                       )      (1) 
Where,   *          +     is the set of discrete states,    
  is the set of 
continuous states,    is the set of control and disturbance inputs,          is 
the set of initial states,  (   )        is the continuous vector field, 
   ( )      is the discrete state domain,       is the set of edges or 
transition maps,  ( )      is the set of transition guard conditions, and 
 (   )        is the continuous vector field reset relation. 
Hybrid systems modelling is applied to a number of engineering system 
problems such as air traffic control, highway traffic modelling, manufacturing 
processes and more recently power systems [3]. Describing such complex 
systems in this domain allows for the use of formal performance verification 
techniques where otherwise determining the behaviour of the system can prove 
difficult or non-conclusive [4]. The study of power systems in the hybrid domain 
enables determining the primary system performance under different 
conditions. Usually, hybrid modelling is applied to study power system stability 
problems. For instance, the impact of circuit disconnection (a discrete event) on 
the generator stability (a continuous dynamic system) can be determined as 
discussed in [5]. It has also been used to evaluate the performance of power 
system controls to avoid system overload through automatic load disconnection 
[6]. In this case, circuit breaker action is used to indicate the discrete events and 
transmission line loading represents the continuous dynamics. 
181 
In order to analyse the properties of a hybrid system, its dynamics are 
abstracted using a discrete event system (DES) representation such as that 
shown in Figure 6-1. The continuous state variables of the plant are monitored 
for events (discrete transitions). The process of detecting these events is 
modelled by the event ‘generator’. A response is produced by the controller 
from a set of control actions. These are interpreted by the ‘actuator’ for 
application to the continuous plant. 
 
Figure 6-1 Basic DES abstraction of a hybrid system [1] 
6.2.2 Modelling power systems in the hybrid domain 
To apply the automaton of (1) in a power system context, the general model can 
be adjusted to deal with the specific system being analysed. In the case of power 
system stability, for instance, the field vector can represent the angular or 
voltage stability dynamics and examples of their formulation can be found in [5] 
and [7] respectively. In these papers, generator swing dynamics were used to 
capture the power system continuous dynamics and these were varied with 
different fault and network topology conditions, hence represented by different 
discrete states. Furthermore, protection action was used to trip certain lines in 
the power systems to mitigate potential stability issues as identified by the 
evolution of the continuous state space. [6], [8], [9] and [10] illustrate the 
transitions between discrete states describing the states of a transmission line 
as a result of protection operation as well as the transition between power 
system operational states. In these papers, the hybrid system model was 
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realised using the Simulink Stateflow toolbox. The model included line loading 
dynamics and dynamics of an overcurrent relay. A controller that responds to 
the line loading conditions was developed to perform emergency load shedding 
if transmission circuits become overloaded post fault conditions. The work in 
[11] incorporates the action of a transformer tap changer into the primary 
system model and its effect on the system voltage profile. The hybrid system 
representation has also been applied to marine electrical systems for the design 
of network reconfiguration controllers that deal with failures [12]. In this paper, 
faults in the marine network are monitored and an appropriate action is taken 
post fault including network topology changes, reduction in propulsion, 
shedding of loads, etc. The actions depend on the nature of the fault and its 
impact on the marine network while trying to maintain as much power as 
possible to critical loads. Modelling the power system in the hybrid systems 
domain is an emerging area of research interest with promising applications to 
the verification of the said systems’ performance under dynamic conditions. 
Furthermore, formulating the behaviour of the system through a hybrid model 
enables a bottom up approach for synthesising stable and robust controls [13]. 
It is clear from the literature that the nature of the hybrid model allows for 
encompassing primary and secondary system dynamics simultaneously. 
However, the extent to which the size and complexity of the power system 
model that can be elaborated remains unclear. This is mainly due to the limited 
sizes of networks being presented and the limited actions of the controllers 
being designed. The scope of the network used in this chapter’s case study does 
not exceed those presented in the literature. Furthermore, the actions 
performed by the adaptive protection logic (developed in the previous chapter) 
are well defined in a handful of settings groups options, and do not have a direct 
impact on the evolution of the dynamic state variables of the primary system. 
Thus there is no evidence that the methods proposed for power system 
applications in the literature will place limitations in terms of state formulation 
for the adaptive system case study. However, there are limitations in terms of 
interaction formulations that need to be overcome and will be examined further 
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in a later section. Although the literature examined the interactions between 
protection and power system, to some extent, in the hybrid systems domain, no 
attempt has been made to incorporate the actions of adaptive protection – this 
is the focus of this chapter. 
6.3 Verification of hybrid systems performance 
The ability to determine the performance of complex dynamic systems through 
hybrid modelling has proven to be an advantage. The performance of a hybrid 
system can be verified by applying certain analysis techniques [14]. Such 
performance measures include (with possible power system applications): 
 (Transition) stability: discrete state transitions should not be affected 
by small perturbations in the continuous system state. Incorrect 
protection operation can be an example of instability in determining the 
system state. 
 Controllability: the ability to obtain any target state from any initial 
state within a finite time using control action. This applies, for example, 
to the use of FACTS devices for dampening system oscillations to direct 
the power system to a more stable state. 
 Determinism: the ability to determine the next state given the current 
state and input. Ideally, when a short circuit occurs then the protection 
can reliably detect the fault and isolate it given that the fault conditions 
satisfy the protection characteristics and logic. 
 Observability: the ability to determine the system state by observing its 
outputs over a period of time. This can apply to power system state 
estimation, or more recently, wide area measurement systems that can 
determine the power system state by performing key measurements. 
 Safety/reachability: the ability to determine whether an unsafe state is 
reachable from an initial state. For instance, would the onset of a system 
fault lead to instabilities or eventually a blackout? 
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6.3.1 The use of reachability analysis to verify hybrid system safety 
In order to conduct reachability analysis, it is first necessary to partition the 
hybrid system’s state space in safe and unsafe regions. This is then followed by 
monitoring the state transitions and continuous state trajectory to determine 
whether these unsafe regions are reached or that the system resides in the safe 
regions at all times. 
It is generally necessary to explicitly compute the complete state space in order 
to determine the unsafe regions within it [15]. In order to determine whether 
these regions are reachable, then either forward or backward reachability can 
be applied [4]. In forward reachability, initial conditions (states) are set then 
inputs are applied to the system to determine whether the unsafe sets are 
reached. Alternatively, in backward reachability, the starting set is the unsafe 
state and the system trajectory is observed to check if normal operating states 
are reached from the initial conditions. Initialising the system can have a role in 
avoiding or reaching the unsafe state. This is in addition to the role of effective 
(safe) control action that aims to drive the system away from unsafe states. 
Reachability analysis has been applied in power systems applications and has 
encompassed the action of protection systems. For instance, [3] verifies the 
safety of fault release control – a form of operational tripping scheme. Should 
generator disconnection occur, certain transmission lines are tripped in order 
to avoid angular instability of other generators in the network. Generator angles 
limits are used as criteria to determine the safe operating region of the power 
system within the state space. Violating these limits results in loss of 
synchronism. 
In [7], reachability analysis is used to determine whether voltage instability 
occurs as a consequence of transmission circuit disconnection. This takes into 
account the automatic voltage control of the generator along with the discrete 
transitions caused by the disconnection of the lines. The critical value of the bus 
voltages determines the safety region boundary. Voltage stability is also 
examined in [16]. Reachability is also used to determine the onset of voltage 
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instability. However, the paper proposes supervisory control to mitigate its 
effects by issuing a combination of voltage control measures as appropriate. 
6.3.2 Justification for conducting reachability analysis for adaptive 
protection safety verification 
As mentioned earlier, the use of hybrid systems modelling for describing the 
dynamic behaviour of adaptive protection schemes is a unique application. As 
such, once an appropriate model has been developed, the performance of the 
scheme can be verified for one or more of the aforementioned criteria. 
Reachability (safety) analysis was chosen in this case. 
The focus of literature on reachability analysis for power system applications 
has influenced this decision to some extent. But more importantly, determining 
the safety of the adaptive protection logic is the most direct measure of 
potential mal operation due to deficiencies in this logic. As such, reachability is 
seen as an important first step in establishing a ‘toolbox’ of formal performance 
verification methods for adaptive protection. 
Furthermore, one of the main difficulties in conducting the reachability analysis 
is in the requirement to explicitly computing the system’s state space. Although 
an accurate representation of the system interactions is obtained, it may not be 
necessary for all applications. The remainder of the chapter shows how 
computing the complete state space is not always necessary if an appropriate 
abstraction of the behaviour is developed. Once the behaviour of the scheme is 
modelled, potential safety violations can be inferred from a set of predefined 
state transitions. 
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6.4 Defining a hybrid model for the developed adaptive distance 
protection scheme 
In this section, the behaviour of the adaptive distance protection scheme 
developed in the previous chapters will be formally described using hybrid 
systems modelling. Interactions between the primary system and the protection 
scheme will be formulated. The behavioural model from the point of view of the 
adaptive protection scheme will reflect the response of the settings selection 
logic to primary and secondary system inputs to the adaptive logic. The process 
involves developing a suitable DES abstraction and then conducting reachability 
analysis on the system after defining its safety states based on protection 
performance criteria. 
6.4.1 Developing a DES abstraction to include adaptive protection 
functionality 
6.4.1.1 Components of system under study 
Consider the high level structure and interactions of the system under study 
which comprises the adaptive protection logic, conventional distance protection 
IED and the protected primary system shown in Figure 6-2. This reflects the 
adaptive distance protection developed in the previous chapter. 
 
Figure 6-2 System under consideration for behavioural modelling  
A DES abstraction represents a continuous piece of plant and a discrete 
controller. In this case, the continuous plant largely represents the power 
system dynamic behaviour such as line loading. Discrete dynamics in this case 
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represent the QB transformer status including the tap position. The operation of 
circuit breakers has no bearing on the adaptive protection logic. Problems in 
formulating the overall system behaviour arise when attempting to integrate 
the adaptive protection functionality into the model. These functions act on the 
protection relay which is considered a discrete controller in its own right. 
Furthermore, the adaptive protection functions rely on measurements from 
both the power system and the conventional protection elements. None of the 
DES implementations found in the literature represent control structures of this 
hierarchical nature. The first step in overcoming this issue is to examine the 
dynamics and the interactions of the subsystems involved – that is the primary 
system, the conventional secondary system and the adaptive secondary system. 
It is emphasised that the term secondary system is used in this case not only to 
preserve the generality of the model, but also to encompass the control IEDs 
which are used to extract status information related to QB status and circuit 
breakers. 
The conventional secondary system comprises mainly of the conventional 
protection elements and the primary plant controllers. The protection elements 
themselves exhibit both discrete and continuous dynamics. To explain this, 
consider a simplified distance protection element which is depicted in a finite 
state machine in Figure 6-3. 
 
Figure 6-3 Finite state machine representing operating states of protection element 
The behaviour of the protection can be represented using two main discrete 
states – healthy and pick up states. The continuous states are the voltage ( ) 
and current ( ) of the network obtained from instrument transformers. These 
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are used to determine the network impedance locus ( ) as seen at the 
measurement point. A jump of this continuous state occurs when an in zone 
fault is introduced into the protected network. The protection then transitions 
into the ‘pick up’ discrete state where the protection scheme logic is executed as 
long as ( ) reflects an in-zone fault. The protection scheme logic is mainly the 
zone timer (and may include protection signalling for communications based 
distance protection schemes). When the zone timer elapses, a trip command is 
issued and the continuous state variable resets to a value within the ‘healthy’ 
state which reflects the new measured impedance. The trip command is handled 
by separate logic not illustrated here. Should the fault be cleared before the trip 
command is issued (e.g. transient fault), then the ( ) also resets to the ‘healthy’ 
state. For simplicity, additional functions such as power swing blocking, phase 
selection, etc. are not considered here. But these emphasise the continuous 
dynamics occurring within a distance protection relay. 
Similarly, primary plant controllers (e.g. QB controller) can be represented 
using a finite state machine with discrete and continuous states. In this case, the 
QB controller is responsible for adjusting the tap position of the transformer in 
accordance with a set point that controls the circuit power flow. The tap 
position control characteristic will be governed by the continuous power flow 
through the circuit. When certain preconfigured power flow limits are crossed, 
the controller jumps into a new state represented by a new tap position or even 
a different operating mode (i.e. boosting, bucking or bypassed). It is then clear 
the conventional distance protection and QB controllers exhibit both discrete 
and continuous dynamics. This will be used to model the behaviour of the 
system in Figure 6-2 using hybrid systems modelling by breaking down the 
interactions between these elements and associated dynamics. Consequently, 
the adaptive protection logic will be integrated into the DES abstraction. 
Finally, the adaptive protection logic can be similarly broken down into discrete 
and continuous dynamics. As explained in the previous chapter, the adaptive 
logic switches between predefined settings groups based on the prevailing 
power system conditions (i.e. QB state and protection status). The main aspect 
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of concern in terms of adaptive protection is that of dynamic setting selection. 
Adaptive protection logic has direct control over the active protection settings 
by selecting the appropriate setting depending on the primary system 
conditions that are being monitored. The influence of the active settings on the 
output of the protection scheme can be described as in (2, 3): 
   (      )        (2) 
   ̇            (3) 
Where   is the tripping or signaling output of the protection scheme based on 
the active setting   , implemented scheme logic   and scheme input   in the 
form of measured or derived secondary analogues  ̇ and/or remote signaling or 
binary indications  . The adaptive protection logic effectively alters the active 
settings dynamically as in (4): 
    ( )         (4) 
Where the adaptive protection operator   acts on the input   to activate the 
appropriate protection setting   . This can simply take the form of a one to one 
mapping between a subset of     
  and a predetermined settings group 
     . 
Table 3 summarises the components of the hybrid system model and the nature 
of the dynamics exhibited by each. Although different components may serve 
several functions or exhibit a range of different dynamics, only those of 
relevance to the development of this hybrid model are listed. 
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Table 3 Summary of continuous and discrete dynamics in the hybrid system model 
Component Subsystem Nature of 
dynamics 
Function description/role 
within the hybrid model 
Settings 
selection logic 
Adaptive 
protection 
logic 
Discrete Activation of settings group in 
distance protection IED 
Distance 
protection 
elements 
Distance 
protection 
Continuous Fault detection according to 
active settings group 
Programmable 
scheme logic 
Distance 
protection 
Discrete Issue of trip command after 
elapsed time delay 
QB controller Primary 
system 
Discrete QB mode and tap position 
Transmission 
circuit 
Primary 
system 
Continuous Line loading status  
Transmission 
circuit breaker 
Primary 
system 
Discrete Line connection status 
obtained from circuit breaker 
status 
 
6.4.1.2 Proposed extension of the DES abstraction 
In order to understand the interactions between the subsystems further, 
examine Figure 6-4. This shows a pairing between the different subsystem 
components and emphasises the relationship between the underlying 
continuous and discrete dynamics. 
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Figure 6-4 Interactions between continuous and discrete components of system under study 
The hierarchical control structure provided by the full adaptive protection 
scheme will be accommodated using two simultaneous DES abstractions as 
shown in Figure 6-5. Each discrete controller acts on a continuous system. In 
this case, the conventional distance protection elements act on the primary 
system in response to a fault condition in a discrete manner (i.e. trip or no trip). 
Similarly, the adaptive logic reacts to the performance of the conventional 
protection when triggered by activating discrete protection configurations in 
the form of a settings group change. 
The state variables exchanged follow the same DES abstraction rules set out in 
the literature described in section 6.2.2. The conventional protection systems 
will monitor primary system quantities   
 ( ). An event  ̃ , - is generated 
should these quantities exhibit excursions in relation to a certain threshold. For 
example, the system impedance trajectory seen by the relay enters a distance 
protection zone. In response, the protection system produces a trip command 
 ̃ , - if the event correlates with the active protection setting. The associated 
circuit breaker then trips in response to the trip command   ( ). Similarly, the 
adaptive protection logic monitors both the states of the protection system 
  ( ) and the state of the primary system (or specified components of it)   
  ( ). 
In this case, these represent the active protection setting and the active QB 
mode respectively. And changes in the active values of these states triggers the 
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events   , - and   
  , - respectively. The adaptive logic then determines an 
appropriate setting  ̃ , - accordingly and activates it in the target relay by 
means of   ( ). 
 
Figure 6-5 DES abstraction representing adaptive protection functionality and its relation to 
conventional protection elements and the underlying primary system 
Now, the newly introduced event and action generators within DES 2 and their 
associated signals require further development. This will be done with 
assistance of the developed adaptive distance protection scheme. The events 
generated are based on the QB status changes and circuit loading conditions. 
The QB status can be obtained readily from its control indications. Therefore the 
QB domain       can be inferred by these status indications. The 
domain     of the circuit loading  ( ) is bound by     ( )   ( )      ( ) 
where     ( ) is the current which can potentially cause load encroachment.      
is dependent on circuit configuration and must be determined on a case by case 
basis. Circuit loading can be a direct result of network topology changes (i.e. loss 
of parallel circuits), however direct measurement of circuit loading is more 
accurate than inferring a potential overload from topology information. 
Protection system state information in the form of an active settings group     
is required to reflect the configuration of the protection. Finally, information 
related to the parallel line connection status is also included through the circuit 
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breaker status information    . The event generator output   , - is then 
expressed as: 
 ̃, -   [
          
                 
          
          
]      (5) 
    in the implemented adaptive scheme is defined by the 
tuple (              )  for bypass, boost and buck modes respectively, and is 
obtained directly from the QB substation controller indications. Similarly,     is 
defined by the pair (               ). The output of the action generator   ( ) is 
a signal whose purpose is to activate an appropriate settings group    . 
In order to construct the automaton, discrete states, guard conditions and 
transitions need to be specified. Based on the DES abstraction signal/symbol 
flows, the primary system automata are shown in Figure 6-6 along with state 
transition guards. 
 
Figure 6-6 Finite automata reflecting primary plant states 
 
 qb_bypass
qb_boost
qb_buck
c
o
n
tro
l a
c
tio
n
[b
y
p
a
s
s
 =
=
 0
]
c
o
n
tro
l a
c
tio
n
[b
y
p
a
s
s
 =
=
 1
]
c
o
n
tr
o
l 
a
c
ti
o
n
[m
o
d
e
 =
=
 1
]
c
o
n
tr
o
l 
a
c
ti
o
n
[m
o
d
e
 =
=
 0
]
 qb_engage
Line_off
normal_load
overload
b
re
a
k
e
r s
ta
te
[C
B
 =
=
 1
]
B
re
a
k
e
r s
ta
te
[C
B
 =
=
 0
]
lin
e
 l
o
a
d
in
g
[I
 <
 I
e
n
c
]
lin
e
 l
o
a
d
in
g
[I
 >
 I
e
n
c
]
B
re
a
k
e
r s
ta
te
[C
B
 =
=
 0
]
194 
6.4.2 Definition of operation and performance states as a prerequisite for 
reachability analysis 
It is proposed that the overall hybrid system is represented using two invariant 
discrete sets      and      which represent the primary power (pps) system 
and conventional protection system (cps) respectively. Invariant sets are those 
where if  ( )    then  ( )         . This applies to all  ( ) and  , - defined 
in the DES abstraction of Figure 6-5. This means that all primary system 
continuous states   ( ) and conventional protection system continuous states 
  ( ) are strictly bound by their respective domains    (    )          
and    (    )         . Therefore, the discrete states      and      are 
mutually exclusive. The significance of this will be apparent when the safety 
property is defined later on. The discrete sets      and      are represented in 
Figure 6-7. It can be seen that      represents the different primary system 
states related to the operation of the primary system (specifically QB 
operation). Also,      reflects the different operational modes of a conventional 
protection relay as dictated by its settings.      and      will thereafter be 
referred to as ‘operational states’. Discrete transitions between the sub-states 
          and           are indicated by  . These sub-states must also be, 
by definition, mutually exclusive to facilitate the definition of safe state. 
 
Figure 6-7 Partitioning of the hybrid state space 
In addition to the operational states, it is now proposed that new invariant 
discrete sets   are created and called ‘performance states’. These performance 
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states represent unique groupings of operational sub-states. In other words, no 
two sub-states belonging to an operational state share the same performance 
state grouping. For instance, the performance state that groups ‘QB buck’ and 
‘Alternative setting 2’ sub-states shall not include ‘Default setting’ or ‘QB bypass’ 
under the same grouping. 
6.5 Reachability analysis for the verification of the developed 
adaptive distance protection logic 
The analysis focuses on the erroneous adaptive protection behaviour caused by 
an unsatisfactory response of the dynamic setting selection function in response 
to a primary system stimulus. To this end, reachability analysis is proposed to 
examine the possibility of reaching an undesired response. This property is 
hereafter referred to as the safety of the adaptive protection logic. One of the 
key requirements of conducting reachability analysis is defining the unsafe 
states that the system must not reach or dwell in. Given that the adaptive logic 
may take a finite time to determine the appropriate setting, dwelling in an 
unsafe state may be acceptable. This is the case given that a maximum time 
delay for the unsafe state exit transition is specified. Note that it was shown 
experimentally in chapter 5 that the implementation of the scheme has an 
impact on this time delay which can be variable. Nevertheless, it is important to 
determine the acceptable boundaries for this delay. Therefore, verifying this 
condition in the adaptive protection scheme context requires the examination of 
unsafe states entry and exit during the adaptive logic operation.  
The performance invariant sets    previously defined are used to identify these 
unsafe states     . Where   denotes an unsafe state. In Figure 6-7, the 
performance state combining the ‘default setting’ and ‘QB boost’ states is 
considered unsafe since this particular combination results in distance 
protection under reach. As mentioned previously, invariant sets are mutually 
exclusive. Thus, the boundaries of the performance states can be clearly defined 
in the hybrid state space. Ultimately, this will result in a clear (binary) indication 
of whether a particular state can be considered safe or not. 
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The system should either never exist in an unsafe state  , expressed as: 
 ((   )   )         (8) 
Where   is the ‘always’ logical operator, or alternatively, the system should 
eventually always exit the unsafe state: 
  ((   )   )        (9) 
Where   is the ‘eventually’ logical operator. This temporal aspect reflects the 
finite amount of time required to exit an unsafe state through adaptive 
protection setting changes. To formally examine the temporal dimension from a 
hybrid system perspective, timed hybrid automata can be considered. However, 
this is out of the scope of the thesis. 
The backwards trajectory obtained from the unsafe transition    can be used to 
identify faults in the adaptive logic, by observing the scheme inputs and the 
resulting adaptive logic state transitions leading to the unsafe state entry. In 
light of this, a safety performance verification procedure based on reachability 
analysis is proposed and is shown in Figure 6-8. This will be used on the 
adaptive distance protection scheme previously developed. While conducting 
the reachability analysis as outlined in Figure 6-8, it is important to stimulate 
the system with inputs for each set of initial conditions. It is worth noting in this 
case, that merely residing in an unsafe state does not necessarily reflect that the 
system under test is unsafe. Since the adaptive protection logic takes a finite 
amount of time to respond to changes in the network, this should always be 
taken into account in the analysis. 
The dotted region within Figure 6-8 indicates the use of     ,      and    
defined earlier. The unsafe states are mapped directly to these invariant sets as 
will be reflected in the implementation below.  
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Figure 6-8 Reachability analysis procedure 
6.5.1 Reachability verification implementation in Simulink 
Simulink Stateflow was used in order to implement the reachability analysis on 
the adaptive distance logic which was also developed in Simulink as described 
in chapter 5. A state monitor was created to identify the state the system resides 
in at any given time. This is connected to the outputs of the adaptive protection 
algorithm developed in chapter 5 and is illustrated in Figure 6-9 (the connection 
between the different Simulink subsystems can be observed in Appendix B). The 
states defined in the Stateflow charts reflect the operational and performance 
states defined earlier. 
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The inputs to the state monitor are: 
 The reach error which identifies whether the distance relay is over-
reaching, under-reaching or at nominal reach. 
 The line loading which is a binary signal representing the loading 
condition of the protected transmission line. Should the load exceed a 
pre-set threshold, the value of the signal is set and vice versa. 
 The active settings group. 
 The remote extension blocking signal which prevents zone extension to 
avoid zone 2 mis-coordination with adjacent lines. 
 
Figure 6-9 Reachability analysis subsystem 
The outputs of the reachability analysis subsystem are three enumerated signals 
described in the boxes below. The enumeration simplifies the reading of the 
outputs. These signals are the ‘Performance Reach States’, ‘Performance 
Encroachment States’ and ‘Performance Coordination States’. These signify the 
occurrence of reach errors, potential load encroachment or mis-coordination 
respectively – mal operation conditions described in chapter 4 and will be 
tested for later on. The occurrence of any enumerated value other than ‘0’ 
means that an unsafe state has been reached. An additional derived output 
(Unsafe State) is used to quickly identify reaching an unsafe state through using 
a logical OR gate. The Stateflow charts within the reachability analysis 
subsystem are shown in Figure 6-10. Each of the charts is responsible for 
identifying whether the adaptive protection scheme resides in an unsafe state. 
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classdef(Enumeration) PerformanceReachStates < Simulink.IntEnumType 
  enumeration 
    NORMAL_REACH(0) 
    OVER_REACH(1) 
    UNDER_REACH(2) 
  end 
end 
 
classdef(Enumeration) PerformanceEncroachmentStates < 
Simulink.IntEnumType 
  enumeration 
    NO_ENCROACHMENT(0) 
    ENCROACHMENT_POSSIBLE(1) 
  end 
end 
 
classdef(Enumeration) PerformanceCoordinationStates < 
Simulink.IntEnumType 
  enumeration 
    COORDINATED(0) 
    MIS_COORDINATION(1) 
  end 
end 
 
 
Figure 6-10 Stateflow subsystem for reachability analysis showing three categories under test 
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The automaton for the first chart responsible for determining that a zone reach 
unsafe state has been reached is shown in Figure 6-11. Transition guard 
conditions rely on the adaptive algorithm reach error signal and line loading 
conditions. 
 
Figure 6-11 Reach performance Stateflow state diagram (automaton) 
Figure 6-12 shows the automaton responsible for determining whether the 
potential for reaching a load encroachment state is possible due to zone reach 
extension couple with line overload. The transition guard conditions in this case 
rely on the active settings group and the line loading condition. 
 
Figure 6-12 Load encroachment performance Stateflow state diagram 
201 
Finally, reaching a zone 2 mis-coordination state is determined in the 
automaton shown in Figure 6-13. The transition guard conditions rely on the 
active settings group and the value of the zone extension blocking signal. 
 
Figure 6-13 Adjacent line coordination performance Stateflow diagram 
6.5.2 Reachability analysis test setup and results 
As mentioned earlier, the reachability analysis subsystem is connected to key 
signals from the adaptive protection logic developed in Simulink as shown in 
Figure 6-14. The outputs from the analysis block are directly observed using the 
available scope and can be stored for offline analysis. The inputs to the system 
are QB status indications represented using a PRBS obtained from the Simulink 
signal builder. A pseudo-random binary sequence (PRBS) was used for this 
purpose as it is considered an effective means of providing exhaustive coverage 
for possible system executions [17]. The PRBS used is shown in Figure 6-15 and 
the simulation was run for 50s to exhaustively test the algorithm. 
Circuit breaker status information were also synthesised using the signal 
builder. Circuit breaker information is used to determine whether a short 
adjacent line is active. If this condition is identified and the distance zone has 
been extended, then a zone 2 mis-coordination may occur. The line loading 
signal was a threshold value based in a simulation detailed in Appendix C which 
represents the upper loading limit of the protected circuit prior to potential load 
encroachment. This is appropriate since the primary system model is absent 
from the analysis as mentioned before. 
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Figure 6-14 Structure of the Simulink test harness for performing reachability analysis 
 
 
Figure 6-15 QB states for stimulating the adaptive protection logic using a PRBS 
 
The unsafe state, their state transition conditions according to the DES 
abstraction and the unsafe state exit conditions are shown in Table 4. The ’   ‘ 
operator indicates the complement of the state. Note that SG2 is not used as 
discussed chapter 4 and 5. 
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Figure 6-16 shows the outputs from the reachability analysis subsystem in 
response to the inputs previously described. The active settings groups are also 
shown. The safety states trace indicates that unsafe states have been reached a 
number of times. These occurrences reflect the reach errors shown in the figure. 
This can be explained by the finite amount of time the adaptive logic takes to 
determine change settings when the QB state changes. Due to the short 
simulation time step used (1ms), the logic only resides in the unsafe state for a 
maximum of 1ms. In reality, this may take several cycles or as shown in chapter 
5, several seconds depending on the algorithm implementation. 
After 25s of simulation time, the inputs current is increased to cross the 
threshold such that the potential for load encroachment arises. In this case, the 
adaptive protection logic reverts to the default settings group (SG1) and does 
not attempt to extend the reach of the protective zones regardless of the QB 
mode. Consequently no reach errors occur during these mode changes. This 
condition can be observed in the automaton of Figure 6-12. 
 
Figure 6-16 Correct operation of adaptive logic indicated by safe states 
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To further test the reachability analysis implementation. A fault was introduced 
in the adaptive logic. The ability to block zone reach extensions during line 
overloads (potential load encroachment) was disabled and the same inputs as in 
the previous case were applied. 
It can be seen in Figure 6-17, that the reachability analysis has indicated that the 
system reached unsafe states on several occasions after 25s of simulation. Zone 
extension was sanctioned on several occasions due to QB mode changes when it 
should have been blocked due to line overload. It can also be seen that the logic 
dwells in these states for longer that 1ms (simulation time step). Thus, the logic 
in this case is indeed unsafe. 
 
 
Figure 6-17 Failure of adaptive logic leading to unsafe state detection 
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6.6 Discussion of reachability results and the role of formal 
approaches to the verification of adaptive protection 
functionality 
So long as the power system state can be inferred from a set of discrete 
transitions, then explicit continuous space computations will not be necessary. 
However, this assumes that the evolution of the continuous primary system 
state is not influenced by the outcome of the logic decision. Given the scope of 
the verification, this assumption is valid. This is because the verification is being 
conducted to determine whether logic actions are safe based on the 
consequences of an unsafe outcome. And these unsafe outcomes have been 
determined using the performance states   . The temporal dimension of the 
reachability analysis is also of relevance to this matter. It is necessary to identify 
the maximum time period that an adaptive protection scheme requires to 
provide a decision. Otherwise the adaptive scheme may become vulnerable to 
mal-operation if changes in the primary system occur during this time period. 
Therefore, further work is necessary to incorporate the temporal dimension 
into the hybrid model and consequent reachability analysis. 
The practical utilisation of the safety verification would be of interest to 
manufacturers and utilities dealing with adaptive protection. Although 
protection scheme developers can directly apply such verification 
methodologies on their adaptive algorithms, utility commissioning engineers 
require meaningful performance metrics without delving into the intricacies of 
system behavioural modelling. As such, it is important to migrate such 
methodologies into tools and processes that meet usability requirements of end 
users. 
The role of formal verification approaches should be complementary to 
simulation methods such as hardware in the loop testing as presented in the 
previous chapter. The challenge lies in striking an effective balance between the 
two approaches. Simulation based methods’ shortcomings become apparent 
when there is no traceability between the system requirements, the test cases 
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(inspired by scheme use cases). As such it becomes more difficult to explore the 
full extent of the scheme performance or envisage conditions not defined by the 
original test scenarios and indeed usage scenarios. In other words, simulation 
based testing can only be as comprehensive as the designed for operating 
conditions. Furthermore, as adaptive protection functions are applied to 
perform wide area functions, the process of simulation based testing becomes 
more difficult due to requirements for developing larger network models and 
the need for multiple adaptive protection devices integrated over a 
communications network. Furthermore, commissioning testing of such scheme 
becomes more difficult due to the physically expansive nature of such schemes 
and the limitations in obtaining substation outages. Thus, more emphasis can be 
placed on more formal testing approaches to offset these limitations. 
 
6.7 Chapter summary 
This chapter presented a formal method verifying the safety property of an 
adaptive protection scheme logic based on reachability analysis. This required 
modelling the scheme’s behaviour in a hybrid systems paradigm. To achieve 
this, the chapter established the minimum level of discrete abstraction of the 
state space of the system under test. The abstraction was necessarily extended, 
compared to previously proposed representations, to cater for the additional 
control loop that the adaptive logic introduces. This was followed by devising a 
reachability analysis procedure which makes use of the developed abstraction. 
Furthermore, the state space of the system under test was broken down into a 
group of invariant sets that represent operational and performance modes of 
the primary system and underlying protection scheme. Related state transitions 
were inferred without the need for computing continuous field vector within 
each state. This means that in this case, computational resources are not a 
limiting factor to conducting the analysis. 
The effectiveness of the reachability analysis in identifying potentially unsafe 
adaptive logic operation was demonstrated using an example adaptive distance 
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protection scheme. Finite time required to select between different settings, 
both in simulation and in real world deployments, meant that a temporal 
dimension must be considered during the safety assessment. The logic can only 
be deemed unsafe if it dwells (rather than enters) an unsafe state for specified 
period of time depending on the application. The reachability analysis provided 
easy to interpret safety indications when the scheme under test was subjected 
to a number of different inputs representing a range of operational 
circumstances it may be subjected to. 
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7 Thesis Conclusions and Future Work 
 
 
 
7.1 Qualitative reflection on the general hypothesis 
It has been shown through extensive simulations and critical literature review 
that an adaptive protection philosophy plays an important role in improving the 
performance of protection under flexible power system operating conditions. It 
has been shown that only through rigorous scheme modelling and 
comprehensive testing methodologies that well engineered (designed, 
implemented and tested) adaptive protection schemes can be integrated into 
the power system to perform their safety critical functions in a satisfactory 
manner with greater flexibility compared to a conventional protection 
philosophy. 
7.2 Evaluation of conventional protection performance 
The performance of distance protection for transmission circuits with 
quadrature booster (QB) transformers has been quantified under varied QB 
operating conditions and fault conditions for the first time. The distance 
protection can under-reach with increased tap position. Simulations have 
shown a maximum measured impedance error of 3.53Ω (75%) and 5.68Ω 
(64%) for boost and buck modes respectively (expressed in secondary ohms). 
The under reach only occurs for unsymmetrical faults and the maximum error 
occurs for phase to phase faults. The inherent impedance of the QB results in an 
additional offset in terms of the impedance error. Due to the coverage of the 
MHO characteristic, under reach for non-resistive faults only becomes an issue 
at around 7° and 15° phase shift for zone 2 and zone 3 respectively. Zone 1 is 
unaffected due to the position of instrument transformers – downstream of the 
QB. The protection has the potential to over-reach by up to 0.15pu (assuming 
typical QB impedance) if the QB is bypassed while backup protection zones 
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(zones 2 and 3) are set to ensure protection of the remote bus bar. This is 
usually mitigated by applying more conservative reach settings for back up 
protection zones. 
Operating a collection of QBs in a coordinated control strategy, as planned by 
National Grid, has no additional effect on the reach errors from an individual 
distance protection relay’s point of view. This has been verified by operating 
QBs in parallel in circuits with close proximity based on a section of the National 
Grid transmission network. However, static reach settings based on the 
operating ranges of QB may not always be valid for such a coordinated control 
strategy. This is because of the potential for QBs to alter their operating modes 
more regularly and operate at tap positions that the system operator may not 
have envisaged particular QBs operating at. 
The performance of loss of mains protection functions (ROCOF) has been 
quantified for different generator technologies and for different manufacturer 
implementations of these functions through extensive secondary injection 
testing. The testing showed some inadequacy of settings recommended by 
engineering recommendations ER G59/2 especially for ensuring loss of mains 
protection stability against remote disturbances. This is especially true for 
inverter-interfaced generators which require in some cases desensitising the 
ROCOF protection to 3Hz/s, rendering it ineffective for true loss of mains 
conditions. Thus ROCOF should not be used with such generators where simple 
under/over voltage and frequency protection would perform better under loss 
of mains situations. 
For a given ROCOF setting, the testing also showed that there was disparity in 
the performance between different manufacturer relays which is attributed to 
different methods in measuring frequency. Without stipulating minimum 
performance requirements for the frequency measurement algorithms, it would 
be difficult to ensure repeatability in performance across a wide range of 
manufacturer solutions. 
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7.3 Design of adaptive protection schemes 
It was shown that one of the most important design decisions made in 
developing an adaptive protection scheme (from the point of view of scheme 
verification), is the amount of flexibility that should be introduced by the 
scheme functionality. This manifested itself in the approach to choosing the 
active protection setting. Choosing active protection settings from a limited pool 
of pre-calculated settings groups is more desirable from a scheme validation 
point as opposed to using online settings calculations. The number of settings 
groups necessary is highly dependent on the protection scheme and application. 
Generally speaking, the trade-off between the simplicity and flexibility provided 
by a limited or large number of settings groups respectively is determined by 
the increase in risk of continuous settings changes due to a higher resolution 
provided by a larger number of settings groups and the additional risk of 
scheme failure because of this. Moreover, the more settings groups used, the 
less distinct the approach becomes compared to online calculations, which 
diminishes its validation advantage. 
The adaptive distance protection scheme developed in this thesis was limited by 
the maximum number of settings groups provided by the relaying platform – 
four in this case. Theoretically however, this can be expanded to provide a 
dedicated settings group for each mode of the QB and associated tap positions – 
that is up to 41 settings groups for a typical QB. The effort in validating this 
amount of settings groups becomes magnified, where in reality adjusting 
distance zone reach is always governed by error margins of about +/-5% of 
reach setting based on engineering practices and testing standards. Thus, a 
theoretical upper limit of settings groups can be applied based on this error 
margin. In this particular case, 10 settings groups have been shown to be 
sufficient. 
The operational scope of adaptive protection functionality was defined, for the 
first time in this thesis, to ensure valid performance at the design stage. This 
was achieved by designating the roles of adaptive and conventional functions. It 
was shown that adaptive protection functions are more suited to performing 
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tasks triggered by non-fault events such as system reconfiguration. Conversely, 
tasks performed during a fault transient should be preserved for conventional 
protection functions that have been configured by adaptive functionality 
beforehand – again appropriately when triggered. 
7.4 Structural and behavioural modelling of adaptive protection 
schemes 
The concept of an adaptive protection architecture (APA) was further developed 
through the definition of minimum functional elements and interfaces for each 
of its layers. This has been shown to achieve, for the first time, the following: 
 Ensured the architecture’s applicability to transmission level adaptive 
protection applications and consequently a wider application domain 
than the original conceived conceptual applications. 
 Enabled the implementation and experimental testing of an adaptive 
protection scheme (adaptive distance protection developed in the thesis) 
based on the architecture. 
 Facilitated adaptive scheme validation by providing a reference 
functional and performance specification that is independent of the 
scheme implementation. 
Furthermore, this development of the architecture concept enabled creating a 
clear distinction between what constitutes coordination and management layer 
functions. This distinction has been shown to be based on three criteria – the 
nature of information used to infer system state, protection operation time 
frames and the breadth of protection actions each layer exerts on another. 
To facilitate the performance verification of adaptive protection algorithms, a 
novel approach based on hybrid systems was used to describe its behaviour – 
that is a characterisation of its response to measured events in the protected 
system. The application of hybrid systems modelling to adaptive protection 
schemes is the first of its kind. 
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It has been shown that standard approaches to abstracting the behaviour of 
hybrid systems (discrete event system abstractions) had limitations in 
encompassing the hierarchical ‘control’ nature of adaptive protection based on 
the APA. The work reported in this thesis has been shown to overcome this 
limitation by extending the definition of these behaviour abstractions. This 
necessarily required the definition of additional interfaces and interactions 
between constituent elements of the behaviour model. 
7.5 Validation and verification of adaptive protection schemes 
The adaptive distance protection scheme developed and implemented in this 
thesis was shown, using hardware in the loop validation, to provide an 
improvement in selective reach of up to 20% of protected line impedance for 
zone 2 – an improvement limited by coordination with adjacent line protection 
zones. Thus, performance of backup protection is restored dynamically based 
on the state of the QB transformer and circuit being protected. 
The functional abstraction of the APA enabled performing unit testing of 
constituent components of the developed adaptive distance scheme as well as 
the validation of the overall scheme more effectively. This is due to the ability to 
define more clearly the functional and non-functional requirements for the 
adaptive schemes components and the expected overall scheme performance 
under varied operating conditions of the QB transformer. In other words the 
scheme requirements were more traceable and as such more confidence can be 
obtained from the adaptive scheme validation process. 
This thesis reported the first application of reachability analysis (based on the 
hybrid behavioural model) as a means of verifying the performance of adaptive 
protection schemes. The reachability analysis methodology presented in this 
thesis was demonstrated through verifying the safety property of the adaptive 
settings selection logic for the developed distance protection scheme. The 
reachability analysis methodology reported in this thesis is also novel in the 
approach to defining the boundaries of the reachable state space representing 
unsafe adaptive performance. 
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It has been demonstrated that the approach to defining the unsafe state space 
eliminated the need for explicitly computing the continuous state space of the 
underlying hybrid behavioural model provided that: 
 The continuous evolution of the primary system states are not directly 
influenced by the outcome of the adaptive setting selection logic. 
 The adaptive logic forms part of the coordination layer functionality. 
As such efficiencies in the verification process are gained. The approach to 
defining the state space is based on splitting the hybrid system state space into 
‘operational’ and ‘performance’ invariant sets through which a direct mapping 
between power system conditions and scheme performance can be made. This 
process necessitated defining the state transitions (and guard conditions) 
associated with these invariant sets. 
The adaptive scheme verification through reachability analysis has been shown 
to incorporate a temporal aspect that reflects the adaptive scheme’s finite 
response time to changes in the power system. Design and implementation 
measures can be put in place to minimise this time delay. The required 
improvements in the time response are dictated by the acceptable duration of 
power system vulnerability caused by the temporary degradation of protection 
performance levels. To better characterise this temporal aspect, it is then 
necessary to use timed automata to model the hybrid state space. 
Testing adaptive protection schemes must generally incorporate the full 
complement of simulation and formal testing methods. This is necessary to 
address inherent limitations of simulation based testing stemming from the 
design of the testing scenarios. Therefore, testing approaches stipulated by 
testing standards still hold but should be extended with approaches developed 
in the thesis to incorporate the characteristics of interactions between 
conventional and adaptive functions. More emphasis should be placed on formal 
testing as it becomes more difficult to test the full set of potential operating 
scenarios in the field during scheme commissioning – a task that is even more 
difficult when the schemes perform wide area protection functions. 
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7.6 Future work 
Interfaces and functions within the adaptive protection architecture have been 
defined. However, this can be taken a step further by using standard ways of 
describing and implementing the architecture. For instance, IEC 61499 event 
driven function blocks can be used to represent the architecture’s constituent 
functions as standard executable elements. The use of standard interfaces 
simplifies the process of porting these functions into different platforms. 
Further research is necessary to determine methods of distributing adaptive 
functionality. And the use of IEC 61499 enables such an approach as it supports 
describing distributed control functionality. 
A full suite of formal performance verification techniques can be applied with 
the aid of the behavioural model. These include determinism and observability. 
Knowledge of the current state of the adaptive logic and stimulating inputs, 
results in knowledge of its output if it is deterministic. Also, the state of the 
adaptive scheme can be identified by observing its inputs and outputs in 
relation to the behavioural model. The significance of determining these 
properties lies in offering complementary methods that can be used to verify 
the adaptive protection functions’ performance. 
Making full use of management layer functions necessitates identifying system 
integrity protection schemes (SIPS) that would benefit from adaptation in their 
performance. Moreover, techniques of establishing the system state and its 
impact on system protection performance must be developed. Changing the 
configuration of system protection, in this case, requires greater levels of 
coordination to avoid conflict in performance objectives between coexisting 
system protection schemes. The developed hybrid system model will prove to 
be a powerful approach to understanding this complex problem and 
reachability analysis is one of the tools that should be used to determine the 
safety of these interactions. 
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Appendix A  Test transmission network model data and 
protection settings 
Table A-1 details the transmission network model substation data in terms of 
voltage, fault level and derived source impedance (Zs). This is obtained from the 
NG seven year statement for 2010/2011. The parameters of the distance 
protection model are summarised in Table A-2 and Table A-3. Finally, the 
transmission network line data is detailed in Table A-4. This data was also 
obtained from the NG seven year statement, apart from zero sequence 
parameters where typical values were used. 
Table A-1 Substation data for test transmission network 
Substation Voltage (kV) Fault level (kA) X/R Zs (Ω) <Zs(°) 
RATS 400 38.52 12 5.9953 85.24 
WBUR 400 39.66 12 5.823 85.24 
HIGM 400 30.8 12 7.4981 85.24 
GREN 400 31.64 12 7.299 85.24 
WILE 400 38.22 12 6.0424 85.24 
STAY 400 28 12 8.2479 85.24 
COTT 400 46.22 12 4.9965 85.24 
 
Table A-2 Distance relay model configuration and related data 
Protection parameters Configuration 
RCA 84.67° 
k0 calculation Automatic 
CT ratio 1000/1 A 
CVT ratio 400kV/110V 
Tripping 3 pole 
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Table A-3 Distance relay model zone reach and delay settings 
Protection zone Zone reach (secondary Ω) Time delay (s) 
Zone 1 0.9943 0 
Zone 2 1.732 0.5 
Zone 3 7.912 1 
 
Table A-4 National Grid network section data used for distance reach studies 
Circuits Length (km) R1(Ω/km) R0(Ω/km) X1(Ω/km) X0(Ω/km) B1(µS/km) B0(µS/km) 
WBUR-HIGM 15 0.0275 0.1 0.2956 0.78 5.66 2.28 
HIGM-RATS 65 0.0277 0.1 0.2971 0.78 4.38 2.28 
WBUR-GREN 136 0.0271 0.1 0.2955 0.78 3.85 2.28 
GREN-STAY 103 0.0278 0.1 0.2977 0.78 3.83 2.28 
COTT-STAY 27 0.028 0.1 0.2975 0.78 3.83 2.28 
STAY-RATS 43 0.0277 0.1 0.2975 0.78 3.83 2.28 
RATS-WILE 22 0.026 0.1 0.2956 0.78 4.81 2.28 
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Appendix B  Adaptive Distance Protection Simulink Model 
This appendix briefly presents and describes the Simulink model and associated 
subsystems used to develop the adaptive distance protection scheme. 
B.1 Complete subsystem 
Figure B-1 shows the four subsystems constituting the full Simulink model. 
These represent the coordination layer and management layer functions of the 
adaptive protection architecture. An event generator subsystem is used to 
generate signals for testing the model. The reachability analysis subsystem 
contains the logic and Stateflow charts for conducting the safety verification 
presented in chapter 6. 
 
Figure B-1 Full high level Simulink model showing constituent subsystems 
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B.2 Event generator 
The signal generator shown in Figure B-2 is used to generate events and signals 
for testing the complete Simulink model. Examples of the waveforms generated 
are shown in chapter 6 (Figure 6-15). Some of the signals are exported to the 
Matlab workspace for offline analysis. Furthermore, the signal ‘Irms’ is imported 
from the Matlab workspace to simulate transmission circuit loading to test the 
load encroachment scenario as explained in chapter 6 and Appendix C. The 
current signal is obtained from an RTDS simulation (as detailed in Appendix C) 
in a COMTRADE format and the raw data is imported to Matlab. 
The signal generator block provides the ability to define pseudo random binary 
sequences that represent the QB states. This was used to stimulate the adaptive 
settings selection logic in the model as explained in chapter 6. 
 
Figure B-2 Signal generator for testing the model 
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B.3 Coordination layer functions 
Figure B-3 shows the overall coordination layer subsystem. This consists mainly of four functions that reflect the adaptive 
protection architecture definition. These are the ‘state acquisition’, ‘protection performance verification’, ‘protection setting select’ 
and the ‘setting apply and verify’ functions. In addition, a ‘reachability analysis signal mapping’ subsystem is created to propagate 
relevant signals to the reachability analysis subsystem. Some signals are monitored using a scope for troubleshooting. 
 
Figure B-3 Coordination layer subsystems 
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B.3.1 State acquisition subsystem 
Stateflow charts have been used to determine the state of the QB and 
transmission circuit loading as shown in Figure B-4. Status measurements from 
the event generator subsystem are fed into the charts. When the model is 
deployed on the prototype target, the signals are obtained from the RTDS 
simulation. The tap position is propagated to the next subsystem (protection 
performance evaluation) directly. 
 
Figure B-4 Primary system state acquisition subsystems 
The Stateflow chart ‘QB_STATES’ is shown in Figure B-5. The ‘qb_mode’ and 
‘qb_bypass’ signals are used to determine the state of the QB (i.e. boost, buck or 
bypass). The QB states are enumerated throughout the model to simplify signal 
exchange and logic statements involving the QB state variables. 
 
Figure B-5 Stateflow chart to determine QB state based on status measurements 
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Figure B-6 shows the Stateflow chart used to determine the state of the 
transmission circuit. Circuit breaker position status indications determine 
whether the line is energised or not. The level of line current flowing through 
the circuit determines whether the line is overloaded. Line overloading is 
defined based on the potential for load encroachment to occur as explained in 
Appendix C. 
 
Figure B-6 Stateflow chart used to determine line loading state based on status measurements 
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B.3.2 Protection performance verification subsystem 
This subsystem (Figure B-7) calculates the impedance error       based on the equation presented in chapter 3, section 3.4.5. The 
equation is implemented as Matlab code within the Matlab function block shown in the figure (the code is presented below). The 
associated variables presented in Table 3-8 are either hard coded in this subsystem or obtained through lookup tables. 
 
Figure B-7 Protection performance verification subsystem 
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function z_error = fcn(z_min, z_offset,length_per, alpha) 
%#codegen 
  
z_error = (z_min + (z_offset * length_per))*alpha; 
 
B.3.3 Protection setting select subsystem 
In this subsystem (Figure B-8), the impedance error calculated in the previous 
subsystem is compared with a predetermined threshold   as discussed in 
chapters 4 and 5. If it is exceeded, then a change in settings is initiated. 
The ‘block_change’ Matlab function block prevents the extension of the adaptive 
protection zone if there is a risk of load encroachment. Furthermore, the 
‘remote_coordination’ Matlab function block sends a signal to a remote distance 
relay to extend its zone 2 reach if the remote line is short. Note that the remote 
zone extension functionality is not implemented in the prototype and is only a 
placeholder for future improvements. The associated code for the Matlab 
functions is shown below. 
 
Figure B-8 Protection settings selection subsystem 
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function setting_group = block_change(qb_state, loading, 
change_enable) 
%#codegen 
  
if(change_enable == 1) 
    if (loading == 1) 
       setting_group = 1;     
    else 
       setting_group = double(qb_state); 
    end 
else 
    setting_group = 1; 
end 
 
function extend_z2 = remote_coordination(sg_select) 
%#codegen 
  
if (sg_select ~= 1) 
    extend_z2 = 1; 
else 
    extend_z2 = 0; 
end 
 
B.3.4 Setting apply and verify subsystem 
This subsystem (Figure B-9) implements the low level setting changes by 
manipulating the appropriate bits to be communicated to the protection relay. 
Further details can be found in chapter 5, section 5.5.4. 
 
Figure B-9 Setting activation and verification subsystem 
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B.3.5 Reachability analysis signal mapping subsystem 
The subsystem shown in Figure B-10 propagates the ‘line_loading’, 
‘existing_setting’ and ‘remote_extension’ signals to the reachability analysis 
subsystem. Moreover, based on the ‘qb_state’ and ‘existing_setting’ signals, a 
new signal is generated (‘reach_error’) for use by the reachability subsystem. 
This new signal gives a numerical indication on whether the distance zone reach 
(defined by the existing setting) is under reaching, over reaching or neither. The 
stateflow chart (Figure B-11) and Matlab code used to generate this signal are 
shown below. 
 
Figure B-10 Reachability analysis signal mapping subsystem 
 
function existing_zone_reach = fcn(existing_setting) 
%#codegen 
  
switch(existing_setting) 
    case 1 
        existing_zone_reach = 1; 
    case 3 
        existing_zone_reach = 1.1; 
    case 4 
        existing_zone_reach = 1.3; 
    otherwise 
        existing_zone_reach = 1; 
end 
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Figure B-11 Staeflow chart mapping QB state and protection setting for reachability analysis 
B.4 Management layer functions 
As mentioned in chapter 5, the implemented management layer functions are 
restricted to an ‘enable’ logic. The value of the logic must be set to ‘1’ in order 
for the coordination layer functions to select a settings group other than the 
default one. This logic is propagated to the coordination layer as shown in 
Figure B-12. 
 
Figure B-12 Management layer functionality 
B.5 Reachability analysis subsystem 
Figure B-13 shows the reachability analysis sub system. This has already been 
discussed in detail in chapter 6, section 6.5.1. 
 
Figure B-13 Reachability analysis subsystem 
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Appendix C  Load encroachment test scenario 
Load encroachment was discussed in the thesis as a potential risk when 
adaptively extending zone 3. Moreover, the performance of the developed 
distance protection scheme during a potential load encroachment scenario was 
verified using reachability analysis. The network model and associated data to 
achieve load encroachment are included in this appendix. 
Load encroachment is usually associated with networks long lines. So it was 
difficult to create such a scenario with the network used for testing in chapter 3. 
Therefore, the network shown in Figure C-14 was used to record the current 
threshold post load encroachment used in the reachability analysis. The data for 
the network model is shown Table C-5. 
 
Figure C-14 Transmission circuit used for load encroachment 
 
Table C-5 Transmission network model data 
Line Impedances Line 
Configuration 
CT, VT Ratios 
Z1 = 0.027+j0.296 
Ω/km 
Four single 
circuit segments 
CT ratio =  
1000:1A 
Z0 = 0.1+j0.439 
Ω/km 
Segment length 
= 200km  
VT ratio  = 
400kV/110V 
 
A load encroachment scenario is created by increasing the protected circuit (C-
D) through QB boosting action. This is then followed by the disconnection of the 
parallel circuit (A-B) which forces more power through the protected circuit. 
The impedance seen by the relay before and after load encroachment is 
illustrated in Figure C-15. 
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Figure C-15 Mho characteristic showing impedance pre and post load encroachment 
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